XIV — Les kibboutzim

Chapitre XIV

CASE STUDY: THE KIBBUTZIM

Israel offers a unique laboratory of voluntary community life with two main models: the kibbutzim (entirely collective communities) and the moshavim (cooperatives with individual ownership) [41][42]. At their peak in the 1980s, kibbutzim counted 125,000 members spread across 270 communities, while moshavim grouped even more.

14.1 — The Diversity of Models

Contrary to the often-conveyed monolithic image, the kibbutz movement comprised several federations with distinct philosophies:

• HaKibbutz HaArtzi (Hashomer Hatzair): the most collectivist, secular, and socialist
• HaKibbutz HaDati: religious kibbutzim combining Torah and collective work
• Takam: a more moderate federation, resulting from mergers
• Kibboutz Poalim Datiim: another religious movement

The moshavim represented a less radical alternative: land cultivated individually by each family, but pooled services (marketing, group purchases, credit). It is an intermediate model between private property and integral collectivism.

14.2 — What Worked

Exceptional longevity. More than a century of continuous existence [41]. Some kibbutzim founded in the 1910s still exist. This is proof that a voluntary community can span generations.

Agricultural productivity. The cooperative model allowed collective mobilization of resources to clear arid land and build irrigation infrastructure. This startup advantage was decisive before intensive mechanization [42].

Sources: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999), Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2017), OECD Review of Agricultural Policies.

Today, cooperative productivity per hectare is comparable to that of individual farms—the collective model is no longer a productive advantage, but neither is it a handicap.

Bankruptcies as proof of proper functioning. From the 1980s, more than half of kibbutzim went bankrupt. Far from being a model failure, this is proof that natural selection was working: poorly managed or unsuitable structures disappeared, others learned lessons and reformed. Those who survived—about 270 today—have proven their viability over more than a century. This is exactly what we want for Autonomous Collectives: no state bailout, no artificial survival, but Darwinian evolution of organizational models [42].

Well-being of the elderly. Studies show that elderly kibbutz members have higher life expectancy and better psychological well-being than the general population [44][45]. The community framework protects against isolation.

Successful diversification. Facing agricultural difficulties, many kibbutzim diversified into industry, services, and tourism. This adaptability ensured their economic survival.

Coexistence of varied models. The spectrum ranged from integral collectivism (classic kibbutz) to partial cooperation (moshav), allowing everyone to find a degree of pooling suited to their preferences.

14.3 — Economic Analyses: Equality, Incentives, and Migration

Kibbutzim have long been presented as a successful experiment in integral collectivism, combining economic equality, common ownership, and direct democracy. However, empirical analyses have progressively highlighted significant structural limits. Ran Abramitzky’s quantitative work shows that strict egalitarianism generates incentive problems and favors differential member selection: individuals with higher productivity or human capital are more inclined to leave kibbutzim when gaps between effort and remuneration become too marked [52].

This selective exit dynamic is reinforced by internal redistribution mechanisms. Abramitzky also demonstrates that redistribution intensity directly influences migration flows: the stronger the redistribution, the more the most productive members tend to leave, ultimately weakening the collective economic base [53]. These results suggest that the apparent stability of kibbutzim masks persistent economic tensions between equity and efficiency.

On the historical and institutional level, Ben-Rafael’s work documents the systemic crisis of the 1980s, marked by massive indebtedness, erosion of ideological legitimacy, and the rise of more technocratic governance. This crisis led to a profound transformation of the model, with the progressive introduction of differentiated salaries, market mechanisms, and partially privatized forms of ownership [54]. These developments indicate that the original collectivist model proved difficult to sustain without major concessions to the market economy.

14.4 — What Is Problematic

Youth hemorrhage. Since the 1980s, kibbutzim have lost their most dynamic members [43]. Young people leave for cities, attracted by economic opportunities and individual freedom.

Crisis of pure collectivism. The strict egalitarian model (identical salaries for all) created tensions. The most productive members felt exploited. Partial privatization was necessary to survive [42].

Subsidy dependence. In the 1980s, many kibbutzim accumulated massive debts, bailed out by the State. Self-funding was not always real [43].

Cultural homogeneity. Kibbutzim were essentially Ashkenazi. This homogeneity facilitated cohesion but limited the model’s universality.

Convergence toward moshav. Today, the majority of kibbutzim have adopted salary “differentials” and partial private property—approaching the moshav model they initially rejected [42].

14.5 — What We Keep from Israeli Models

• Proof that voluntary communities can last decades
• Well-being of the elderly in community (empirically validated)
• Economic diversification as the key to survival
• Natural mutual aid that replaces formal insurance mechanisms
• Coexistence of varied models (from the most collectivist to the most individual)
• The collectivism gradient between kibbutz and moshav, which ACs adopt

14.6 — What We Improve

• No state subsidy: strict self-funding is a constitutional constraint—kibbutzim were bailed out by the State
• No imposed homogeneity: the prohibition of identity selection avoids the ghetto—kibbutzim were culturally homogeneous
• Freedom of exit without stigma: in ACs, leaving is not a betrayal—kibbutzim experienced departures as defections

14.7 — What We Do Not Adopt

• Strict salary egalitarianism: source of tensions and talent drain
• Externally imposed ideology: an AC can adopt any ideology (socialist, libertarian, religious…) if members freely choose it—kibbutzim served a collective mission defined by the Zionist movement
• State dependence: no bailout in case of bankruptcy
• Single model per community: each AC chooses its position on the gradient