G — Vacant housing
Appendice G
VACANT HOUSING — MINIMUM CONSERVATION OBLIGATION
Reference: Chapter VIII (The Flat Tax)
G.1 — The Principle
Housing vacancy is not penalized. The owner has no obligation to rent, sell, or put their property into circulation. Private property implies the right to do nothing.
However, degradation of a property that creates nuisances for the neighborhood or public space is a legitimate problem. It is not vacancy that is targeted, but its potential negative externalities.
This mechanism is optional. It is not constitutionalized. Local authorities can adopt it or not according to their needs.
G.2 — What Is NOT in This Mechanism
- No surtax on vacant housing. Vacancy itself is not taxed.
- No exception to the flat tax. The tax system remains uniform.
- No obligation to rent. The owner remains free in their choices.
- No penalty for vacancy. Only nuisance is penalized.
G.3 — The Minimum Conservation Obligation
Every property owner—whether occupied or not—must maintain their property in a condition that does not create nuisances for others. This principle fits within a long tradition of “housing code enforcement” documented in academic literature [84].
This obligation breaks down into four minimum requirements:
Safety. The building must not threaten ruin, present collapse risks, or constitute a danger to passersby or neighbors.
Stability. Structural elements (roof, walls, foundations) must be maintained in a condition that does not deteriorate to the point of harming adjacent properties.
Sanitation. The property must not become a source of insalubrity: pest proliferation, waste accumulation, sanitary degradation affecting the neighborhood. Epidemiological studies have demonstrated the link between degraded housing conditions and respiratory pathologies [87].
Absence of nuisance. The property must not degrade neighbors’ quality of life or public space appearance beyond a reasonable threshold.
G.4 — Finding Procedure
The mechanism relies on finding nuisance, not vacancy:
Report. A neighbor, building manager, or local authority can report a nuisance.
Adversarial visit. A sworn officer verifies the property’s condition, in the owner’s presence or after notification.
Formal notice. If nuisance is established, the owner receives formal notice to remedy within a reasonable period (3 to 6 months depending on severity).
Default work. In case of persistent failure, the authority can have safety work carried out at the owner’s expense (debt recoverable against the property).
G.5 — What Triggers the Obligation
| Situation | Obligation triggered? |
|---|---|
| Vacant housing but in good condition | No |
| Vacant housing with collapsed roof | Yes (safety) |
| Vacant housing with rat infestation | Yes (sanitation) |
| Vacant housing with very degraded facade | Depending on neighborhood impact |
| Vacant housing for 10 years, good condition | No |
| Vacant housing with squatters | Separate issue (public order) |
Duration of vacancy has no effect. Only the property’s condition matters.
G.6 — Penalties for Established Nuisance
If the owner does not remedy the nuisance after formal notice:
Default work. The authority has necessary work carried out.
Recovery. Cost is recovered from the owner, with legal mortgage on the property if necessary.
Penalty payment. A daily penalty may be imposed until work is completed.
No surtax, no punitive taxation. The mechanism remains in the realm of administrative enforcement, not taxation.
G.7 — Why This Mechanism Is Optional
This mechanism is not constitutionalized because:
- It falls under local administrative enforcement, not fundamental principles.
- Needs vary by territory (high-demand zones vs rural areas), as illustrated by studies on housing in Brussels [88].
- The nuisance threshold definition depends on local context.
- Intervention means differ by authority.
Authorities that wish to adopt it can do so by local deliberation. Those that don’t need it are not required to.
G.8 — What Is Recommended
For authorities that adopt this mechanism:
Define objective nuisance criteria. Avoid arbitrariness—studies show for example that code violations have measurable effects on prices and rents [85].
Guarantee adversarial proceedings. The owner must be able to contest the finding.
Proportion deadlines. Light work = short deadlines. Heavy work = reasonable deadlines.
Avoid fiscal drift. This mechanism is not a disguised tax. It generates no revenue for the authority beyond work recovery—even if, as Brussels analyses show, restoration is economically preferable to prolonged vacancy [89].
Provide exemptions. Estates in settlement, pending legal proceedings, force majeure situations.
Monitor unintended effects. As some American studies show, overly aggressive enforcement can penalize vulnerable tenants if owners prefer to withdraw housing from the market rather than renovate [86].
G.9 — Distinction from Vacant Housing Tax
Some jurisdictions (Vancouver, France) tax vacancy itself. This is not the approach adopted here.
| Criterion | Vacant Housing Tax | Conservation Obligation |
|---|---|---|
| Triggering fact | Vacancy | Nuisance |
| Objective | Incentivize renting | Protect neighborhood |
| Legal nature | Fiscal | Administrative enforcement |
| Revenue for authority | Yes | No (except work recovery) |
| Property rights impact | Indirect (taxation) | Minimal (maintenance obligation) |
| Libertarian consistency | Debatable | Yes (negative externalities) |
The conservation obligation is more consistent with libertarian principles: we do not penalize inaction, we penalize nuisance caused to others.
This mechanism is proposed as an option for local authorities. It is neither mandatory nor constitutionalized.
Return to chapter VIII