I — Comparative dictionary of autonomous collectives
Appendice I
COMPARATIVE DICTIONARY OF AUTONOMOUS COLLECTIVES
Reference: Chapter X (Autonomous Collectives)
This appendix offers a comparative survey of intentional communities, cooperatives, and collective arrangements documented in the literature. It distinguishes autonomous collectives (integral or partial), cooperative hybrids, state mechanisms (counter-models), and federations that structure them.
I.1 — Reading Key
- Integral autonomous collectives: institutionalized mutual aid + collective property + internal governance.
- Partial autonomous collectives: strong mutual aid, incomplete economic pooling.
- Cooperative hybrids: family/individual property + pooled services/production.
- State mechanisms: imposed organization, dependence on plan/State.
- Excluded cases: disciplinary communities without institutionalized economic mutual aid.
I.2 — Integral Autonomous Collectives
Hutterites
Canadian prairies and northern United States — 16th c. to present [177][178]
Anabaptist communities practicing integral religious communalism. Complete collective property with total redistribution (housing, work, care). Governance structured by religious leadership, limiting internal democracy. Religious discipline and social sanctions create medium to high coercion. Standard of living often stable and materially high thanks to efficient agricultural and entrepreneurial economy. Exit formally possible but at high social cost. Strengths: stability, risk pooling, efficiency at “colony” scale. Limits: social control, low model transferability (homogeneity required). Durable model that grows by swarming rather than indefinite expansion.
Bruderhof
Europe (origin), North America, Australia — 20th–21st c. [179]
Christian communal movement advocating pacifism and complete sharing of goods. Strong income pooling and complete member care. Governance tending toward centralization, with communal discipline creating medium coercion. Material security assured, variable by site. Exit possible but frequently entails social rupture. Strengths: cohesion, reproducibility across multiple sites. Limits: authority/individual tensions, schism risks. History marked by successive schisms and recompositions.
Twin Oaks
Virginia, USA — since 1967 [180][181]
Secular intentional community founded on pragmatic egalitarianism, inspired by B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two. Income sharing and basic needs guaranteed according to explicit contribution rules. Structured internal democracy with defined procedures and roles. Low to medium coercion (explicit rules, social pressure). Voluntary simplicity but basic security assured. Exit legally simple, variable social cost. Strengths: concrete work allocation mechanisms, proven durability over 50+ years. Limits: organizational fatigue, constant trade-offs between ideals and daily management. Durable model through incremental adaptations.
Emmaüs Communities
France (origin), 37 countries — since 1949 [194][197]
Movement of work communities founded by Abbé Pierre, self-funded through recovery and recycling. Over 400 structures welcoming excluded persons (ex-prisoners, addicts, migrants, people in crisis). Collective ownership of work tools, communal living with shared housing and meals. Local governance by companions, federated at national and international levels. Low coercion (minimal rules, alcohol abstinence in community). Strengths: self-funding without recurring operating subsidies, unconditional welcome (no file, no delay), functional economic model for 75 years, springboard toward autonomy [196]. Limits: historical dependence on founder’s charisma, growing competition from online secondhand market, practice heterogeneity across communities [195]. Resilient model but in permanent adaptation to economic changes.
Shakers (historical)
United States — 18th–20th c. [182][183]
Religious communities practicing integral communalism, gender equality, pacifism, and celibacy. Collective property with redistributed artisanal and agricultural production. Religious hierarchies structuring governance. Medium coercion linked to strong norms. Sober but productive standard of living, marked by notable innovations (furniture, tools). Exit possible. Strengths: technical and organizational innovations, collective stability. Limits: low lasting attractiveness, dependence on conversions for recruitment. Structural decline caused notably by demographics (mandatory celibacy).
Oneida Community (historical)
New York, USA — 1848–1881 [184][185]
Perfectionist Christian community practicing integral communalism. Strong income pooling with redistributed industrial production. Central leadership limiting internal democracy, with high social control. Relatively high standard of living thanks to solid economic base (silverware, traps). Exit possible but socially costly. Strengths: institutional coherence, economic power. Limits: vulnerability to external pressures, power drift risks. Dissolution in 1881 and conversion to joint-stock company (Oneida Limited, still existing).
I.3 — Partial Autonomous Collectives
Amish
United States and Canada — 18th c. to present [55][56]
Anabaptist communities characterized by voluntary cultural separation. Strong community mutual aid (support, reconstruction after disasters, assistance), but less centralized productive pooling than Hutterites or kibbutzim. Local governance ruled by the Ordnung (community rules), with religious norms and social sanctions creating medium coercion. Modest but stable standard of living. Exit possible via Rumspringa (exploration period at 16), but high social cost for those who leave permanently. Strengths: cohesion, resilience, strong social capital. Limits: strong constraints, exit costs, permanent tension between individual autonomy and collective requirements. Durable model through selective technological adaptations.
I.4 — Cooperative Hybrids (Israel)
Moshav (moshav ovdim)
Rural Israel — since early 20th c. [173][172][176]
Service cooperation without integral collectivization. Production at family level, but pooled cooperatives for purchasing, sales, marketing, and credit. Low coercion. Internal democracy via local cooperatives and federative structures. Variable standard of living, often better than integral collectivism in favorable market periods. Exit legally free. Strengths: flexibility, preserved family incentives, service cooperation. Limits: vulnerability to credit crises and intermediate organization failures. 1980s crisis heavily affecting regional organizations.
Moshav shitufi
Israel — since 1930s [174]
Hybrid “between moshav and kibbutz”: collectivized production and services, more family-oriented consumption. Strong mutual aid on production and services, less on consumption. Low to medium coercion. Internal democracy via local cooperative with collective production rules. Variable standard of living. Exit legally free. Strengths: compromise between collective efficiency and family autonomy. Limits: tensions over boundaries between collective and private spheres. Resilient but remained minority form.
Classical Collective Kibbutz
Israel — since 1909, peak mid-20th c. [166][52][165]
Zionist socialism and integral egalitarianism. Complete collective property with redistribution (housing, services, education). Low to medium coercion (social norms). Internal democracy via general assembly and committees. High security but historically modest comfort. Exit legally free. Strengths: strong internal social security, social capital, quality collective services. Limits: incentive problems, risk of most productive member flight. 1980s debt crisis followed by restructuring agreements.
“Renewed” / Partially Privatized Kibbutz
Israel — since 1990s [165][54]
Pragmatic market adaptation after 1980s crisis. Reduced mutual aid (differentiated salaries, partial privatization of some services), but maintained safety nets. Low coercion. Internal democracy formally maintained, but intense debates on identity. Often higher standard of living than before. Exit legally free. Strengths: increased financial sustainability. Limits: erosion of original equality and internal conflicts over founding values.
I.5 — State Mechanisms (Counter-Models)
These mechanisms are outside the autonomous collective scope because they depend on the State and rely on coercion. They are useful as counter-examples.
Kolkhozes (USSR)
Socialist collectivization imposed within the plan framework. Formal mutual aid at collective level, but within coercive framework. High coercion (historically forced collectivization, repressions). Weak internal democracy in practice. Highly variable standard of living, often constrained depending on period. Exit historically limited. Transformation or dissolution after 1991.
Sovkhozes (USSR)
USSR — 20th c. until 1991 [186]
State salary farms, distinct from kolkhozes by absence of even formal collective property. High coercion (direct state hierarchy). Post-Soviet transformations.
People’s Communes (China)
Rural China — 1958–1983 [188][189]
Total political-administrative collectivization. Collectivized mutual aid but with possible extraction by State apparatus. High coercion. Weak internal democracy (political hierarchy). Low exit (territorial and administrative membership). Replaced by townships and household responsibility reforms.
I.6 — Federations and Confederations
Kibbutzim — Main Federations (Israel)
HaKibbutz HaMeuhad (1927 → 1980) [167][168] — Federation associated with labor currents; political and educational infrastructure. 1951 schism along Mapai/Mapam lines, 1980 reunification.
Ihud HaKvutzot VeHaKibbutzim (1951 → 1980/81) [168] — Other major historical pole from post-1951 recompositions; trajectory ended by merger into unified movement.
Kibbutz Artzi / Hashomer Hatzair (1927 → 1999) [164][169] — Federation linked to Hashomer Hatzair/Mapam; own institutional culture, cultural autonomy preserved after unification.
United Kibbutz Movement / TaKaM (1981 → 1999) [164] — Merger of HaKibbutz HaMeuhad and Ihud; major representation and services actor during 1980s-90s.
The Kibbutz Movement (1999 → present) [164][165] — Main umbrella structure (~230 kibbutzim), excluding religious movement; governs a sector in post-crisis transformation.
Religious Kibbutz Movement / HaKibbutz HaDati (1935 → present) [170] — Framework for Orthodox kibbutzim; also includes moshavim shitufi; “cluster” policy for schools and religious infrastructure.
Crisis as federative event [165] — Federations structure credit access, risk pooling, and negotiations with State and banks. Key point: late 1989 agreement includes cancellation of mutual co-signing (cross-guarantees between kibbutzim).
Moshavim — Movements / Federations (Israel)
Moshavim Movement / Tnu’at HaMoshavim [171] — Moshavim federation; mutual aid instruments (insurance, funds, bank, pensions) and regional services (marketing, inputs). Intermediate structure vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks.
Regional organizations crisis (1985–86) [176] — Near-insolvency of regional organizations during budget tightening. Crisis passes through mutual guarantees and intermediate levels rather than individual household.
Agricultural Union / HaIhud HaHakla’i [175] — Settlement movement including moshavim and community settlements; from early 1960s merger.
Mondragon (Basque Country, Spain)
Basque Country, Spain — since 1950s [190][191][192][193]
Confederation of worker cooperatives founded on economic democracy. Confederal rules: pay caps and ratios, inter-cooperative solidarity funds, worker redeployment mechanisms. The Fagor Electrodomésticos bankruptcy (2013) constituted a stress test of group solidarities, showing how a confederation arbitrates between solidarity and systemic survival.
I.7 — Excluded Case
German Templars (Israel)
Sarona & Haifa, Israel — 1868–1948 [166]
German Pietist Protestant sect established in Ottoman Palestine. Disciplined and prosperous community, but founded on private property and without institutionalized economic mutual aid → outside “autonomous collective” scope in the strict sense. Retained as conceptual edge case.
Return to chapter X (Autonomous Collectives)