XXII — Tax and power

Chapitre XXII

TAX AND POWER: WHO PAYS DECIDES

Money is the sinews of war. Budget decisions commit taxpayers’ money. It is logical that those who contribute more weigh more heavily on these decisions.

But beware: this is not about excluding anyone. Everyone votes. It is the weight of the vote that varies.

The idea of non-strictly equal suffrage (plural voting) was defended in the 19th century in liberal representation theory, notably by John Stuart Mill, as a solution aimed at reconciling broad participation and decision quality [140][141]. The justification and normative tensions of plural voting have been clarified in contemporary academic literature [142][143].

22.1 — The Criterion: Tax Paid, Not Income

What counts is what one actually contributes to the common pot. If you optimize fiscally, that’s your right. But you lose political weight. Want to influence decisions? Contribute.

This creates a positive incentive to pay taxes. It’s no longer just a levy, it’s an investment in one’s political influence.

22.2 — The Census Weight Curve

Vote weight follows a progressive curve between a floor (1 vote) and a ceiling (100 votes). The exact shape of this curve—rapid rise to reward entry into contribution, regular progression afterward, moderate acceleration for very large contributors—is detailed in Appendix D.

The number of census votes is not necessarily a whole number—it’s a continuous value, precisely calculated.

22.3 — Floor and Ceiling

Nobody falls below one vote. The unemployed, the student, the person in difficulty—their voice exists. Their democratic dignity is preserved.

Nobody exceeds one hundred votes. A billionaire cannot crush the system. One hundred modest citizens balance one ultra-rich.

22.4 — Weight Relative to Level of Power

The weight is not absolute. It is calculated relative to the contribution to the budget of the relevant level of power. Contribution to the national budget determines weight in national elections. Contribution to the local budget determines weight in local elections.

A billionaire who pays little local tax in their rural commune weighs less locally than a local entrepreneur who contributes heavily there.

22.5 — Dynamic Weight

Situation changes, weight changes. You lose your job, you contribute less, weight decreases. You succeed, you contribute more, weight increases. This is not a fixed caste. It’s an updated snapshot of contribution.

22.6 — Weighted Recall

When you recall an elected official, you recall with the weight you have at the time of recall. If large contributors withdraw their support, it weighs more heavily. Logical: they are the ones funding that official’s decisions.

The total weight of all voters is recalculated at each tax deadline (once a year), or in case of legislative change affecting tax.

22.7 — Self-Regulation: The Self-Correction Mechanism

Here is the decisive advantage of the census system: it corrects itself.

Imagine a group manages to pass laws that shift the tax burden onto another group. What happens?

The group that pays more → gains census weight
The group that pays less → loses census weight
At the next election (probably quick, thanks to the recall system), the aggrieved group weighs more heavily
They vote for candidates who rebalance
The system returns to equilibrium

Concrete example. The richest vote a tax that hits the middle classes. Result: the middle classes pay more taxes, so their census weight increases. At the next election (quick, therefore, with recall), they weigh more and can reverse this policy. Exploitation of one group by another is structurally unstable.

This is a self-regulation mechanism. Any attempt at imbalance automatically generates the forces that correct it.

Figure 22.1 — Census system feedback loop

For this mechanism to work, the polynomial curve must be calibrated so that a significant increase in tax paid leads to a significant increase in weight. Rebalancing must be fast enough to prevent prolonged exploitation, but not too brutal to avoid instability. It’s a fine-tuning, but the principle is robust.

22.8 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The Prussian Three-Class Voting System (1849-1918)

Prussia used for nearly 70 years a three-class census voting system (Dreiklassenwahlrecht) [135][136]. Voters were divided into three groups according to their tax contribution, each group electing the same number of electors—thus giving disproportionate political weight to the largest taxpayers.

How It Worked

Taxpayers in each constituency were ranked by tax amount paid, then divided into three fiscal thirds:

First class: the largest taxpayers representing 1/3 of total taxes (often 4-5% of the population)
Second class: medium taxpayers representing the next 1/3 (about 10-15% of the population)
Third class: everyone else (80-85% of the population)

Each class elected the same number of electors. A first-class industrialist thus weighed 15 to 20 times more than a third-class worker [135].

What Worked

Political stability. The system lasted 70 years without major revolution. Economic elites, secure in their influence, did not seek to overthrow the regime. Prussia became an industrial power [136]. The Dreiklassenwahlrecht has also been the subject of modern quantitative analysis in political economy, allowing study of its effects on elite selection, public choices, and institutional stability [137].

Incentive to contribute. Paying more taxes meant potentially changing class and gaining influence. The system created a positive incentive for tax contribution.

Legitimacy of the era. The principle “who pays decides” was widely accepted in the 19th century. The system reflected a coherent vision of the link between property and political responsibility [135].

What’s Problematic

Extreme inequality. The weight ratio could reach 1 to 20 or more. It was assumed plutocracy, not weighted democracy [136].

No floor or ceiling. An ultra-rich person could dominate their local first class. A poor person had only one voice drowned among thousands. No minimal democratic dignity.

Rigid classes. The three classes created brutal discontinuities. Moving from second to first class multiplied weight by 5-10. Our system uses a continuous curve.

No self-correction mechanism. If the rich voted laws favoring the rich, their weight did not decrease—it could even increase. The system amplified inequalities instead of correcting them [135].

Public, not secret voting. Voting was done orally, in public. Coercion was possible. Workers voted under their employers’ gaze.

Inevitable abolition. The system was abolished in 1918 after Germany’s defeat. Its association with the old Prussian regime made it indefensible.

What We Keep from the Prussian Model

The weighting principle according to tax contribution
The positive incentive to contribute to weigh more
The link between financial responsibility and political influence

What We Improve

Continuous curve, not classes: our system uses a polynomial function, not brutal thirds. No discontinuity.
Floor and ceiling: nobody below one vote (dignity), nobody above one hundred (no plutocracy)
Guaranteed secret ballot: physical booth, biometrics, structural anonymity
Self-correction mechanism: if a group is overtaxed, their weight increases and they can reverse this policy. The Prussian system had no such feedback

What We Don’t Keep

Extreme inequality (1:20 ratio or more): our maximum ratio is 1:100, with a curve that limits power concentration
Public voting: ballot secrecy is sacred
Absence of democracy for fundamental rights: our system reserves census voting for budget. Rights fall under equal suffrage (Senate)
Class rigidity: our weight is dynamic and recalculated annually