XXIX — Who enters, who stays, who votes
Chapitre XXIX
WHO ENTERS, WHO STAYS, WHO VOTES
Who can enter? Who can stay? Who can vote? These questions are fundamental, especially in a system where voting is linked to contribution.
29.1 — Quota Immigration Falls Under Parliament (Census)
Immigration quotas: how many people can enter each year. It’s a question of economic and budget impact—infrastructure, services, labor market.
Economic entry criteria: work immigration, investors, family reunification with resource conditions. Those who pay decide who can come contribute.
Senate veto. However, the Senate retains veto power over immigration policies, to safeguard national identity or impose societal conditions (language mastery, respect for fundamental values, etc.).
The quota immigrant enters directly into the labor market or an Autonomous Collective (self-funded reintegration structures). No specific aid, no particular advantage. They are treated exactly like a citizen in the same situation.
29.2 — Asylum Rights Fall Under the Senate (Equal)
Asylum rights are constitutionalized (modification at 4/5 of each chamber). It’s a question of human dignity—protecting someone whose life is threatened is a fundamental right.
Procedures are strict and ironclad: precise criteria, regulated deadlines, no infinite extension. Asylum rights are not disguised immigration.
The asylum seeker enters either the labor market or an Autonomous Collective (self-funded reintegration structures). If they refuse both, they lose asylum rights. No exception.
No specific aid, no particular advantage. The asylum seeker is treated exactly like a citizen in the same situation. The system is therefore budget-neutral—that’s why the Senate alone has jurisdiction, with no Parliament veto possible.
29.3 — Naturalization and Denaturalization Fall Under the Senate
Naturalization: becoming a citizen means acquiring civic rights. The Senate defines conditions—duration of residence, tax contribution, clean criminal record, language mastery.
Denaturalization: removing citizenship is a serious infringement of a fundamental right. The Senate alone can do it, in exceptional cases (terrorism, treason), with strict procedural guarantees.
29.4 — Consistency with Census Voting
Voting is reserved for citizens. A resident, even if they contribute fiscally, does not vote before naturalization. The right to vote is not a supermarket you enter by paying. Naturalization is the entry threshold into the political community—it gives access to census voting (Parliament), equal voting (Senate), and elective functions.
29.5 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The Canadian Express Entry System (1967/2015-present)
Canada was the world pioneer of points-based immigration, with a system introduced in 1967 and modernized in 2015 under the name Express Entry [153][154]. This system selects economic immigrants according to objective and measurable criteria, without quotas by nationality.
What Worked
Objective selection. The Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) awards points according to age, education, professional experience, language skills (English/French), and job offers in Canada [153]. Maximum 1200 points. No subjective judgment, no discrimination by origin.
Flexible quotas. The government adjusts the cutoff score according to economic needs. In times of labor shortage, the threshold drops. In times of surplus, it rises. Rapid adaptation to circumstances [154].
Processing speed. Express Entry processes 80% of applications in less than 6 months, compared to years in other countries. Administrative efficiency attracts talent with other options.
Successful economic integration. Immigrants selected by points have higher employment rates and incomes than other immigration categories [153]. The system selects those who will contribute.
International attractiveness. Canada is regularly ranked among the preferred destinations for qualified migrants. The points system contributes: it’s perceived as fair and transparent.
What’s Problematic
Sectoral concentration. The system favors certain profiles (IT, health, engineering) at the expense of other sectors in shortage (crafts, agriculture). Points don’t capture all economic needs [154].
Deskilling. Despite high diplomas, some immigrants don’t work in their field (doctors become drivers). Canadian professional orders don’t always recognize foreign qualifications.
Dependence on labor market. Job offer points favor large companies able to navigate the LMIA system. SMEs struggle to recruit abroad.
No cultural filter. The system is purely economic. It doesn’t measure adherence to values, willingness to integrate, or mastery of social codes.
Invisible queue. Candidates with excellent scores can wait years if their profile is common. The system is competitive, not first-come first-served.
What We Keep from the Canadian Model
- The points selection principle: objective and measurable criteria
- Quota flexibility: adaptation to economic circumstances
- Administrative efficiency: rapid application processing
- Transparency: each candidate knows their score and chances
What We Improve
- Senate veto on cultural criteria: our system allows the Senate to impose societal conditions (language, values) that the Canadian system doesn’t integrate
- Integration through Autonomous Collectives: immigrants without immediate employment enter an AC, not public assistance
- No deskilling by the system: immigrants enter the real labor market, not an administrative purgatory of diploma recognition
What We Don’t Keep
- Absence of cultural filter: our Senate can impose integration criteria
- Federal centralization: our system can decline quotas by region according to local needs
- LMIA complexity: our system simplifies foreign recruitment for businesses