XXVIII — The head of state
Chapitre XXVIII
THE HEAD OF STATE: SYMBOL AND CONCILIATOR
Every political system needs a unifying figure. Someone who embodies the country beyond partisan divides. Someone who can oil the wheels when institutions creak. But this figure must not have real power—otherwise they become a political actor like others, with their interests, allies, and enemies.
28.1 — The role: conciliator and guardian
The head of state—president or monarch—has no executive power. They do not govern. Their functions:
Representation. They embody the country abroad, receive ambassadors, represent national unity at ceremonies.
Facilitating government formation. Belgian-style, they consult parties after elections, appoint an informateur (to probe coalition possibilities), then a formateur (to negotiate). They oil the wheels without deciding. The Prime Minister is designated by Parliament—the Head of State acknowledges this choice and facilitates the process.
Conciliation. In case of institutional crisis, they can advise, facilitate negotiations between powers. Their experience and neutrality make them a natural mediator. They oil the wheels without holding the steering wheel.
Referendum triggering. This is their only real power. If they deem a law poses a serious problem—even after validation by the Constitutional Council—they can trigger a referendum for the people to decide. This power gives them moral weight: when they speak, they have a weapon. But it’s a limited power: they don’t decide, they ask the people to decide. And if they abuse it, they risk their position (recall or forced abdication).
Re-referral to the Constitutional Council. After a law is validated by the CC, the Head of State can request a reexamination if they believe a point was insufficiently examined. Their longevity gives them valuable institutional memory. The CC reexamines and decides definitively.
Pardon proposal. The Head of State can propose pardon for a convicted person. It’s a safety valve when justice is too slow to correct itself. But they don’t decide alone.
The pardon jury. A jury examines the file and decides. It is composed mainly of citizens and jurists drawn by lot, with participation from judges of the original trial and the Head of State. Deliberations are private, jurors anonymous, vote secret. This composition ensures the people dominate the decision while making participants accountable. The details of composition and weightings are presented in Appendix I.
If the jury grants pardon, the person is released or their sentence annulled. But pardon does not erase the judgment—it suspends the sentence. Complete rehabilitation (record expungement, recognition of innocence) goes through trial revision, which remains possible and even encouraged.
Emergency procedure. If justice recognizes flagrant new evidence (DNA, key witness, real perpetrator’s confession), it can immediately suspend the sentence pending revision, without waiting for the pardon jury. The judicial path and pardon path coexist—the faster one applies.
What they don’t do. They don’t sign laws (the CC attests their conformity). They don’t appoint the Prime Minister (Parliament designates them). They have no veto. They don’t govern.
Figure 28.1 — Head of State powers
28.2 — Presidential version
Long term: 10 years. Term length allows accumulating experience, seeing several governments pass, becoming institutional memory.
Equal direct suffrage. One person, one vote. The president is the symbol of national unity—all citizens weigh equally to choose them. This is not a budget question, it’s a question of collective identity.
Re-electable without limit. If the people want to renew a good president for 30 years, that’s their right. Longevity is earned, not guaranteed.
Recallable. The standard mechanism applies: recall booth, threshold (for example 55%), delay proportional to severity. A president who fails gravely can be dismissed by the people, without waiting 10 years.
28.3 — Monarchical version
Hereditary. According to the country’s dynastic rules. Continuity is guaranteed by lineage.
Forced abdication possible. The monarch can be forced to abdicate by:
- A 2/3 referendum, OR
- A double 4/5 vote in each chamber (Parliament AND Senate separately)
Abdication benefits the next in line of succession. This is not abolition of the monarchy—it’s a change of holder.
Abolition of monarchy. To abolish the monarchical institution itself, it requires:
- A constitutional modification at 4/5 of each chamber, AND
- A 3/5 referendum
It’s a double lock. The monarchy can only be abolished by massive and lasting consensus.
28.4 — The head of state’s budget
Whether president or monarch, their budget is determined by Parliament (census). It’s a budget question like any other.
This budget includes:
- The personal allowance of the head of state
- Direct heirs (in case of monarchy)
- The protocol cabinet (advisors, secretariat)
- Official residences and their maintenance
The head of state does not set their own allowance. Neither do elected officials—any modification goes through the usual rules (referendum for increases).
28.5 — Adaptability as strength
Libertarian Libertarianism does not demand a blank slate. It adapts to each country’s history.
A country has a monarchy? It can be preserved, in protocol version. A country has a presidential tradition? It can be maintained, with appropriate safeguards.
What matters is the architecture of real powers: census Parliament, equal Senate, locking mechanisms, permanent recall. The protocol head of state grafts onto this architecture without modifying it.
Certain parameters are not fixed here. They depend on cultural, historical, local choices:
- The list of fundamental rights (Senate competence): defined by each country’s constituent assembly, according to its values
- The base of the vacant housing tax: cadastral value, fictitious market rent, or other—to be defined locally
- The head of state regime: presidential or monarchical, according to the country’s history
- Thresholds and percentages: all figures in this document are illustrative, exact settings depend on local calibration
This is a strength, not a weakness. The system is not dogmatic. It proposes an architecture, not a single answer. Peoples keep their calibration freedom. It respects traditions, cultures, identities. It does not ask peoples to renounce their history to embrace liberty. It tells them: “Keep what unites you. Change what enslaves you.”
28.6 — Case study (empirical example): The Belgian government formation system (1831-present)
Belgium offers the most sophisticated model of facilitator head of state [119][120]. The king does not govern but plays a crucial role in coalition formation, through the figures of informateur and formateur. This system has managed one of Europe’s most fragmented democracies.
What worked
Neutral mediation. The king consults all parties after elections, listens, synthesizes. Their neutrality allows everyone to express themselves without losing face. They successively appoint an informateur (who probes possibilities) then a formateur (who negotiates the coalition) [119].
Procedural flexibility. The king can appoint several successive informateurs, change track, combine approaches. No rigid procedure—case-by-case adaptation.
Institutional memory. Belgian kings (Baudouin, Albert II, Philippe) have accumulated decades of experience. They know the actors, the red lines, the possible compromises. This memory is irreplaceable.
Non-partisan legitimacy. The king not having been elected, they have no electoral agenda. Their neutrality is credible. Parties trust them as mediator.
Extreme crisis management. Belgium has experienced 541-day government formations (2010-2011) without institutional collapse [120]. The king maintained dialogue throughout the crisis.
What poses problems
Extreme slowness. Belgian government formations are among the longest in the world. 541 days in 2010-2011, 652 days in 2019-2020 [120]. The country can remain months without a fully empowered government.
Negotiation opacity. Royal consultations are secret. Citizens don’t know what’s being negotiated. Transparency is lacking.
Dependence on king’s quality. A competent king oils the wheels. A mediocre king can worsen blockages. The system depends on the person, not the mechanism.
No sanction power. The king can facilitate, not decide. If parties refuse to agree, they cannot force an agreement. They have no ultimate weapon.
Fragility of monarchical consensus. The Belgian monarchy is contested by part of Flanders. Its legitimacy is not universal.
What we keep from the Belgian model
- The facilitator role: the head of state consults, appoints informateur and formateur, oils the wheels
- Neutrality: no partisan agenda, no involvement in substantive negotiations
- Flexibility: procedure adaptation case by case
- Institutional memory: longevity of head of state as an asset
What we improve
- Referendum power: our head of state has a weapon—they can submit a question to the people. The Belgian king doesn’t have this power
- Recallability: our president is recallable, our monarch can be forced to abdicate. The Belgian king has no popular sanction mechanism
- Transparency: consultations can be public or at least their conclusions made public
- Time limit: our system provides unblocking mechanisms (budget renewal, automatic elections) that Belgium doesn’t have
What we don’t adopt
- Total opacity of royal consultations
- Absence of referendum power: our head of state can appeal to the people
- Absence of unblocking mechanism: our system doesn’t tolerate 541 days without government