XXIV — Local governance

Chapitre XXIV

LOCAL GOVERNANCE: ADAPTING PRINCIPLES TO SCALE

The asymmetric bicameralism described in chapter XXIII is designed for a central state. At the local scale—municipalities, inter-municipalities, regions—maintaining two distinct assemblies is often an unjustifiable budgetary luxury.

This chapter proposes architectures adapted to local authorities, preserving founding principles without imposing the cost of a second chamber.

24.1 — Structuring Principles

Whatever architecture is chosen, the same principles apply:

1. Civic equality for fundamental rights. Decisions touching local liberties (public space regulations, municipal police, residents’ rights) are made by equal suffrage. One citizen = one vote.

2. Contributive logic for money questions. Budgetary decisions—local taxation, investments, subsidies—are made by census vote, weighted by local tax contribution.

3. Permanent recall. Local elected officials remain recallable according to the same mechanisms as at national level. No blank check.

4. Budget deadlock mechanism. In case of non-adoption of the local budget, the same rules apply: automatic 10% reduction, feeding a local catch-up fund, management in standby.

5. Risk encapsulation. Each authority assumes its decisions. No automatic bailout by the higher level.

24.2 — Option A: The Variable-Geometry Single Council

A single assembly, but whose voting modalities change according to the nature of the decision. This architecture draws on work on measuring voting power and double-majority systems [144][146].

Operation

The local council is elected by mixed suffrage: each elected official has an equal weight (fixed, identical for all) and a census weight (proportional to their voters’ tax contribution). Voting and collective decision theory provides tools for calibrating these weightings [145].

At each vote, the session chair announces the applicable mode:

• Equal vote: each councilor weighs 1. Simple or qualified majority depending on subject.
• Census vote: each councilor weighs according to their contributive legitimacy. Majority calculated in points, not heads.

Domains of Competence

Advantages

• Economy. One assembly, one venue, one staff.
• Simplicity. Same elected officials, same debates. Only the count changes.
• Transparency. All votes are public. Citizens immediately see which mode applies.

Limits

• Possible confusion. The dual weight can disorient voters.
• Complex calculation. Census weight must be recalculated at each election, even annually if tax contribution evolves.

24.3 — Option B: Dedicated Contributive Representation

Two bodies, but one is light: a specialized budget committee.

Operation

The local council is elected by equal suffrage. It deliberates on all non-budgetary questions.

The budget committee is composed of the same elected officials, but sits separately with census weight. It deliberates exclusively on budget, local taxation, and major expenditures.

Legally, it’s the same body sitting in two distinct formations. No second election, no second building, no second staff.

Operating Rules

• The budget committee is convened specifically for money questions.
• Its agenda is limited: initial budget, supplementary budget, administrative accounts, taxation, loans, investments beyond a threshold.
• The local council retains all other competences.

Advantages

• Institutional clarity. Two formations = two visible logics.
• Specialization. Budget debates are isolated, with their own majority rules.
• Legal compatibility. Easier to integrate into existing legal frameworks (plenary formation vs committee).

Limits

• Procedural burden. Two convocations, two minutes, two deliberations.
• Friction risk. Council decisions may have budgetary implications that the committee refuses to fund.

24.4 — The Local Veto Mechanism

Whatever the option, a cross-veto applies:

• If an equal decision has significant budgetary impact, it must be validated by census vote (or by the budget committee).
• If a budgetary decision affects local fundamental rights, it must be validated by equal vote (or by the council in equal formation).

The trigger threshold is defined locally (for example: any impact greater than 1% of annual budget).

24.5 — Local Budget Deadlock

In case of non-adoption of budget within legal deadlines:

1. Automatic renewal. Previous year’s budget is renewed, reduced by 10%.
2. Catch-up fund feeding. The difference feeds a frozen local fund.
3. No state intervention. The higher level doesn’t bail out. The authority assumes.
4. Unblocking. As soon as a budget is passed, the catch-up fund is reinjected.

This mechanism discourages blocking without resorting to external supervision.

24.6 — Choice Criteria Between Options

Neither option is intrinsically superior. Choice depends on context: territory size, political culture, social acceptability, available resources.

24.7 — What Is Constitutionalized

• The dual logic principle: equal for rights, census for money.
• The budget deadlock mechanism: renewal -10%, catch-up fund.
• Recallability of local elected officials.
• Risk encapsulation: no automatic bailout.

Exact modalities (Option A or B, thresholds, procedures) fall under organic law or local regulation.

This chapter offers a catalog of options, not a single solution. Context will decide.