XXIII — Two chambers, two logics

Chapitre XXIII

TWO CHAMBERS, TWO LOGICS

Not all decisions are of the same nature. Money questions and fundamental rights questions do not follow the same logic. We need two chambers with distinct election methods, with asymmetric competences.

23.1 — Parliament: The Chamber of Power

Parliament is elected by census vote, according to the rules described previously. It is the system’s central chamber. It has jurisdiction over:

• The budget: expenditures, revenues, financial arbitrations. Parliament operates within a closed envelope (mandatory surplus, levy ceiling)
• The government: Parliament invests and overthrows the government. The Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament alone
• Increasing the tax rate: by two-thirds majority. Those who pay decide to pay more
• All ordinary laws that do not affect fundamental liberties

23.2 — The Senate: The Chamber of Protection

The Senate is elected by equal suffrage. Each citizen weighs the same. The Senate has jurisdiction over:

• Societal laws: everything touching fundamental rights and liberties, defined in a closed constitutional list. Right to life, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, physical integrity, civic rights, family…
• Decreasing the tax rate: by two-thirds majority. Protecting everyone’s property, rich and poor alike

The Senate does NOT participate in government investiture. It cannot overthrow the Prime Minister. Its role is defensive: protecting liberties, not governing.

23.3 — Why Parliament Is More Stable

Census Parliament is structurally protected against blocking:

• Rich voters are generally more educated, less impulsive
• It’s their money at stake—they have an interest in the system working
• Black voting triggers the blocking mechanism (-10% budget)—large contributors lose the most in absolute value
• Weight proportional to contribution dilutes demagogues’ influence

The equal-suffrage Senate is more vulnerable to calls for black voting. But it’s less serious: the Senate doesn’t vote the budget, doesn’t invest the government. A blocked Senate puts liberty protection on pause, but doesn’t paralyze the country.

The asymmetry is intentional. The weak point (Senate) is where consequences are lesser. The strong point (Parliament) is where consequences are serious. The system places its resilience where it’s most necessary.

23.4 — The Veto Mechanism

If the Senate votes a societal law that has budgetary impact, Parliament can veto. But it must demonstrate this impact. The burden of proof lies with it.

Facing the veto, the Senate has three options: reformulate the law to make it budget-neutral, reduce the budgetary impact and retry, or convince Parliament to fund within the existing envelope.

23.5 — The Reverse Veto

If Parliament votes a budgetary law with societal implications—touching fundamental rights—the Senate can oppose it. This prevents, for example, Parliament from voting forced euthanasia for budgetary reasons.

23.6 — The Classification Criterion

How to distinguish societal from budgetary? Through a closed constitutional list of societal domains. Everything in the list falls under the Senate. Everything with budgetary impact falls under Parliament or requires its agreement.

The discriminating criterion is simple: is there budgetary impact, yes or no?

23.7 — Persistent Legislative Deadlock Between Chambers

When a text is vetoed (in either direction) and no agreement is reached, legislative deadlock is declared. The following rules apply:

Automatic Trigger

Legislative deadlock is established when:

1. A text has undergone three shuttles without identical adoption by both chambers; or
2. One chamber issues a formal veto without counter-proposal within 60 days; or
3. 180 days have elapsed since initial filing without adoption.

The deadlock finding is automatic, without intervention by a third body. Each chamber’s secretariat records dates; triggering results from the calendar.

Immediate Effects of Deadlock

Upon deadlock finding:

1. Status quo prevails. Existing law remains in force. Neither chamber can unilaterally impose modification.

2. Extension freeze. Any new expenditure, any new commitment, any creation of new rights related to the blocked text’s domain are suspended. Only renewal of existing is authorized.

3. Prorated reduction. If deadlock concerns a text with budgetary impact, credits allocated to the concerned domain are reduced by 0.83% per month (i.e., 10% per year, prorated). The difference feeds a sectoral catch-up fund, distinct from the general budget, frozen until deadlock exit.

4. Symmetry of consequences. Deadlock effects apply regardless of which chamber initiated the veto. No chamber can block without suffering the same restrictions as the other.

Escalation and Political Sanction

1. Beyond 12 cumulative months of deadlock on the same text or set of related texts: automatic dissolution of both chambers and general elections within 90 days.

2. Cumulation is counted by legislature. If deadlock ceases then resumes on the same subject, delays add up.

3. Both chambers are dissolved simultaneously. Neither survives the other. The voter decides.

Exiting Deadlock

Deadlock ends when:

1. Both chambers adopt an identical text; or
2. One chamber withdraws its veto by express simple majority vote; or
3. New elections produce a composition allowing agreement.

Upon deadlock exit, the sectoral catch-up fund is released and allocated to the concerned domain, under control of the competent chamber.

Guiding Principle

Deadlock has a cost for everyone. It cannot serve as a cost-free obstruction strategy. Whoever blocks deteriorates services, triggers elections, and exposes themselves to voter judgment. The mechanism requires no arbiter, no judge of good faith: it relies on deadlines, counters, and automatic consequences.

23.8 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The British House of Lords (1911-present)

The United Kingdom offers the oldest and most studied example of asymmetric bicameralism [108][109]. Since the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, the House of Lords has lost its absolute veto right in favor of a mere delaying power—creating a constitutional asymmetry between the two chambers.

What Worked

Specialization by domain. The House of Lords cannot block “money bills” (financial bills). This regime is formalized in the Parliament Act 1911 [117], which explicitly frames the asymmetry between chambers on financial matters [118]. These texts, certified by the Commons Speaker, become law after one month even without Lords agreement [108]. The budget thus escapes all bicameral blocking.

Suspensive, not absolute veto. For other laws, Lords can delay a text by one year maximum. If Commons persists, the text passes. This allows reflection without paralysis [109].

Expertise and revision. Lords, not subject to electoral pressure, examine texts in detail. They propose technical amendments often accepted by Commons. Effective “chamber of reflection” function.

Distinct legitimacies. Commons derives legitimacy from universal suffrage. Lords (since 1999, mainly life peers) derive theirs from expertise and experience. Two logics coexist.

Remarkable stability. The system has functioned for over a century without major institutional crisis, despite very different Lords compositions (hereditary, then appointed).

What’s Problematic

Weak democratic legitimacy. Lords are not elected. Their delaying power is tolerated, but any extension attempt would be contested [109]. The system relies on Lords’ self-limitation.

Arbitrary composition. Peers are appointed by the Prime Minister, creating partisan nomination risk. No objective entry criteria.

Incomplete asymmetry. The “money bill” vs other laws distinction is sometimes blurry. Hybrid texts create certification tensions [108].

No exclusive competence. Lords have no reserved domain where their voice is preponderant. They can delay, never impose.

What We Keep from the British Model

• The budget/non-budget distinction: financial questions fall under one chamber
• Asymmetric veto: one chamber can definitively block, the other only delay
• Functional specialization: each chamber has a distinct role
• Proven stability over more than a century

What We Improve

• Two democratic legitimacies: our Senate is elected by equal suffrage, not appointed. Both chambers have popular legitimacy, but different. Bicameralisms have already articulated two different electoral legitimacies: several 19th-century Australian upper houses were elected on a property franchise, while the lower house relied on broader suffrage, institutionalizing distinct representation without eliminating election [112]. Documented example: the 1856 South Australian Constitution establishes two elected chambers, one on “property suffrage” (upper house) and the other on very broad male franchise (lower house) [113][114]. The imperial framework enabling creation of bicameral parliaments in Australian colonies explicitly deals with franchise qualifications, showing that dissociation of electoral bases between chambers was among contemplated constitutional options [116].
• Domain reserved to Senate: fundamental rights fall under Senate alone, not just a suspensive veto
• Clear criterion: budgetary impact = Parliament; fundamental rights = Senate. No gray zone
• Mutual veto on encroachments: Senate can block a budgetary law touching liberties; Parliament can block a societal law that costs

What We Don’t Keep

• The unelected chamber: our Senate is elected, by equal suffrage
• Mere delaying power: our Senate has real blocking power in its domain
• Political appointment: no partisan nomination in our system

23.9 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #2: American Bicameralism (1789-present)

The United States invented modern bicameralism with the “Grand Compromise” of 1787 [110][109]. The House of Representatives represents the people (proportional to population), the Senate represents states (two senators per state, regardless of size).

What Worked

Constitutional stability. The American Constitution is the oldest written constitution still in force [110]. 235 years of continuous operation, despite a civil war and major crises.

Protection of territorial minorities. The Senate gives equal weight to Wyoming (600,000 inhabitants) and California (40 million). Small states cannot be crushed by large ones [109].

Reciprocal veto. Any law must be adopted by both chambers. Equal bicameralism forces compromise between different legitimacies.

Legislative shuttle. Texts go back and forth between chambers until convergence. This process improves law quality, even if it slows them.

Confirmation of appointments. The Senate confirms judges, ambassadors, and cabinet members. This counter-power limits presidential arbitrariness.

What’s Problematic

Structural blocking (“gridlock”). Different majorities in the two chambers regularly paralyze the system [111]. Budget “shutdown” has become routine.

Rural over-representation. The Senate gives disproportionate weight to sparsely populated rural states. 50 senators can represent 18% of the population [111].

Filibuster. The 60-vote rule in the Senate (to close debate) creates a de facto supermajority threshold. A minority of 41 senators can block any legislation.

No conflict resolution mechanism. In case of persistent disagreement between chambers, there’s no automatic procedure. Blocking can last indefinitely.

Polarization. The bicameral system doesn’t prevent partisan polarization. Both chambers are often as divided as each other.

What We Keep from the American Model

• Authentic bicameralism: two chambers with real powers
• Reciprocal veto: neither chamber can impose alone
• Minority protection: one chamber can defend specific interests
• Confirmation of appointments: counter-power over executive

What We Improve

• Functional asymmetry: our Parliament manages budget, our Senate protects rights. Not two equivalent chambers
• Resolution mechanism: joint committee and status quo avoid permanent blocking
• No filibuster: simple or qualified majority depending on subject, no structural blocking minority
• Two distinct legitimacies: census vs equal, not territorial vs proportional

What We Don’t Keep

• Equal bicameralism: our asymmetry avoids paralysis
• Territorial representation: our Senate is not a “Senate of territories”
• Filibuster: no minority can block indefinitely
• Absence of automatic resolution: our system has unblocking mechanisms

23.10 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #3: The Swiss Council of States (1848-present)

Switzerland combines bicameralism and direct democracy in a unique balance [121][122]. The National Council represents the people (proportionally), the Council of States represents cantons (two per canton).

What Worked

Mandatory consensus. The two chambers have strictly equal powers. Any law must be adopted identically by both [121]. This forces broad compromises.

Institutional stability. 175 years of continuous operation. The system absorbed two world wars at its borders without institutional rupture.

Representation of linguistic minorities. Romandy and Ticino cantons have weight in the Council of States greater than their demographic weight. Linguistic minorities are protected [122].

Direct democracy as safety valve. Mandatory referendum (for constitutional modifications) and optional referendum (for laws) allow breaking deadlocks between chambers.

Governmental collegiality. The Federal Council (government) is elected by the Federal Assembly (both chambers combined). No dominant executive power.

What’s Problematic

Slowness. The shuttle between chambers, combined with referendum delays, considerably slows legislation [122]. Reforms take years.

Complexity. The system of committees, conciliation conferences, divergence elimination procedures is opaque to ordinary citizens.

Structural conservatism. The double veto (two chambers + referendum) favors status quo. Bold reforms are difficult.

Low representation of women. The Council of States remains mostly male. Territorial representation doesn’t improve diversity [121].

What We Keep from the Swiss Model

• Mandatory consensus between chambers
• Minority protection through a dedicated chamber
• Long-term institutional stability
• Referendum as safety valve in case of blocking

What We Improve

• Functional asymmetry: budget vs rights, not two identical chambers
• Speed: asymmetry allows faster resolution
• Distinct legitimacy: census vs equal, not territorial vs proportional

What We Don’t Keep

• Strict equal bicameralism: our asymmetry is more efficient
• Territorial representation: our Senate is not cantonal
• Governmental collegiality: our Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament alone

23.11 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #4: The German Bundesrat (1949-present)

The German Bundesrat represents Länder governments, not their populations [123][128]. It is a chamber of regional executives, unique in Western Europe.

What Worked

Technical expertise. Bundesrat members are serving ministers in their Länder. They bring execution expertise that parliamentarians lack [123].

Federalism protection. Laws touching Länder competences require Bundesrat agreement. The federal government cannot unilaterally encroach [128].

Effective counter-power. When the Bundesrat is dominated by the opposition, it slows federal government reforms. This counter-power has sometimes prevented excesses.

No electoral cycle of its own. The Bundesrat is not directly elected. Its composition changes with regional elections, not in bloc. This smooths alternations.

What’s Problematic

Partisan blocking. When Bundesrat and Bundestag have opposite majorities, the system blocks [128]. The Schröder government (1998-2005) was paralyzed by a hostile Bundesrat.

Opacity. Negotiations between federal and regional governments happen behind closed doors. Citizens don’t see who decides what.

Indirect legitimacy. Bundesrat members are not elected for this role. Their legitimacy is derived, not direct.

Bargaining. Länder use their Bundesrat vote as bargaining chip to obtain regional advantages. Partisan logic mixes with territorial logic [123].

What We Keep from the German Model

• Effective counter-power of a second chamber
• Protection of competences of one level against the other
• Smoothing of alternations through different electoral cycles

What We Improve

• Direct election: our Senate is elected by equal suffrage, not composed of regional ministers
• Transparency: public deliberations, no backroom negotiations
• Own legitimacy: the Senate has its own electoral base

What We Don’t Keep

• Chamber of executives: our Senate represents citizens, not governments
• Indirect legitimacy: direct election by equal suffrage
• Territorial bargaining: our Senate is not a negotiation venue between regions

23.12 — The Unicameral Option

The bicameralism described in this chapter is designed for a central state with sufficient resources. But it is not always necessary.

For local authorities, a second chamber represents a fixed cost often disproportionate to the stakes. Municipalities, inter-municipalities, regions: maintaining two distinct assemblies with their shuttle procedures can be an unjustifiable budgetary luxury.

In these cases, a single assembly suffices—provided it integrates both logics (equal and contributive) in voting modalities.

Chapter XXIV (Local Governance) details this option: a single council where the voting method varies according to the nature of the decision. Budgetary questions by census vote, local fundamental rights by equal vote, all in the same venue.

This architecture preserves the principles—who pays decides on money, civic equality on rights—without the cost of a second chamber. It is the adaptation of asymmetric bicameralism to scales where it would be too heavy.