
FOR A SOVEREIGN FREEDOM

Manifesto of Libertarian Libertarianism

Solidarity without spoliation: neither dependents nor abandoned.

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Notice

This document was originally written in French and translated into other languages using automatic translation tools. Due to frequent updates, these translated versions have not undergone thorough proofreading. The translations are intended to facilitate access to the content and ideas developed in the text.

The Three Principles

Who pays decides — but not everything.

- Decisions involving shared resources must be made by those who fund them.
- Matters of liberty, rights, and justice are not decided by wealth.

Who elects revokes — permanent sovereignty.

- Voting is not surrendering one's sovereignty: sovereignty cannot be surrendered.
- Legitimacy stems from ongoing accountability.

Who falls rises — neither dependent nor abandoned.

- A free society keeps no one trapped in dependency, nor leaves anyone behind.
- Learning to walk beats being given crutches.

This manifesto describes how to bring these three principles to life.

Definition

Libertarian Libertarianism is a political doctrine articulating permanent sovereignty, a limited and revocable regalian State, voluntary non-coercive solidarity, and a common normative framework ensuring coexistence and the protection of freedoms.

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Partie 1 ## Fondements

Introduction

This document explores a radical overhaul of the social contract. It starts from an observation: **our democracies are ailing.**

- Bottomless debt
- Inflation eroding wages
- Stifling and illegible taxation
- Rampant bureaucracy
- Citizens powerless between elections
- A state without limits

The problems raised here are real. The proposed solutions are avenues to explore, intended as a basis for reflection. This is exploratory work, not a ready-made constitution.

The guiding thread: a state limited by design

Not by goodwill, but by constitutional rules requiring a 4/5 supermajority in each chamber:

- **Budget constrained to surplus** — with reserve funds for crises
- **Currency subject to competition** — ending the state monopoly
- **Single, visible flat tax** — no more fiscal labyrinth, no more hidden VAT
- **Constitutional ceiling on taxation**
- **National sovereignty** — domestic laws take precedence over supranational decisions

Social protection without a welfare state

Mandatory private insurance, in competition, with pooling of major risks:

- Health insurance
- Unemployment insurance
- Education insurance
- Funded retirement accounts

And for those who fall through the cracks: **Autonomous Communities (ACs)** — a self-funded social safety net.

ACs are:

- **Non-stigmatizing** — open to everyone, including by choice
- **Diverse** — from highly structured to fully self-managed
- **Self-funded** — through members' work, not through taxes
- **Voluntary** — free entry, free exit

Real-time democracy

- **Permanent recall** of elected officials — no more blank checks
- **Online voting** for ordinary referendums
- **Mandatory referendum** for major public contracts
- **Voting weight proportional to tax contribution** for budgetary matters
- **Equal suffrage** for fundamental rights
- **Two chambers** with distinct logics (censitary Parliament, egalitarian Senate)
- **Self-correcting mechanism** — any attempt by one group to exploit another is automatically corrected

This system is called **Libertarian Libertarianism**: solidarity without plunder. Neither dependent nor abandoned.

A method, not a recipe

This manifesto is not a turnkey program. It proposes **principles, frameworks, and possible architectures** — not fixed solutions.

For each mechanism described, practical implementation will depend on context: political culture, economic situation, local needs, balance of power. The figures and thresholds mentioned are **illustrative**, not prescriptive. This text should be read as a **coherent catalog of options**, not as a constitution ready to apply.

In several places, the manifesto deliberately presents **multiple alternatives** for the same problem. This plurality is not indecision: it is a deliberate choice of flexibility.

Chapitre I

THE DIAGNOSIS: WHY EVERYTHING IS BROKEN

Look around you. Abyssal debt. Inflation eroding wages – that invisible tax nobody voted for. Suffocating taxation. Bureaucracy proliferating like ivy on a wall. And rulers who seem to live on another planet.

These symptoms have a common cause: **the State has no limits**. No real limits. No walls it cannot cross.

The cycle is immutable. A government is elected on promises. These promises are expensive. Money comes from taxes, but raising them is unpopular. So they borrow. Debt accumulates. To repay it – or pretend to – they print money. Inflation sets in. Purchasing power melts. Citizens demand aid. The State grows. And the wheel turns, again and again. This is not a conspiracy, it's a mechanism — what sociologists call *unintended consequences* [9]: each decision is locally rational, but the sequence produces a result nobody wanted. Add cognitive limitations when facing complex systems [10], and you get a machine that runs wild without a pilot.




Figure 1.1 — The debt spiral

Meanwhile, the citizen votes once every four or five years. Then watches, powerless, as their representatives trample their commitments. No recourse. No way to sanction before the next deadline. **The democratic contract has become a blank check.**

Pure libertarianism offers a radical solution: reduce the State to the bare minimum, or even eliminate it. Seductive on paper. But this vision crashes against stubborn realities. Some functions cannot be handled by the market alone. Some investments interest no private actor. Some people, without a support structure, would be abandoned in the street.

We must therefore think differently. Not a minimal State by principle, but a **State limited by architecture**. Not the absence of public power, but its framing so strict that it can no longer overflow. Not the end of democracy, but its transformation into **permanent control**.

This is the purpose of this document.

Chapitre II

WHY THIS LIBERTARIAN LIBERTARIANISM?

Why this Libertarian Libertarianism?

Libertarianism is not a monolithic bloc. It's a family of thought ranging from limited State to total absence of State. Where does this document stand, and why?

Classical libertarianism (Hayek, Friedman) accepts a limited but relatively flexible State. It tolerates certain interventions – monetary policy, temporary safety nets, sometimes even a negative income tax. The risk: without strict constitutional lock-in, the State expands inexorably. Each exception becomes a precedent. This is the history of Western democracies for a century.

Minarchism (Nozick, Bastiat) reduces the State to the strictly sovereign: justice, police, army. Nothing else. It's more coherent, but leaves two unresolved problems. First, fundamental research – no private actor will finance work whose return on investment is counted in decades or centuries. Second, the ultimate safety net – what do we do with those who have lost everything and whom the market cannot absorb? Letting them die in the street is neither ethical nor politically stable.

Anarcho-capitalism (Rothbard, David Friedman, Hoppe) goes all the way: zero State, not even sovereign functions. Private justice, private police, private defense. Intellectually pure, but economically fragile. Without a monopoly on legitimate violence, competing security agencies risk armed conflict. Transaction costs explode: every interaction requires verifying the other party's reputation, negotiating applicable rules, planning recourse. Legal insecurity slows long-term investments. And anarcho-capitalism is probably unstable: it tends either toward chaos, or toward the emergence of a proto-State when the dominant security agency becomes de facto sovereign.




Figure 2.1 — Spectrum of libertarianisms

This document proposes a fourth path: Libertarian Libertarianism, constitutionally locked in. It retains from minarchism the sovereign State. It adds fundamental research (as classical libertarianism tolerated) and Autonomous Collectivities – a self-funded safety net that costs the taxpayer nothing. It locks everything at four-fifths of each chamber to prevent drift. And it borrows from anarcho-capitalism currency competition, eliminating the State's power over monetary creation.

It's a practical optimum. It captures 90% of the benefits of economic freedom while retaining State functions with positive returns. Better to start from a locked minimal State than to arrive there by accident – or never arrive at all.

Symbiosis is this: different organisms living together, each gains, none parasitizes the other. **Solidarity without spoliation: neither dependents nor abandoned.**

Chapitre III

OVERVIEW

This document proposes a complete institutional architecture. This overview presents the logic of each part and the system's coherence.

Part I — Foundations

The system starts from an observation: the welfare State imposes uniform solidarity on everyone, transforming politics into a war for control of the State apparatus. The proposed alternative rests on a simple principle: the State protects rights, society organizes solidarity.

The minimal State does not eliminate solidarity — it ceases to impose it. The same country can thus accommodate autonomous individuals, egalitarian cooperatives, religious communities — each living according to their values without imposing them on others. The right of exit is the keystone: no one can be held against their will.

Part II — Economy and Finance

This part defines the State's perimeter and its fiscal architecture. The State is limited to sovereign functions and cases the market cannot absorb. Quasi-inviolable budgetary rules — mandatory surplus, levy ceiling, reserve fund — prevent perpetual expansion of the public sphere.

Social protection shifts from State monopoly to a system of mandatory private insurance, with mutualization to prevent risk selection. Taxation is simplified to a single income tax (flat tax with allowance), all indirect taxes abolished. Currency ceases to be a State monopoly: monetary competition disciplines governments. Each domain — health, unemployment, pensions — is encapsulated in its own financing mechanism to prevent contagion of failures.

Part III — Autonomous Collectivities

Some people do not know how — or do not want — to manage themselves alone. The current system offers them dependency or abandonment. Autonomous Collectivities propose a third way: integration into a productive and self-funded community.

This part defines the concept, the different possible models (from highly directed to totally self-managed), the mechanisms of entry and exit, and the ecosystem connecting them. Case studies — Amish, kibbutzim, Emmaus, Mondragon — document what already works and what must be adapted.

Part IV — Self-Protection Without Community

Not everyone wishes to join a community. Between total autonomy and community membership, there exists an intermediate path: voluntarily delegating certain decisions to a chosen third party.

This part explores chosen delegation mechanisms — financial representatives, designated agents, automated savings — that allow vulnerable or overwhelmed people to protect themselves without losing their legal capacity or freedom of revocation.

Part V — Electoral System

Current representative democracy grants a blank check every five years. This document proposes real-time democracy: permanent recall of elected officials, black vote for blocking, white vote for counterweight, gray vote for abstention.

Not all decisions are of the same nature. Parliament, elected by property-weighted suffrage, manages the budget and economic questions — those who contribute more weigh more. The Senate, elected by equal suffrage, protects fundamental rights — each citizen weighs the same. This asymmetry is intentional: resilience is placed where the stakes are most serious. Budgetary blocking mechanisms prevent paralysis without letting sabotage go unpunished.

Part VI — Institutions

This part defines the architecture of powers. Judges are elected, revocable for serious misconduct, but protected by long mandates. The Constitutional Council, composed of elected officials, jurists, and citizens drawn by lot, verifies compliance with rules without creating them. Political parties, to be recognized, must function democratically internally. The head of State — president or monarch according to traditions — represents unity without exercising executive power.

Part VII — Citizen Protection

This part groups the mechanisms by which the collectivity protects the citizen against legal, economic, and normative asymmetries coming from outside.

Immigration is managed according to its nature: economic quotas by Parliament, fundamental rights by the Senate. The right to asylum is constitutionalized but budgetarily neutral — the asylum seeker enters the insurance system or joins an Autonomous Collectivity, without specific aid.

International trade rests on the principle of normative equality: any product sold on the national market must respect the norms applicable to national producers. International treaties are subordinate to national law and can be denounced by referendum.

Part VIII — Specific Questions

The administrative millefeuille — communes, intercommunalities, departments, regions, State — superimposes levels, overlaps competencies, dilutes responsibilities. This part sets the principles for radical simplification: strict subsidiarity, fiscal competition, voluntary merger, regulatory guillotine. This work remains partially open — the transition will need to include a major cleanup.

Part IX — Transition

How to dismantle an obese State without provoking collapse? By placing the safety net before cutting. Autonomous Collectivities must be operational before reducing public spending — people who lose their jobs or aid immediately have a structure to land in. The transition is brutal, but not cruel.

Appendices

The appendices provide technical details, calculations, and simulations supporting this document's proposals: existing empirical precedents, mathematical formulas for property-weighted voting, pension transition simulations, mechanisms of the incorruptible price index, comparative dictionary of autonomous collectivities.

Chapitre IV

A MINIMAL STATE FOR A PLURAL SOCIETY: SEPARATING SOLIDARITY FROM COERCION

4.1 — Introduction: exiting imposed solidarity

The modern welfare State rests on an implicit but absolute idea:

Solidarity must be decided by the State and imposed uniformly on all.

Even when democratic, this model produces a centralized, uniform, and mandatory system from which no one can exit. This leads to growing tensions:

- citizens who refuse to adhere to the system and no longer wish to contract with the State,
- individuals who would want more solidarity but in a different form,
- groups who wish to organize their own social protection without imposing it on others,
- permanent conflict between “right-wing” and “left-wing” visions.

Hence the founding question:

Must solidarity be a State monopoly?

The model presented here clearly answers: **no**.

4.2 — The founding principle: dissociating the State from solidarity

The central idea is simple:

The State protects rights; society organizes solidarity.

This principle allows distinguishing two functions often confused:

1. **The sovereign role of the State:**
2. guarantee freedoms,
3. arbitrate contracts,
4. ensure security,
5. maintain the common legal framework.
6. **Solidarity**, which need not be imposed by this same State.

The minimal State does not eliminate solidarity: it **ceases to impose it**, to let individuals and groups organize it themselves, freely and contractually.

The State becomes a neutral guarantor, no longer a central organizer of social life.

4.3 — The minimal State is not a “non-State”: it allows all models

The minimal State retains essential functions:

- fundamental rights,
- justice,
- security,
- contracts,
- monetary sovereignty,
- minimal infrastructure.

What it **no longer does**:

- impose a redistribution model,
- define a vision of “good solidarity”,
- stifle community or voluntary alternatives,
- lock everyone into a uniform system.

Thus, the same country can accommodate:

- independent and autonomous individuals,
- mutualist villages,
- modern kibbutzim,
- egalitarian cooperatives,

- religious or philosophical communities,
- liberal or entrepreneurial structures,
- village federations,
- collectivity associations.

The State does not choose the best form of society. It guarantees the possibility of all these forms.

A minimal State allows a maximal society.

4.4 — Voluntary solidarity: contractual, diverse, reversible

In this model, solidarity becomes again:

- **voluntary** — one adheres by choice,
- **contractual** — rules are explicit and accepted,
- **pluralist** — several models coexist,
- **reversible** — one can exit,
- **adapted to members' values** — each group defines its vision.

This authorizes:

Communities more “leftist” than the State itself — kibbutzim, integral cooperatives, mutualist villages where everything is shared.

Lifestyles more “rightist” — individualistic, based on private property, with minimal mutualization.

And all nuances between the two — each collectivity freely defines its level of redistribution, its internal social protection, its rules of life, its economic organization.

The State no longer imposes a universal model: it guarantees the freedom to experiment with them.

4.5 — The right of exit: keystone of pluralism

The essential principle of this system is:

No one can be held in a collectivity against their will.

When a person leaves a community:

- they keep their personal property,
- they keep the fruit of their labor,
- they are not penalized for their departure,
- they can join another collectivity or live alone.

When a village leaves a federation:

- it can keep its own infrastructure,
- it must negotiate on common goods (e.g., land),
- an independent tribunal arbitrates in case of disagreement.

This mechanism guarantees:

- individual freedom,
- property protection,
- limitation of collective abuses,
- compatibility between solidarity and freedom.

Without the right of exit, solidarity becomes servitude. With it, it remains a choice.

4.6 — Fractal jurisdiction: collectivities, federations, meta-collectivities

The model proposes a **polycentric** and **fractal** architecture:

- a collectivity can contain other collectivities,
- several villages can form a federation,
- several federations can form a union,
- these unions can cooperate or split freely.

Each entity possesses:

- its legal personality,
- its membership contract,
- its right of exit,

- its internal autonomy.

Nothing prevents:

- a collectivity from encompassing another (with its consent),
- an association of collectivities from being itself a collectivity,
- a federation from evolving or dividing.

This is no longer a pyramidal State: it's an organic, flexible, and self-organized society. Subsidiarity is no longer an abstract principle — it becomes the very structure of the system.

4.7 — The kibbutzim as an extreme example made compatible with a liberal framework

Historically, Israeli kibbutzim demonstrated that:

- voluntary solidarity can be very strong,
- collectivist communities can prosper,
- mutual aid can replace a large part of public institutions.

But they lived in a State that otherwise imposed its own solidarity model.

The model presented here offers an unprecedented framework:

Collectivist communities can exist without depending on the State and without imposing it on others.

They become:

- contractual (one enters voluntarily),
- autonomous (they define their own rules),
- evolving (they can change),
- compatible with a liberal environment.

Thus, a community can be deeply collectivist, while the country in which it is located is not at all.

It's this space of freedom that makes the model coherent: everyone lives according to their convictions without imposing them on others.

4.8 — Beyond the left-right divide

This model does not choose between right and left: it **shifts the question**.

- The right can no longer impose its economic model at the national level.
- The left can no longer impose its social model on the whole country.
- Both can exist, but **locally** and **voluntarily**.

Politics ceases to be a war for control of the State, and becomes a freedom to choose one's way of life.

Disagreements are no longer imposed by the force of national law: they unfold in concrete projects, experimented by those who desire them, observed by those who hesitate.

National democracy arbitrates the rules of the common game (fundamental rights, justice, security). It no longer arbitrates the content of social life.

4.9 — A more stable society because more diverse

A pluralist system naturally reduces:

- polarization (no need to convince 51% of the country),
- frustration (everyone can live according to their values),
- social conflict (less at stake in national elections),
- dependence on a single model (if one model fails, others survive),
- the obligation to “convince the whole country” before acting.

Communities:

- innovate (they test new solutions),
- cooperate (they exchange best practices and resources),
- compete positively (the best attract members),
- learn from each other (one's failure is everyone's lesson).

The diversity of local structures produces a **systemic resilience** superior to that of a centralized welfare State. A shock that would destroy a uniform system only destroys a few models in a plural system.

4.10 — Conclusion: the freedom to choose one's society

The proposed model can be summarized thus:

The State protects. Communities choose. Individuals decide.

By separating solidarity from State coercion, this system finally allows citizens:

- to live according to their values,
- to experiment with varied social forms,
- to participate in communities that resemble them,
- or to live without collectivity,
- without ever imposing their choice on others.

This is the central philosophy of this document: **a truly free society is a society that allows several ways of being free.**

The following chapter details what the State does — and especially what it does not do.

Partie 2 ## Économie et finances

Chapitre V

THE STATE: PERIMETER AND FINANCES

Let's start at the beginning: what is the State for?

5.1 — The sovereign functions – the reactor core

Justice. Police. Army. Diplomacy. These functions involve the legitimate use of force. Privatize them, and you get competing militias, à la carte justice, fragmented allegiances. The State holds the monopoly on legitimate violence. That's its primary reason for being, its DNA.

5.2 — Emergency services – private management, public control

Firefighters and emergency medical services sit at the border of sovereign functions. They protect life, but their management does not require a State monopoly.

How does it work? Firefighters are delegated to private companies, chosen by competitive bidding at the municipal or inter-municipal level. Municipalities can group together to strengthen their bargaining power – economies of scale, intensified competition. Contracts are time-limited, with strict specifications: maximum response time, mandatory equipment, staff training. Emergency medical services work the same way, but at a larger scale – departmental or regional – because helicopters and mobile intensive care units require critical mass.

The principle: **the private manages, the public controls, competition disciplines.** If a provider fails, it loses the contract. The market sanctions incompetence faster than bureaucracy.

5.3 — Fundamental research – betting on the next century

Physics. Astronomy. Chemistry. Nuclear fusion. These fields have one thing in common: their return on investment is counted in decades, sometimes centuries. What private investor would finance research today whose benefits will arrive in a hundred years? None. And yet, all civilization benefits from it. The Internet, GPS, nuclear energy, semiconductors – all this comes from fundamental research that the market would never have funded.

Concrete examples: black hole studies, gravitational waves, unification of the four fundamental forces, nuclear fusion reactors (ITER), large synchrotrons (CERN), pure mathematical research, fundamental biological research.

The criterion is clear: if the return on investment exceeds the private sector's time horizon, and if the benefit is collective, then public funding is justified.

But always through competitive bidding. Labs, universities, consortia in competition. No rents: each project must be defended, evaluated, renewed. Peer review (independent scientific committees) takes precedence over price considerations.

The obligation of local spin-offs. All public research funding – including through international consortia – must generate local spin-offs: jobs, skills, patents, infrastructure. No blank check to foreign entities. This obligation is constitutionalized.

International consortia (CERN, ITER, ESA...) are pooling of resources, not funding of foreign entities. Each country funds its share and receives its share of spin-offs. If a consortium does not respect this rule: we renegotiate, we seek an amicable agreement, we sue if necessary, and we exit – but only after recovering what is owed.

If no acceptable offer is received, several possible reasons:

- *The country lacks competence*: we drop it, or we redefine the tender to create local competence (training, transfer, capacity building).
- *It's already covered by the private sector*: the market already funds this field; the public tender is unnecessary. Good news.
- *It's not interesting*: scientists themselves don't want to invest in it. Signal: bad idea, we move on.

Public money funds national competence, not dependence on foreign entities.

Strategic investment. Beyond fundamental research, the State can invest in industries to develop: semiconductors, batteries, biotech, AI, space, etc. This is an industrial bet. Same rules: competitive bidding, local spin-offs, budgetary envelope.

Prestige as investment. National prestige is a legitimate return on investment, as long as it remains reasonable:

- Attracts talent (researchers, students, entrepreneurs)
- Strengthens the country's image (soft power)
- Creates national pride

The spillover effect. Even “inapplicable” research pulls an entire field upward. Those who can do the most can do the least:

- A space program advances all engineering
- Particle physics stimulates instrumentation, computing, materials
- Pure mathematics always ends up finding applications (cryptography, AI, finance...)
- Training teams on the very difficult makes them excellent at the rest

We never know what will be useful in 50 years. Radio waves were a laboratory curiosity before Marconi. Quantum mechanics seemed purely theoretical before transistors. Funding today’s “useless” is preparing tomorrow’s useful.

The safeguard: the constitutional budgetary envelope limits excesses. We can’t fund everything. We must prioritize. But prestige and spillover effects are legitimate criteria in this prioritization.

5.4 — Competitive bidding: not just price

This principle applies to **all** public tenders, not just research.

If price is the only criterion, you get the lowest bidder, not the best bidder. Result: mediocrity, cut corners, failures. This is “mediocritization.”

Mandatory multiple criteria (constitutionalized):

- Price: 30-40% maximum
- Technical quality: 30-40%
- Track record (past results): 15-20%
- Deadlines / feasibility: 10-15%

The exact weighting may vary according to the type of tender (research, construction, services), but price can **never** be the sole or majority criterion.

For fundamental research specifically: peer review, team track record, originality and discovery potential. Price is secondary – we fund the best science, not the cheapest.

5.5 — Total transparency of public procurement

All tenders are published. No exceptions. Specifications, evaluation criteria, weighting – everything is public from the launch.

All bids are published together after the submission deadline. Once the deadline has passed, all received bids are made public simultaneously. Every citizen can see who proposed what, at what price, with what conditions. Light kills fraud.

Jury deliberations are public. How each bid was scored on each criterion, why a candidate was selected or rejected – everything is documented and accessible.

The final contract is public. Including subsequent amendments. A contract that inflates after signing is visible.

5.6 — Referendum for large contracts

Above a certain threshold – for example 5% of the concerned authority's annual budget – the contract must be approved by referendum. The people decide whether they want to commit a significant share of their money to this project.

The mechanism:

- The authority publishes the tender, receives bids, evaluates them, selects a winner
- The choice is submitted to referendum with the complete file: project, selected bid, justification of choice, rejected alternatives
- The referendum is held by property-weighted voting (it's a budgetary question – those who pay decide)
- If the referendum rejects, the authority can relaunch a new tender with modified specifications, or abandon the project

The threshold is relative to the authority. For a municipality, 5% of the budget may represent a few million. For the State, it would be billions. Popular control is exercised at each level, proportionally to the stakes.

Popular control prevents fraud. When everyone is watching, backroom deals become risky. Overcharging is visible. Specifications tailored for a favored candidate are detected. Transparency + referendum = double insurance against corruption.

5.7 — Extreme cases – leaving no one on the roadside

The insurance market works on risk mutualization. But some cases are so costly that no private insurer will voluntarily take them. Heavy chronic diseases. Profound disabilities. Specialized education. Without intervention, these people are abandoned.

Caution: this does not mean the State should manage these cases directly. All non-sovereign public funding must first go through competitive bidding to the private sector. The State only funds the supplement if necessary, or reschedules the project. **The private manages, the State supplements.** No one is abandoned, but the State manages nothing directly.

An independent anti-cartel authority ensures these tenders remain competitive. It has investigative and sanctioning powers. All contracts are public.

5.8 — And nothing else

Everything else – standard education, routine healthcare, pensions, unemployment, transport, energy, housing – can and must be managed by the private sector, with if necessary a mandatory insurance obligation. The State does not have to produce these services. It simply must ensure no one falls through the cracks.

5.9 — No indirect funding either

The State does not fund NGOs, associations, culture, sports, or any other non-sovereign sector. Neither directly by subsidy, nor indirectly by tax reduction. Tax niches are disguised expenditures – they bypass the budgetary ceiling and escape democratic control.

If citizens want to support a cause, they do it with their own money, not the taxpayer's. Private generosity replaces State redistribution. It's more efficient – everyone chooses what they fund – and more honest – no clientelism.

5.10 — The constitutional safe

The State must fund certain things. Fine. But how to prevent it from always funding more? This is THE problem of liberalism for two centuries. Each legitimate exception becomes a precedent. The perimeter inexorably expands, like an oil stain.

The answer is in one word: **constitution**. Not a constitution of vague principles and fine declarations, but a constitution of strict rules, locked by a quasi-impossible majority to reach.

5.11 — Rule #1: Mandatory budgetary surplus

The State must not only balance its budget. It must generate a **surplus each year**. This surplus feeds the structural reserve fund – a cushion for future storms. When crisis arrives, we draw from the cushion. We don't borrow. We don't print. We don't push the problem onto future generations.

Use of the cushion is regulated. When drawing from the reserve fund, a temporary and concomitant spending reduction is imposed – for example 50% of the shock absorbed by the reserve fund, 50% by spending reduction. This ratio is constitutionalized. The objective: extend the cushion’s effect, be able to absorb a second shock if the first is prolonged, and force real-time adjustment.

If the cushion is insufficient despite this discipline, we reduce spending further. It’s painful, but it’s short. Brutal adjustment allows rapid recovery. Chronic deficit prolongs the agony.

Budgetary slippage below threshold triggers elections. The constitutional minimum surplus threshold is for example 5%. If the government projected an effort of 8% and achieves only 6%, there’s no problem – we remain above threshold. On the other hand, if the surplus falls below 5% (outside legitimate crisis), parliamentary elections are automatically triggered. It’s the principle of *credible commitment* [70]: a quasi-inviolable rule changes incentives better than a political promise — because violating it is costly.

How to distinguish slippage from legitimate crisis? The criterion used is **real GDP**: if GDP falls by more than X% compared to the previous year (for example 2%), it’s a crisis – passing below threshold is tolerated without automatic elections. If GDP is stable or growing and the budget slips below threshold, it’s irresponsibility – automatic elections.

The recall mechanism as safety net. Even without automatic elections, the permanent recall system allows citizens to trigger new elections if they judge budgetary management unacceptable. It’s not automatic, but it’s in their hands.

Capping the reserve fund. The structural reserve fund cannot grow indefinitely. A ceiling is set as a percentage of GDP (for example 50% or 100% — to be calibrated). Beyond that, the surplus no longer feeds the fund.

When the ceiling is reached, Parliament decides on surplus allocation: sovereign investments, infrastructure, army, fundamental research. It’s an ordinary budgetary decision, not a constitutional revision.

The buffer year. What is not spent in year N is automatically deducted from year N+1 levies. The State cannot hoard: unused money returns to taxpayers. This mechanism is automatic — it requires no vote.

Priority allocation during pension transition. During the pension system transition period (see appendix E), the budgetary surplus is prioritized for repaying the **transition debt** — the temporary loan covering the gap between pension needs and the constitutional differential ceiling. This priority is inscribed in the constitution. It guarantees that transition debt remains minimal (close to zero) and that the transition ends without burdening future generations. Once the transition is complete, the surplus returns to its normal allocation (structural reserve fund).

A second fund exists: the **catch-up fund**. It's fed by involuntary "savings" in case of budgetary blockage (we'll come back to this). This money is earmarked to repair blockage damage – aging infrastructure, deferred maintenance. Same logic: if the fund is not fully used, the surplus is deducted from next year's taxes. We don't mix prudence (structural reserve fund) with consequences of irresponsibility (catch-up fund).

5.12 — Rule #2: Strict ceiling on levies


All mandatory levies – taxes, fees, contributions, charges, whatever the name – cannot exceed a certain percentage of GDP. This ceiling is inscribed in the constitution.

The definition must be **extensive**. All money transiting through the State or its emanations, whatever the legal appellation, counts toward the ceiling. This closes the door to semantic games: renaming a tax as "contribution" changes nothing. Any quantified rule generates circumvention strategies — this is *Goodhart's law* [71]: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. Hence the extensive definition.

Where to set the ceiling? International examples.

International comparison shows that very different levels of public spending are possible, with measurable results:

Country	Public spending (% GDP)	HDI	Life expectancy	Crime
Singapore	17%	0.939 (9th worldwide)	84 years	Very low
Hong Kong (pre-2020)	20%	0.952 (4th)	85 years	Low
Switzerland	34%	0.962 (1st)	84 years	Very low
United States	38%	0.921 (20th)	77 years	High
France	56.5%	0.903 (28th)	82 years	Medium
Denmark	52%	0.952 (6th)	81 years	Low



What this data shows:

- **Singapore** and **Hong Kong** prove that a State at 17-20% of GDP can produce excellent social outcomes: life expectancy among the highest in the world, near-zero crime, top-tier education, impeccable infrastructure. These results are not achieved *despite* low spending, but *thanks to* the efficiency forced by budgetary constraints.
- **France**, with 56.5% of GDP in public spending (world record among major economies), achieves an HDI lower than Singapore's and comparable life expectancy. Tripling spending does not triple results.
- **Switzerland** achieves the world's best HDI with 34% of GDP — 22 points less than France. The difference is decentralization and budgetary discipline.

The Singapore model: what works?

Singapore funds its essential public services (education, health, security) with only 17% of GDP thanks to several mechanisms:

- **No pay-as-you-go pensions:** the Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a mandatory capitalization system where each worker saves for their own retirement. No intergenerational transfer, no implicit debt.
- **Systematic copayment:** in health and education, the citizen pays part of the cost. This eliminates overconsumption and creates responsibility.

- **Social housing through ownership:** 80% of Singaporeans live in HDB housing they *own*, not rent. The State builds and sells; it does not subsidize perpetually.
- **Absence of massive redistribution:** no generous unemployment benefits, no comfortable minimum income. Solidarity comes through family and community, not the State.

This model is not perfect: democratic participation is weak, freedom of expression limited, the ruling party is quasi-hegemonic. This document borrows Singapore's budgetary efficiency, not its political authoritarianism.

5.13 — Rule #3: Prohibition on delegating sovereign functions by obligation

The State cannot bypass the ceiling by requiring businesses to fund public missions. If an obligation economically amounts to a tax, it must be counted as such. No sleight of hand.

5.14 — Rule #4: The four-fifths lock

These rules can only be modified with a **four-fifths** (or three-quarters) **majority of each chamber** (Parliament AND Senate, separately). This is virtually unattainable in practice. No normal political coalition can gather such consensus in both chambers simultaneously. Rules become virtually inviolable, except by broad consensus.

5.15 — Case study (empirical example): The Swiss debt brake (*Schuldenbremse*)

Switzerland adopted in 2001, by referendum (85% yes), a constitutional mechanism of budgetary discipline known as the “debt brake” [72][73]. This mechanism offers a valuable empirical precedent for evaluating the feasibility of rules proposed in this chapter.

What worked

Spectacular debt reduction. Between 2003 and 2023, the Confederation's gross debt fell from 130 billion CHF to less than 85 billion CHF, from 25% to about 12% of GDP [74]. This is exceptional performance among developed economies.

Counter-cyclical discipline. The mechanism requires that spending not exceed cycle-adjusted revenues. In growth periods, surplus is mandatory. In recession, a limited deficit is tolerated. The cyclical factor (ratio between potential and actual GDP) disciplines automatically [72].

Strong democratic legitimacy. Approved by popular referendum, the mechanism enjoys rare citizen acceptance. Political attempts to bypass it are unpopular.

Regulated flexibility. A compensation account absorbs temporary gaps between forecasts and outcomes. Overruns must be absorbed within the following six years [73].

What poses problems

Loophole through para-state entities. The rule only applies to the Confederation. Cantons, municipalities, and entities like railways or postal services can borrow without federal constraint. The rule's "perimeter" leaves blind spots [75].

Circumvention through extraordinary spending. Since 2020, Covid-19 was classified as "extraordinary spending" outside the brake. Debt temporarily climbed. The repayment mechanism exists, but political temptation to extend the exception remains [74].

No automatic sanction. If Parliament votes a non-compliant budget, there is no automatic dissolution. The Court of Auditors signals, but does not impose. The system relies on Swiss political culture, difficult to export.

Potential underinvestment. Some economists criticize a bias toward excessive austerity, to the detriment of long-term infrastructure [75]. The debate remains open.

What we keep from the Swiss model

- The **constitutional principle** of balanced or surplus budget
- The **compensation account** to absorb temporary fluctuations
- **Legitimization by referendum** of fundamental budgetary rules
- The **cyclical factor** that allows limited deficits in recession

What we improve

- **Expanded perimeter:** our system includes all levies and all public entities in the ceiling, not just the Confederation
- **Automatic sanction:** slippage below threshold triggers elections, not just a report
- **Permanent mandatory surplus:** not just balance, but a surplus that feeds the reserve fund
- **Recall mechanism:** citizens can sanction in real time, not just at ordinary elections

What we don't retain

- **The "extraordinary spending" exception:** our system uses the objective criterion of real GDP (drop $> X\%$) to qualify a crisis. No discretionary political qualification
- **No constraint on lower levels:** all levels count in the global ceiling
- **Trust in political culture:** our system relies on automatic mechanisms, not on the goodwill of elected officials

Chapitre VI

MONEY: THE END OF MONOPOLY

The State has a secret weapon to circumvent budget constraints: **the printing press**. Cannot raise taxes? Print. Cannot cut spending? Print. The inflation that follows is an invisible, unvoted tax that hits the poorest first—those with no assets to protect themselves.

The solution is not to forbid the State from managing a currency. It is to subject it to competition.

6.1 — Currency Competition

Gold, Bitcoin, private currencies, regional or even foreign currencies, are authorized in **all transactions**. Everyone can choose their currency. The State continues to issue its own, but it no longer has a monopoly.

Specifications govern private currencies to prevent abuse: reserve transparency, mandatory audits, user protection. And above all: all transactions, whatever currency used, remain subject to tax. Changing currency does not allow evading one's contribution. Transactions with the State (taxes, fines, public contracts) are in national currency—giving it a natural competitive advantage against foreign currencies.

What happens then? If the State devalues its currency through inflation, citizens flee it. They turn to more stable currencies. The State is punished automatically, without any body needing to intervene. **The market disciplines**. This mechanism rests on a simple idea: prices aggregate *dispersed knowledge* that no plan-

ner can centralize [11]. When citizens flee a currency, they vote with their feet—what Hirschman calls *exit* [12], the most direct form of sanction.

6.2 — Stability as Competitive Advantage

In this context, the State has every incentive to maintain a stable currency. This is its advantage against Bitcoin (volatile) or gold (impractical daily). A stable national currency, backed by constitutional budget discipline, becomes attractive.

The State no longer needs to print to “lubricate” the economy. **Stability itself becomes the lubricant**. Trust replaces manipulation.

6.3 — Adjustment Through Reduction, Not Inflation

In case of crisis, if the budget cushion is insufficient, we cut spending. We do not create money. Reduction is painful but fast. The economy adjusts and recovers. There are no inflationary aftereffects, no accumulated debt, no crisis artificially prolonged. Inflation modifies agents' *expectations* [90]: once established, it self-perpetuates, because everyone adjusts their behavior in anticipation of the next rise.

This is the lesson of the Austrian school, confirmed by the Milei experience in Argentina.

6.4 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #1: Ecuadorian Dollarization (2000)

Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its official currency in January 2000, after a catastrophic monetary crisis [91][92]. The sucre had lost 67% of its value in one year. Inflation reached 96%. Banks were collapsing.

What Worked

End of hyperinflation. Inflation dropped from 96% (2000) to 2-3% by 2004 [92]. Price stability became the norm. Savers stopped fleeing to real assets.




Figure 6.1 — Ecuador: effect of dollarization on inflation

Imported credibility. By abandoning its currency, Ecuador “borrowed” the Federal Reserve’s credibility. Interest rates dropped. Foreign investment stabilized.

Forced budget discipline. Without the printing press, the government can no longer monetize its deficits. It must balance or borrow on markets—at rates that punish irresponsibility.

Durability. 25 years later, despite left-wing (Correa) and right-wing governments, no one has reintroduced a national currency. Popular consensus remains strong.

What Is Problematic

Loss of monetary policy. Ecuador cannot devalue to absorb an external shock (oil price drop, for example). Adjustment goes entirely through wages and employment [93].

Dollar dependence. Fed decisions are made for the American economy, not Ecuador's. A US rate hike can strangle the local economy.

No lender of last resort. In case of banking crisis, the State cannot create money to bail out. Systemic risk remains [92].

Excessive rigidity? Some economists consider the system too rigid, depriving the country of macroeconomic adjustment tools [93].

What We Keep from the Ecuadorian Model

- **Discipline through impossibility of monetization:** when you cannot print, you manage
- **Price stability as a public good** acquired by abandoning monetary monopoly
- **Proof of political durability:** 25 years without reversal

What We Improve

- **Competition rather than abandonment:** our system maintains a national currency, but in competition with others. The State keeps a monetary policy tool, but disciplined by the market
- **No dependence on a foreign central bank:** the diversity of accepted currencies avoids dependence on a single authority
- **Preserved flexibility:** the State can adjust its policy, but citizens vote with their feet (and wallets)

What We Do Not Adopt

- **Total abandonment of monetary sovereignty:** we keep a national currency
- **Dependence on a single foreign issuer:** competition implies several alternatives
- **Absence of lender of last resort:** private insurance and risk compartmentalization replace this role

6.5 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #2: The Israeli Stabilization Plan (1985)

Israel offers a fascinating counter-example: how to stop hyperinflation without abandoning one's currency [94][95]. In 1984, inflation reached 450% per year. The country was on the brink of economic collapse.

What Worked

Credibility shock. The plan combined temporary price and wage freeze, drastic deficit reduction (from 15% to 1% of GDP), and shekel anchor to the dollar [94]. Inflation fell to 20% in one year, then to single digits in following years.




Figure 6.2 — Israel: effect of the stabilization plan on inflation

Simultaneous structural reforms. The freeze was not an end in itself, but a pause to allow real adjustments: subsidy cuts, privatizations, gradual liberalization [95].

Government-union-employer coordination. The temporary “social pact” allowed absorbing the shock without social explosion. Each party accepted immediate sacrifices for collective gain.

Maintained monetary sovereignty. Unlike Ecuador, Israel kept its currency and central bank. Discipline came from policy, not tool abandonment.

What Is Problematic

The price freeze is not libertarian. Temporarily controlling prices violates free market principles. It was an emergency measure, not a permanent model.

Dependence on political will. The plan worked because the national unity government wanted it. Without this rare consensus, it would have failed. “Political culture” is not exportable [95].

Massive external aid. The United States provided \$1.5 billion in emergency aid. Not all countries have such a generous ally.

Possible relapses. Without a permanent constitutional mechanism, the risk of inflation return exists. Discipline remains political, therefore fragile.

What We Keep from the Israeli Model

- Proof that one can **stabilize without abandoning** one’s currency
- The importance of **structural reforms** accompanying stabilization
- The principle of **credible shock** rather than gradual adjustment

What We Improve

- **Permanent automatic mechanism:** our system inscribes discipline in the constitution, not in a government’s will
- **Monetary competition:** discipline comes from the market (flight to other currencies), not from administrative freeze
- **No price controls:** price freedom is preserved even in crisis

What We Do Not Adopt

- **Price and wage freeze:** incompatible with libertarian principles
- **Dependence on exceptional political consensus:** our system works with ordinary politicians
- **Need for massive external aid:** the system must be self-sufficient

Chapitre VII

PROTECTING OURSELVES WITHOUT THE WELFARE STATE

Libertarianism is often accused of abandoning the most vulnerable. This criticism would be valid if we eliminated all protection without putting anything in its place. But there is a different path: **market-based protection, with a self-financed safety net.**

7.1 — Constitutional common baselines

Before detailing each insurance, a fundamental principle: **common baselines are enshrined in the constitution.** This prevents Parliament from inflating them indefinitely—which would recreate the welfare state through the back door.

What is constitutionalized:

- The *principle* of the common baseline (minimum coverage)
- The *maximum scope* of the baseline (limited list of what can be included)
- The *pooling mechanism* between insurers
- The *prohibition on expansion* of the baseline without a 4/5 majority in each chamber

What remains legislative: technical parameters (amounts, durations, rates), inflation adjustment, practical modalities.

7.2 — Pricing: free but pooled

For each insurance, the principle is the same:

- **Free pricing:** insurers set their prices, in competition
- **Pooling of heavy risks:** each insurer contributes to a common pot proportionally to its number of insured; the pot compensates those who have more costly profiles

Result: the insurer no longer has an incentive to select “good risks”. It makes money by being **efficient**, not by sorting clients. Competition plays on service quality, management efficiency, and supplementary benefits. This mechanism neutralizes two classic pitfalls of insurance markets: *adverse selection* (insurers flee costly profiles [59]) and *moral hazard* (the insured overconsumes since they don’t pay directly [58]).

7.3 — Health insurance

Mandatory for all. Without insurance, the free rider shows up at the emergency room and makes others pay. The common baseline guarantees essential care.

The hybrid system for children. The child did not choose their parents or their health problems. Several funding sources, combinable:

- *Parental insurance*: the parent contributes for the child
- *Child insurance*: the child is enrolled, repays from future income
- *Mix*: depending on means and needs, adjustable over time

The child repays what they cost—no modulation based on future income, otherwise it's a disguised tax. If repayment is too heavy, they can enter an autonomous community to pay off their debt (see section V-bis).

The parent who becomes wealthy can take over and catch up on arrears, freeing the child from their debt faster.

Child insurance is retroactively activatable in case of emergency: we treat first, regularize later.

Severe chronic diseases: the State intervenes. Childhood cancer, cystic fibrosis, type 1 diabetes can generate hundreds of thousands of euros. No individual can repay that. The State covers severe chronic diseases defined in the constitutional baseline.

Sanction for consanguinity. Consanguineous marriages drastically increase the risk of genetic diseases. If the State pays for chronic diseases, it can sanction behaviors that deliberately multiply them. Consanguineous parents **who knew or should have known** bear the additional costs. Good faith cases (unknown adultery, clinic error, adoption, unknown origins) are excused. No retroactive effect before the transition.

7.4 — Unemployment insurance

Optional, with explicit opt-out. By default, you are insured. An active step is required to unsubscribe. This protects the absent-minded while preserving freedom.

A common baseline guarantees minimum duration and benefit level for those insured. This baseline is pooled among insurers. Competition plays on supplementary benefits and support.

Insurers have an incentive to help their clients find work quickly: the shorter the unemployment, the less they pay. **The system self-optimizes.**

Those who choose not to insure themselves accept their choice: in case of job loss, they can join an autonomous community (see section V-bis).

7.5 — Education insurance

Flexible hybrid system. Homeschooling is a right. Forcing a single education insurance would amount to imposing a model.

Several funding sources, combinable and adjustable over time:

- *Parental insurance*: the parent contributes, insurance pays
- *Child insurance*: the child is enrolled, repays from future income
- *Child's work*: student job, work-study, apprenticeship
- *Direct loan*: classic student loan

Example pathways:

- Primary/middle school: parental insurance
- High school: mix parental insurance + job
- Higher education: child insurance + job + some parental insurance
- Or any other combination depending on each person's means and choices

Possible transitions:

- Parent loses job → switch to child insurance
- Child finds a good student job → reduce insurance
- Parent becomes wealthy → takes over and can catch up on arrears

The child repays what they cost. If repayment is too heavy, they can enter an autonomous community.

Parents in autonomous community. The organization can supplement them: either by directly paying the children's education insurance, or by giving money to parents with destination control (strict earmarking). The second option preserves their dignity as parents who "pay for their children."

What remains mandatory: periodic checks (verified homeschooling), the minimum knowledge baseline (reading, writing, arithmetic).

Trainings without job prospects disappear. Funding follows results: professional integration.

Theoretical foundation. Murray Rothbard demonstrated that mandatory free education, far from liberating, creates dependence on the State and standardizes pathways [6]. The system proposed here restores parental responsibility and diversity of pedagogical approaches.

7.6 — Pension capitalization

Optional, with explicit opt-out. Same logic as unemployment insurance: insured by default, active step to unsubscribe.

Each person saves for their own retirement via private pension funds. No hidden debt, no untenable promises, no generational conflict. **What we have saved, we recover.**

Those who choose not to save accept their choice: old and without resources, they can join an autonomous community.

For immigrants arriving late: economic immigration can be filtered by age or require starting capital. Late arrivals may be subject to higher contributions to catch up. Political refugees enter the general system—autonomous communities welcome them if they lack means.

Why capitalization, not pay-as-you-go? This document totally rejects the pay-as-you-go system. Pay-as-you-go is structurally unsustainable: it's a pyramid-type system that depends on perpetual demographic growth. Worse, it enslaves future generations—children are forced to contribute to pay their elders' pensions, without any choice. The implicit debt of pay-as-you-go systems typically represents 200 to 300% of GDP—a time bomb. It's a problem of *intertemporal constraint*: today's promises commit future resources that no one has provisioned [64].

The transition from the current system (pay-as-you-go) to capitalization is possible. **Appendix F** provides rigorous demonstration: a simulator has modeled this transition for 7 European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Poland), with explicit and verifiable parameters. Result: the transition takes 70 to 85 years depending on the country, with a temporary differential of 8-11% of GDP for 40 years—then all debts converge to zero.

7.7 — Case study (empirical example) #1: Swiss health insurance (LAMal, 1996)

Switzerland reformed its health system in 1996 with the Health Insurance Act (LAMal) [60][61]. This system combines mandatory insurance, competing private insurers, and a risk compensation mechanism—a model close to the one proposed here.

What worked

Universal coverage without state monopoly. 100% of the population is covered by private insurers [61]. No competing public system. Mandatory insurance eliminates free riders.

Competition on efficiency. Insurers cannot refuse clients for basic insurance. They compete on premiums, customer service, and supplementary insurance [60].

Risk compensation. A compensation pool redistributes among insurers according to the age and sex of the insured. This partially neutralizes risk selection [62].

Free choice of doctor and insurer. The patient chooses their practitioner. They can change insurers each year for basic insurance. Freedom is preserved.

Cantonal subsidiarity. Cantons can adapt certain parameters. Premiums vary from one canton to another, reflecting real local costs.

What poses problems

Cost explosion. Premiums have tripled since 1996. Switzerland spends 12% of its GDP on health, among the highest rates in the world [62]. Competition has not curbed costs.

Persistent risk selection. Despite compensation, insurers have developed subtle strategies: targeted marketing, high deductibles attractive to the healthy, reimbursement delays [61].

Growing complexity. The basic benefits catalog expands under political pressure. The constitutional prohibition on expansion proposed here would have avoided this drift.

Public subsidies. One third of the insured benefit from cantonal subsidies to pay their premiums. The system is not fully self-financed [62].

What we keep from the Swiss model

- The **principle of mandatory insurance** with competing private insurers
- The **risk compensation mechanism** between insurers
- The **free choice** of insurer and practitioner
- The prohibition on **refusing clients** for basic insurance

What we improve

- **Constitutional lock on the baseline:** the benefits catalog can only expand at 4/5. Switzerland lacks this safeguard
- **Expanded risk compensation:** our system includes chronic diseases, not just age and sex
- **No public subsidy:** the autonomous community system replaces contribution aid
- **Severe chronic diseases separate:** separate state funding for catastrophic cases, avoiding pressure on ordinary premiums

What we don't adopt

- **Continuous catalog expansion:** the political drift toward ever more coverage

- **Premium subsidies:** our system prefers integration in autonomous communities to direct financial aid
- **Tolerance of residual selection:** our pooling is stricter

Note: the Belgian mutuelles system. Belgium offers an older variant (since 1850) [63]. Mutuelles there are historically linked to ideological “pillars”: Christian, socialist, liberal. Each political family has its mutuelle. This organization shows that competition can coexist with strong identities. However, competition is less fierce than in Switzerland: historical loyalties slow mobility, and the system remains more administered than market-driven. The Swiss model, more recent and more competitive, is closer to what is proposed here.

7.8 — Case study (empirical example) #2: Chilean AFPs (1981-present)

Chile was the first country to fully privatize its pension system in 1981, under Pinochet, with the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) [65][66]. This is the major historical precedent for mandatory capitalization.

What worked

Massive capital accumulation. AFP funds represent 80% of Chilean GDP [66]. This savings has financed local investment and contributed to economic growth.

Positive real returns. Despite fluctuations, the annualized real return over 40 years is about 8% [65]. Contributors have seen their savings grow.

Transparency. Each contributor has an individual account. They know exactly what they have accumulated. No “hidden debt” as in pay-as-you-go.

Portability. Savings belong to the contributor. They follow them if they change employer, country, or situation.

Budget discipline. The system has not created implicit liabilities for the State. Promises are funded, not deferred to future generations.

What poses problems

Insufficient pensions. Despite returns, many retirees receive low pensions [67]. Causes: insufficient contributions (low wages, informal work, career interruptions), high management fees, underestimated life expectancy.

Oligopolistic concentration. The market has consolidated around a few dominant AFPs. The promised competition has not fully played on fees [66].

Gender inequalities. Women, with shorter careers and lower wages, accumulate less. The system amplifies labor market inequalities [67].

Absence of safety net for non-contributors. Those who never contributed (informal work) reach retirement with nothing. The State had to create a guaranteed minimum pension—a return to public funding.

Popular rejection. Massive demonstrations contested the system in 2016 and after. The model is politically fragile [67].

What we keep from the Chilean model

- The **principle of capitalization**: everyone saves for their own retirement
- The **transparent and portable individual account**
- **Budget discipline**: no unfunded promises
- **Freedom of choice** between funds

What we improve

- **Explicit opt-out, not opt-in**: by default, we contribute. This protects the absent-minded and vulnerable
- **Autonomous community safety net**: those who haven't contributed are not abandoned, but integrated into a productive structure
- **Strengthened competition**: our system prohibits excessive concentrations (shareholder compartmentalization)
- **Planned transition**: the shift from pay-as-you-go to capitalization is organized over several decades (see Appendix F)

What we don't adopt

- **Absolute obligation**: our system allows explicit opt-out, with assumed consequences
- **Absence of social safety net**: autonomous communities replace the state-guaranteed minimum pension
- **Gender-differentiated actuarial calculation**: our system can impose uniform tables to avoid penalizing women

7.9 — Case study (empirical example) #3: Singapore's Central Provident Fund (1955-present)


Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) is often cited as the most accomplished capitalization model [125][126]. Created in 1955 under British rule, it has evolved to cover retirement, health, housing, and education—all without pay-as-you-go.

What worked

Effective universal coverage. 99% of working-age Singaporeans contribute to CPF [125]. The system is mandatory for employees and optional (but incentivized) for the self-employed.

Guaranteed real return. The CPF offers a guaranteed interest rate of 2.5% to 4% depending on accounts, above inflation [126]. Unlike Chilean AFPs, the contributor doesn't suffer market volatility on their basic account.

Intelligent multi-use. The CPF is not just a retirement fund: - **Ordinary Account:** housing, education, investments - **Special Account:** retirement (better rate) - **Medisave:** health expenses



This flexibility allows using savings to buy housing (80% of Singaporeans are homeowners) while preserving retirement.

No implicit debt. The Singaporean government has no hidden pension debt. Each obligation is fully provisioned. This is the opposite of France where the implicit pension debt represents about 300% of GDP.

Macroeconomic discipline. The CPF's forced savings (37% of salary, 20% employee + 17% employer) financed Singapore's industrialization in the 1960s-1980s. Accumulated capital is reinvested locally.

What poses problems

Very high contribution rate. 37% of gross salary is deducted—more than in France. The difference: the money belongs to the contributor; it is not redistributed. But the burden on labor costs remains heavy.

Insufficient return for low wages. With 2.5-4% guaranteed return, very low wages don't accumulate enough for a decent retirement. The government had to create supplements (Silver Support Scheme) [126].

Reduced flexibility at retirement. The CPF imposes a minimum “Retirement Sum” locked until 65, then converted to a life annuity. Singaporeans cannot freely dispose of their savings at retirement.

Dependence on government. The CPF is managed by a government agency, not by competing private funds. Political risk exists: a future government could change the rules.

What we keep from the Singaporean model

- **The principle of individual capitalization:** the money belongs to the contributor
- **Multi-use flexibility:** retirement, health, housing in the same vehicle
- **Absence of implicit debt:** everything is provisioned
- **Macroeconomic discipline:** forced savings finance investment

What we improve

- **Competition between funds:** our system allows choice between private funds, not a state monopoly
- **Explicit opt-out:** the freedom not to contribute (with assumed consequences)
- **Autonomous community safety net:** those without enough are not abandoned, they join a productive community
- **Market rate of return:** no artificial guarantee that can mask risks

What we don't adopt

- **State monopoly:** management must be private and competitive
- **Fixed contribution rate:** our system allows more flexibility
- **Mandatory life annuity:** the contributor decides how to use their savings at retirement

7.10 — Case study (empirical example) #4: The Dutch system (2006-present)

The Netherlands has reformed its pension system to combine minimal pay-as-you-go and massive capitalization via professional pension funds [127]. With 1,800 billion euros in assets (180% of GDP), it's the most capitalized system in Europe.

What worked

Massive capitalization. Dutch pension funds manage 180% of GDP in assets [127]. Each worker accumulates rights proportional to their contributions and returns.

Social partnership. Funds are managed jointly by unions and employers, sector by sector. This shared governance has ensured the system's political stability.

Very limited pay-as-you-go. The AOW (universal basic pension) represents only 50% of final salary for a single person. The rest comes from capitalization. The intergenerational burden is minimized.

Transparency. Every Dutch person can consult their "pensioenoverzicht" detailing their accumulated rights in each fund.

What poses problems

Underfunding crisis. Low rates since 2008 have put defined-benefit funds in difficulty. Several have had to reduce promised pensions [127].

Complexity. The system mixes public pension, professional funds, and individual savings. Three pillars, three logics, three administrations.

Sectoral rigidity. A worker changing sectors sometimes must change funds, with complex transfer rules.

What we keep from the Dutch model

- The **dominance of capitalization** over pay-as-you-go
- **Transparency** of accumulated rights
- **Discipline** of professional pension funds

What we improve

- **Total portability:** the account follows the worker, not the sector
- **No pay-as-you-go at all:** our system is 100% capitalization
- **Simplicity:** one pillar, not three

Chapitre VIII

THE FLAT TAX

The tax system of Libertarian Libertarianism rests on a simple principle: **a single, visible tax on real enrichment**. No tax layer cake, no loopholes, no hidden taxes.

8.1 — The single income tax

A single income tax, at the same rate for everyone. No brackets, no exceptions, no loopholes. Each euro earned is taxed the same way.

The flat allowance. Before applying the single rate, a flat allowance is deducted from gross income. This allowance—initially set at €500 per month—applies to everyone, regardless of income level. This is not an exemption for low incomes: it is a universal deduction that makes the flat tax **effectively progressive** without introducing brackets or complexity.


Example with a 25% rate and €500 allowance: - Income of €2000 → taxed on €1500 → tax of €375 (18.75% effective) - Income of €5000 → taxed on €4500 → tax of €1125 (22.5% effective) - Income of €10000 → taxed on €9500 → tax of €2375 (23.75% effective)

Everyone pays, but the allowance represents a larger share of small incomes. The system remains simple—a single rate—while accounting for actual contributory capacity.

Incorruptible indexation. The allowance must evolve with the cost of living. But who calculates this evolution? To prevent any political manipulation, the allowance is indexed to an **incorruptible price index** (PPD—Pseudo-Dynamic Basket), automatically calculated from anonymized transaction data. The complete mechanism is described in [Appendix E](#).

The flat tax applies to NET income (after allowance). Salaries, dividends, realized capital gains, interest, rents—all income is taxed, but after deducting actual expenses. For rental income: gross rent – expenses – work – loan interest = taxable income. We tax real enrichment, not gross flow. Taxing gross would be confiscatory and punish investment. **This principle is constitutionalized**—the definition of net income can only be modified at 4/5 of each chamber.

The effect: everyone contributes, so everyone has a voice in census voting. The poor pay little, but they pay—and they vote. The rich pay a lot, and their weight reflects their contribution. The link between contribution and representation becomes transparent.



8.2 — What is taxed

- **Salaries** (net of social contributions, which become private insurance)
- **Dividends** (net of tax already paid by the company, if applicable)
- **Realized capital gains** (at time of sale, not on paper)
- **Interest** (on savings, bonds, loans)
- **Rents** (net of expenses, work, loan interest)
- **Self-employment income** (net of business expenses)

8.3 — What is NOT taxed

- **Wealth as a stock.** Owning a house, stocks, gold, does not generate tax. Only flow (income, realized gain) is taxed.



- **Inheritances.** The income that built the wealth was already taxed at creation. Inheritance taxes often force liquidation—family business, farm, house—and constitute confiscatory double taxation. Wealth transfers freely.
- **Gifts.** Same logic as inheritances.

- **Unrealized gains.** As long as you don't sell, you don't pay. Paper taxation would force selling to pay tax—a disguised spoliation.
- **Asset transfers.** Buying a house means exchanging money for real estate—an asset transfer, not enrichment. Current “notary fees” are actually transfer duties, a disguised tax on this transfer. They are abolished. Only the notary's fees for actual work remain (drafting, verification, registration). Effect: mobility is smoothed. You can move for a job, adapt your housing to your family, retire to the countryside—without losing tens of thousands of euros in taxes.
- **Fuel.** Fuel taxes are regressive and hypocritical: the rich pay without flinching and pollute as much as they want, the poor are strangled going to work. Result: no less pollution, just more inequality. If we want to reduce pollution, we regulate: emission standards, vehicle bans, low-emission zones. The rule applies equally to all. No right to pollute for those who can pay. Harmful behavior should be banned or regulated—not monetized.

8.4 — VAT and all indirect taxes are abolished

The flat tax replaces **all** indirect taxes:

- **VAT** ($\approx 20\%$ on each purchase)
- **Energy excise duties** (electricity, gas, heating oil)
- **Fuel taxes** (TICPE and equivalents)
- **Transfer duties** (“notary fees”)
- **Property taxes** (on property as a stock)
- **Taxes on insurance, communications, etc.**

These taxes are invisible, complex, and above all **regressive**: they weigh proportionally more on low incomes. A modest household devotes 100% of its income to consumption and thus pays 20% VAT on everything. A wealthy household saves part of its income and thus partially “escapes” VAT.

Abolishing these taxes therefore massively benefits low incomes. A 20% gain on all purchases, plus the disappearance of energy taxes (heating, electricity, gas for commuting) represents a substantial increase in purchasing power—far greater than what transition simulations measure, since they only count the fiscal differential effect, not the effect of abolishing indirect taxes.

With the flat tax, the citizen sees exactly what they pay to the State. No more hidden tax in every purchase. No more complexity for businesses. No more distortion between consumption and savings.

8.5 — Reasoning in real purchasing power

A change in tax framework changes the relevant metric. Comparing nominal amounts between two different tax systems is misleading.

Why nominal comparisons are misleading

In a system with 20% VAT, an income of €1,500 buys €1,250 worth of goods and services (the rest goes to VAT). In a system without indirect taxes, the same real purchasing power requires only €1,250 in nominal income.

This gap applies to all income flows:

- **Salaries.** A nominally lower salary in the new system may offer equivalent or higher purchasing power.
- **Pensions.** A €1,200 pension without indirect taxes may be worth as much as a €1,500 pension in the old system.
- **Capital income.** Dividends, rents, interest—all are affected the same way.

The methodological principle

The model presented here reasons in **net purchasing power** and **real flows**, not in gross amounts inherited from a different tax framework.

This approach:

- avoids false debates about “income cuts” that are not;
- allows honest evaluation of each citizen category’s situation;
- makes international comparisons more relevant.

Consequence for transition financing

This purchasing power neutrality has a major implication for any transition from the old system:

- **Required real flow is reduced.** If one euro in the new system equals €1.20 in the old (thanks to indirect tax abolition), nominal financing needs decrease—without loss of purchasing power for the beneficiary.
- **Transition effort is lightened.** Less nominal flow to pay means less effort for contributors.
- **Effective economic rights are fully respected.** This is not a “reduction”—it is an adaptation to the new tax framework.


This logic applies universally: pensions, benefits, ongoing contracts. It is a structural lever for reducing transition costs, without sacrifice for beneficiaries.

Application to pension transition. Appendix E applies this principle to financing pensions inherited from the old pay-as-you-go system. The temporary differential to finance is lightened by this purchasing power neutrality.

8.6 — The effect on business competitiveness

The reform does not only concern individuals. Businesses benefit from a double virtuous effect.

Reduction of employer contributions. In the current system, employer contributions represent about 25-30% of gross salary on top. These charges increase labor costs and penalize employment—especially for low wages where the relative burden is maximum. In the new system, social insurance (health, unemployment, pension, education) becomes private insurance paid by the worker from their net salary. Employer contributions disappear. The employer pays only gross salary.



Immediate effect on competitiveness. This labor cost reduction makes businesses more competitive—both on the domestic market and for export. Locally made products become cheaper. Businesses can invest, hire, or lower prices.

Domestic market boost. Simultaneously, households—especially low incomes—see their purchasing power increase substantially (+€142/month for a €2000 salary from day one). Yet modest households consume nearly all their income. This additional demand directly benefits local businesses: shops, services, crafts. Domestic market growth feeds business growth that feeds it—a virtuous circle.

Double benefit for exports. Exporting businesses win on both fronts: reduced production costs (fewer employer contributions) and strengthened domestic demand (enabling economies of scale). They become more competitive against foreign competition.

Corporate tax: same rate, same allowance. The flat tax applies to businesses exactly as to individuals: same single rate on net profit, same flat allowance. A micro-enterprise with €1000 monthly profit benefits from the allowance like a modest employee. A large company with millions in profits pays at near-nominal rate. The formula is identical for all—only the result differs.

This uniformity has a major macroeconomic advantage: **the system becomes indifferent to income distribution.** Whether GDP is distributed among many small incomes or few large incomes, total tax revenue remains predictable: it is $(GDP - \text{sum of allowances}) \times \text{rate}$. Simulations do not need to model distribution—they work directly on aggregates.

Allowance and debt repayment. The flat allowance applies only to the flat tax—that is, the State's current budget. The differential rate, which repays debts (transition debt, nominal pension debt, inherited public debt), is calculated on gross income, without allowance. Consequence for simulations: at the macroeconomic level, the allowance has no impact on debt repayment calculations. Only the differential counts, and it applies uniformly. The allowance is already integrated into State current budget calibration from the start.

Natural anti-abuse. Can one multiply companies to multiply allowances? In theory yes, but it is not profitable. The tax saving per additional company is small: allowance \times rate. With a €500/month allowance and 20% rate, each fictitious company saves only €100/month—far less than administrative costs (accounting, declarations, management fees). The system naturally protects itself: the modest allowance and low rate make optimization by entity multiplication unprofitable.

8.7 — Vacant housing: incentive, not wealth tax

Wealth as a stock is not taxed—that would contradict the system's principles. Exception: housing vacant beyond a defined duration must be put into circulation.

This is not a wealth tax. It is an incentive to generate the flow (rent) that will be normally taxed. At most, you pay as if you were renting—never more. Might as well actually rent, choose your tenant, and keep the net rent.

The mechanism includes a grace period, then a progressive tax on estimated rental value, up to a ceiling aligned with the flat tax rate. Work suspends the delay. Actual rental resets the counter. Mechanism details (phases, tiers, anti-yo-yo rules) are presented in **Appendix H**.

What is constitutionalized: The principle (progressive incentive, ceiling aligned with flat tax, anti-yo-yo). Exact settings are local legislative calibration.

8.8 — Rate modification

The flat tax rate is not inscribed in the constitution, but its modification requires a qualified majority:

- **Increase:** 2/3 of Parliament (census). Those who pay most have more weight, and they must massively consent
- **Decrease:** 2/3 of Senate (equal). Every citizen can defend their property

Why this asymmetry? The Senate protects fundamental rights. Property is one. Lowering taxes protects property—so the Senate (equal) decides. Raising taxes takes property—so those being taken from must massively consent (census Parliament).

This is not a technical trick. It is the direct consequence of the founding principle: property is a right to defend, not a state concession.

This asymmetric mechanism creates a virtuous bias: **raising taxes is difficult, lowering them is easier.** The system naturally leans toward fewer levies.

8.9 — Tax conciliation in case of disagreement

It may happen that the Senate votes a decrease and Parliament an increase. This is not absurd: in a system without massive redistribution, the less wealthy might want to pay less tax, while the wealthier might consider that a well-funded sovereign State (police, justice, diplomacy) is good for the economy and their investments.

In case of disagreement, a joint committee is convened:

- **Composition:** equal number of senators and parliamentarians, designated by each chamber
- **Voting rule:** each member has one vote (no census weighting in committee). Simple majority to adopt a compromise
- **Deadline:** a deadline is set to find agreement, extendable once by vote of both chambers
- **If agreement is found:** the compromise rate is submitted to both chambers for ratification by simple majority (no longer need 2/3, the compromise has already been negotiated)
- **If no agreement is found:** the status quo applies. The rate remains unchanged. A new attempt is possible in the next legislature, which can be triggered by recall.

This mechanism forces dialogue between the two legitimacies. No one wins automatically. The status quo protects against non-consensual changes.

8.10 — Case study (empirical example): Baltic flat taxes (1994-present)

Estonia was the first European country to adopt a flat tax in 1994, followed by Lithuania (1994) and Latvia (1995) [77][78]. These three countries offer 30 years of hindsight on a single-rate tax—a valuable *empirical precedent* [76], even if the post-Soviet context limits direct transferability.

What worked

Administrative simplicity. The Estonian system fits on one page. Tax returns take a few minutes online [77]. Complexity disappeared. Compliance costs plummeted.

Strong economic growth. The Baltic countries experienced average growth of 5-7% per year in the 2000s [78]. The flat tax helped attract investments and formalize the underground economy.

Reduced tax evasion. When tax is simple and moderate, the incentive to cheat decreases. Estonia saw tax revenues increase despite a lower rate [77].

Economic neutrality. No distortion between income sources. Capital and labor are taxed at the same rate. Economic decisions are no longer dictated by tax optimization.

Political stability. The system survived multiple political alternations. Even left-wing parties did not abolish the flat tax—proof of its popular acceptance.

What poses problems

Abandoned progressivity. The Baltic countries eventually reintroduced elements of progressivity [79]. Lithuania adopted a second rate in 2019. Latvia followed. Estonia resists but introduced an exemption threshold.

Insufficient revenues. Initial rates (24-26%) were not enough to fund European-quality public services. Pressure to increase revenues led to adjustments [79].

Perceived inequalities. The billionaire and the worker pay the same percentage. Politically, this is hard to defend against egalitarian discourse.

Context dependence. The flat tax was adopted after Soviet collapse, in a clean-slate context. Importing this model into a country with an established tax system is more complex.

No constitutional lock. Rates were modified several times by simple law. Stability is not guaranteed.

What we keep from the Baltic model

- **Radical simplicity:** one rate, no loopholes, no brackets
- **Economic neutrality:** capital and labor treated equally

- **Effect on underground economy:** a simple tax reduces evasion
- **Proof of feasibility:** 30 years of real operation

What we improve

- **Constitutional lock:** the flat tax principle is inscribed in the constitution. No return to progressivity without 4/5 majority
- **Protective asymmetry:** raising the rate is harder than lowering it
- **Levy ceiling:** the single rate fits within a global constitutional ceiling
- **Universal flat allowance:** instead of an exemption threshold (which creates a class of non-contributors), an identical allowance for all preserves the citizen-contribution link while making the system effectively progressive

What we don't adopt

- **Easy rate modification:** our system locks the principle, not the exact rate, but protects against increases
- **No global ceiling:** Baltic countries have no constitutional levy ceiling
- **Pure exemption threshold:** our flat allowance is different—everyone receives it, even high incomes. It does not create “non-contributors”

8.11 — Case study (empirical example) #2: Hong Kong (1947-present)

Hong Kong has maintained a flat tax on personal income since 1947 [163]. With a maximum rate of 15% (and often less thanks to deductions), it is one of the simplest and lowest tax systems in the world among developed economies.

What worked

Exceptional economic growth. Hong Kong went from a poor colonial port to one of the world's wealthiest economies [163]. GDP per capita exceeds most European countries.

Tax stability. The maximum rate of 15% has never been raised in 75 years. This predictability attracted investments and talent.

Radical simplicity. The tax return fits on a few pages. Compliance costs are minimal.

Sufficient revenues. Despite low rates, Hong Kong has always generated massive budget surpluses, accumulating \$500 billion USD in reserves [163].

No VAT. Hong Kong never introduced VAT, contrary to IMF recommendations. Simplicity was preserved.

What poses problems

Inequalities. Absence of tax redistribution contributed to extreme inequalities. Hong Kong's Gini coefficient is among the highest of developed economies.

Unaffordable housing. Property prices are among the highest in the world. Low property taxation contributed to speculation.

Dependence on land revenues. The government draws much of its revenue from land sales, not tax. This model is not reproducible everywhere.

Absence of democracy. Hong Kong never had full universal suffrage. The tax system was never subjected to electoral pressure—which partly explains its stability.

End of autonomy (2020). Integration into mainland China threatens the tax model. The future is uncertain.

What we keep from the Hong Kong model

- **Low-rate flat tax** (15% or less) as an objective
- **Absence of VAT:** our system abolishes all indirect taxes
- **Tax stability** over several decades
- **Administrative simplicity**

What we improve

- **Full democracy:** our system is democratic, not technocratic
- **Land regulation:** vacant housing is incentivized to return to the market
- **Revenue diversification:** no dependence on land sales

What we don't adopt

- **Absence of democracy:** popular consent is essential
- **Tolerance of extreme inequalities:** autonomous communities provide a safety net
- **Land revenue model:** not reproducible elsewhere

8.12 — Case study (empirical example) #3: Russian flat tax (2001-2020)

Russia adopted a 13% flat tax in 2001 [132][133], moving from a progressive system (up to 30%) to a single rate. It is one of the few countries to have made this transition in a difficult economic context.

What worked

Tax revenue explosion. Contrary to predictions, income tax revenues increased 25% in real terms the first year, then continued growing [132]. Simplification reduced evasion.

Economy formalization. Millions of Russians working off the books declared their income. The cost of compliance became lower than the risk of evasion [133].

Simplicity. The return became trivial. Administrative costs plummeted.

Political acceptability. The 13% rate was low enough to be accepted by all, including the rich who previously paid 30%.

What poses problems

Partial abandonment in 2021. Russia reintroduced a second 15% rate for incomes above 5 million rubles [133]. The return of progressivity shows the lock was insufficient.

Authoritarian context. The reform was imposed by presidential decree, not voted democratically. Stability rested on personal power, not an institutional mechanism.

No levy ceiling. Other taxes (20% VAT, social contributions) continued to weigh. The income flat tax was only part of the system.

Rent economy. Oil revenues funded the State, not income tax. The model is not exportable to economies without natural resources.

What we keep from the Russian model

- **Proof that the flat tax increases revenues** through formalization
- **Social acceptability** of a sufficiently low single rate
- **Simplicity** that reduces evasion

What we improve

- **Constitutional lock:** our system prevents return to progressivity
- **Democratic context:** the reform must be voted, not imposed
- **Abolition of all taxes:** not just income tax

What we don't adopt

- **Absence of lock:** Russia could return to two rates in 2021
- **Authoritarian context:** our reform is democratic
- **Dependence on natural resources:** our model works for all economies

Chapitre IX

COMPARTMENTALIZING RISKS: LET NOTHING CONTAMINATE ANYTHING

The current system is a monolithic block. The State manages everything: health, education, unemployment, pensions, culture, transport. When one sector collapses, it contaminates the others. The pension deficit drains the health budget. A public hospital bankruptcy becomes a national political crisis. Everything is linked, therefore everything is fragile.

The system proposed here **modularizes risks**. Each domain is encapsulated in its own funding mechanism: private health insurance, private unemployment insurance, private education insurance, funded pensions, self-funded autonomous collectives. These modules are sealed. A health insurer's bankruptcy does not affect pensions. A pension fund crash does not endanger schools. **Each system absorbs its own shocks.**

The sovereign State itself is isolated. Its budget—justice, police, military, diplomacy, fundamental research—does not depend on social protection vagaries. It is funded by the flat tax, constitutionally capped, protected from redistributive appetites.

9.1 — Legal Sealing

For this encapsulation to hold, two levels of separation apply. First, **between domains**: a bank cannot own a health insurer, a pension fund cannot control a hospital chain, an education group cannot be backed by an unemployment insurer. Then, **within each domain**, specific separations prevent structural conflicts of interest.

9.2 — Intra-Domain Separations

The principle: **whoever funds does not control whoever spends, whoever produces does not control whoever prescribes or certifies.**

Finance (extended Glass-Steagall principle): - Deposit banks ↔ Investment banks: individual deposits do not fund speculation - Insurance ↔ Banks: an insurance claim does not trigger a banking crisis


Health: - Pharmaceutical industry ↔ Health insurance: the insurer does not push drugs it produces - Health insurance ↔ Care providers (hospitals, clinics): the insurer-provider does not ration care to maximize margins - Analysis laboratories ↔ Pharmaceutical industry: diagnosis remains independent of treatment

Education: - Teaching establishments ↔ Educational content publishers: the school does not prescribe textbooks it sells - Certification bodies ↔ Teaching establishments: whoever trains is not whoever diplomas

Pensions: - Pension funds ↔ Retiree service providers (residences, care): the fund does not capture savings it manages - Pension funds ↔ Deposit banks: retirement does not depend on a bank's soundness

Unemployment: - Unemployment insurance ↔ Placement/training agencies: the insurer has no interest in prolonging unemployment to sell its training - Unemployment insurance ↔ Temp agencies: no closed insurer-placer circuit

This list is constitutionalized. An organic law can add separations, but cannot remove any without 4/5 majority of both chambers.



9.3 — Interfaces Between Domains

When collaboration between domains is necessary, it goes through limited-liability joint ventures or simple service contracts. To prevent these structures from becoming circumvention means, general rules apply:

- Each parent entity must retain at least 75% of its activity outside any inter-domain joint venture
- The joint venture cannot represent more than 50% of revenues for any parent
- Each parent must demonstrate significant activities with third parties, outside the joint venture
- An annual stress test verifies each parent would survive the joint venture's bankruptcy
- Losses are shared according to capital distribution, without cross-guarantee or automatic bailout

These rules apply uniformly, regardless of sector or ownership ratio. No exception list, no favorable treatment. Legal structure is free; safeguards are automatic.

9.4 — Compartmentalized Shareholding

Encapsulation would be fictional if the same shareholder could control entities in multiple domains. To prevent this top-down contagion, rules apply:

- Beyond 10% stake in an entity of one domain, a shareholder cannot hold more than 5% in any other domain
- Multi-domain holdings are prohibited, unless each subsidiary is totally autonomous: no cash pooling, no cross-guarantees, no common executives
- A public registry lists every shareholder holding more than 3% in a regulated entity. Cross-holdings are transparent and monitored

The goal is not to prohibit diversified investment—a small investor can hold shares in all sectors. It is to prevent the **coordinated control** that would recreate, through shareholding, the monolithic block that legal structure has undone.

9.5 — Constitutional Lock

Encapsulation rules—substance thresholds, exposure ceilings, shareholding compartmentalization—are inscribed in the constitution. Their modification requires a four-fifths majority of each chamber (Parliament AND Senate, separately). This is not a technical detail adjustable by changing majorities. It is the very architecture of the system. **You do not change a building's foundations by a show of hands.**

9.6 — Resilience Through Separation

This is software architecture applied to the State: loosely coupled modules, with clear interfaces, that can fail independently without bringing down the whole. **Resilience is born of separation.**

9.7 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The Glass-Steagall Act (1933-1999)

The American Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 imposed strict separation between deposit banks and investment banks [103][104]. For 66 years, this Chinese wall structured the American financial system. Its repeal in 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) shortly preceded the 2008 crisis.

What Worked

Prolonged financial stability. Between 1933 and 1999, the United States experienced no systemic banking crisis [103]. Compartmentalization protected individual deposits from market risks.

Role clarity. Deposit banks collected savings and lent to households and businesses. Investment banks financed markets. Each to their trade, each to their risks.

Depositor confidence. Savers knew their money was not used for speculation. Deposit insurance (FDIC) was credible because risks were contained.

Market discipline. Investment banks, not protected by deposit insurance, bore their losses. No “too big to fail”—they could go bankrupt without threatening the system [104].

Framed financial innovation. Compartmentalization did not prevent innovation but channeled it into structures where risks were identifiable.

What Is Problematic

Progressive erosion. Even before formal repeal, regulators granted increasing exemptions. The wall cracked long before falling [104].

Regulatory arbitrage. Banks created complex structures to circumvent restrictions. Subsidiaries, holding companies, and off-balance-sheet vehicles blurred boundaries.

International competitiveness. European and Japanese universal banks were not subject to this separation. American banks argued a competitive disadvantage.

No constitutional lock. A simple law could repeal 66 years of protection. Congress yielded to banking lobbies in 1999.

Prohibition rather than encapsulation. Glass-Steagall prohibited combination rather than framing it with strict firewalls. Prohibited activities migrated to less regulated shadow banking.

What We Keep from the Glass-Steagall Model

- The **separation principle** between activities with different risks
- **Depositor protection** against market risks
- **Role clarity** enabling targeted regulation
- Proof that **compartmentalization works** for decades

What We Improve

- **Constitutional lock:** repeal requires 4/5 majority, not a simple law

- **Encapsulation rather than prohibition:** joint ventures are possible with strict firewalls (stress tests, absence of cross-guarantees)
- **Extension to all domains:** not just finance, but health, education, pensions, unemployment—with specific intra-domain separations (see section “Intra-Domain Separations”)
- **Shareholding compartmentalization:** prevent conglomerate reconstitution through shareholding

What We Do Not Adopt

- **Legislative simplicity:** a simple law can be simply repealed
- **Rigid prohibition:** our system prefers encapsulation with firewalls
- **Limited perimeter:** Glass-Steagall concerned only finance. We compartmentalize all social domains

Partie 3 ## Collectivités autonomes

Chapitre X

AUTONOMOUS COLLECTIVES

Libertarian Libertarianism rests on a safety net of a new kind: **Autonomous Collectives** (AC). These are neither shelters, nor job integration companies, nor social hotels. They are **communities of work and life**, self-funded, diverse, and open to all.

10.1 — The Starting Observation

In society, there are people who cannot manage on their own—by nature, education, or following trauma. Some have enough energy to live, but not enough to escape a difficult situation. They need a framework, a collective, support—not a check.

The current system offers them either welfare dependency (which keeps them dependent), or abandonment (which leaves them on the street). Autonomous Collectives propose a third way: **integration into a productive community**.

10.2 — General Operation

An AC is a structure where one lives, works, and shares the fruits of collective labor. The fundamental principles:

Self-funding: each AC must balance its books through the work of its members and its production. No permanent subsidy.

Mandatory work: every member contributes according to their abilities. The AC is not a hotel.

Income withholding: members who have external employment see part of their salary withheld to fund collective life.

Personal savings: each member's surplus is accumulated in a personal account, according to the structure's rules and/or their own will.

Freedom of exit: one can leave whenever one wants (except if debt is outstanding). One recovers their savings.

10.3 — The Diversity of Models

ACs are not monolithic. They vary along several axes:

Level of supervision: from highly structured (you're told what to do) to fully self-managed (collective decisions).

Type of governance: hierarchical, democratic, consensus, or mixed.

Location: urban, rural, mixed.

Specialization: agriculture, crafts, services, technology, mixed.

Internal rules: strict or flexible, locked or free savings, vacations allowed or not.

Economic model: pure cooperative, associative, or even entrepreneurial with a founder who takes a margin.

This diversity allows everyone to find the formula that suits them. There is no single model imposed.

10.4 — Ownership Models

ACs can adopt different ownership and governance models:

Pure cooperative: everything is collective, shared decisions, no extracted profit.

Volunteer-led: a leader organizes, without taking personal profit.

Associative: non-profit structure, surpluses reinvested.

Entrepreneurial: a founder/owner who took the initial risk and takes a margin.

Mixed: cooperative shares + investor shares.

All these models can coexist. The only requirement: **transparency about rules at entry**. Who owns what, who decides what, who takes what. No surprises.

If members find a model unfair, they can leave and create their own AC. Freedom of exit regulates everything.

10.5 — The Structured → Self-Managed Gradient

A completely lost person can enter a highly structured AC: they're told what to do, when, how. The external framework frees up cognitive bandwidth. They don't have to manage themselves, just follow.

As they regain their footing, they can migrate to more self-managed structures, where they will participate in decisions. This is a **rehabilitation pathway**, not a single box.

Some will stay their whole lives—by choice or necessity. Others will only spend a few months. The system adapts.


10.6 — Member Statuses

ACs welcome different types of members:

Resident: lives on site, eats on site, works on site. Standard income withholding.

Full-time external: lives at home, but spends their days at the AC (meals, work). Reduced withholding (no housing to fund). They work like the others; what's withheld from their income is simply lower since they don't lodge on site.

Part-time external: participates a few days per week. Proportional contribution.



Affiliate: stays connected remotely, symbolic contribution, network access.

Transitions between statuses are free and fluid. One can be resident, then external, then resident again. Doors are always open.

Chapitre XI

JOINING AN AUTONOMOUS COLLECTIVE

Autonomous Collectives are not closed institutions. Entry is open, transitions fluid, and pooled services create an organized economy of resourcefulness.

11.1 — The 15-Day Trial

Anyone can request a 15-day trial in any AC. Cost to the structure: almost nil (a bed, meals, observation). Potential benefit: a new productive member.

Therefore **no rational reason to refuse a trial**. Even someone with a bad reputation, even a repeat expellee—one can always give them 15 days to see.

The door is never really closed. Someone may have failed ten times and find the eleventh structure that suits them, or have arrived at the right moment in their life.

This mechanism changes everything psychologically. When doors are closed, one can play the victim: “They don’t want me.” When doors are open, victimhood no longer holds: “They accept me for a trial, I’m the one refusing to go.” The system removes the excuse. Only personal choice remains.

11.2 — Voluntary Entry

ACs are not reserved for “social cases.” Anyone can enter voluntarily:

- To **save quickly** (no rent, no bills)
- To **live in community** as a life choice
- To **not be alone** during a difficult period
- To **find a framework** and an activity
- An unemployed person, even paid by their insurance, can directly decide to go there, which probably allows them to save, meet people, not stay home alone feeling down, and directly find an activity or work while looking for another.

This voluntary entry has a crucial effect: it **mixes profiles**. One doesn’t know who is there by choice or necessity. The stigma disappears. It’s the opposite of a ghetto.

11.3 — The Economy of Pooling

Collective life allows savings impossible individually:

Driver's license: an experienced member can be a companion for accompanied driving. The AC has shared vehicles. Real cost: the exam (~€30) + a few supervised hours. Versus €1500 at a commercial driving school. People help each other: it's almost free.

Vacations: exchange between ACs in different regions. The resident is “charged” here or there, it makes no difference. Near-zero marginal cost. The luxury of going on vacation is almost no longer an obstacle.

Training: members train each other. Evening classes, workshops, skill sharing.

Group purchases: collective negotiation with suppliers.

Childcare: pooled between AC parents.

This is the organized economy of resourcefulness.

11.4 — Services Offered

Depending on their size and means, ACs can offer:

Training: accessible to all residents, funded by results. The training organization is only paid if the person finds employment.

Cultural activities: library, workshops (music, painting, theater), screenings, group outings. Often led by residents themselves.

Sports activities: gym, group classes, inter-AC teams.

Housing exchange: residents from Lille ↔ residents from Marseille. International extension possible if the model exports.

Shared mobility: car pool, organized carpooling, bikes.

Others: pooled childcare, group purchases, community gardens, coworking, repair workshops.

11.5 — Economic Activities

ACs are not isolated islands. They can have economic activities open to the public:

- A restaurant open to outside customers
- Guest rooms or a rural gîte
- A farm inn

- A craft workshop selling its production
- Services to local businesses

These activities diversify income and create varied work positions for members. But ACs are not hotels or restaurants in the classic sense, even if this can be part of their services.

The distinction is clear:

Internal relationship (member): contribution through work, income withholding

External relationship (customer): market price, classic commercial relationship

Chapitre XII

COLLECTIVE ECOSYSTEM

Autonomous Collectives form an ecosystem: they associate, exchange, and mutually regulate each other. This chapter describes their economic operation, their partnerships, and the philosophy that drives them.

12.1 — AC Revenue Sources


An AC balances its books through several sources:

Residents' work: captured salaries (external jobs) or internal work

Externals' work: same logic, lower withholding

Internal production: agriculture, crafts, services sold

Partnership with unemployment insurance: bonus for successful placement



Affiliate contributions: symbolic but numerous

Services to businesses: labor, subcontracting

Diversification ensures resilience. No dependence on a single source.

12.2 — AC Federations

ACs can associate in federations to:

- Have more weight with suppliers (group purchases)
- Exchange experiences and best practices
- Expand possibilities (vacations, mobility, exchanges)
- Pool certain services (training, legal, accounting)

This is the equivalent of a franchise or a cooperative of cooperatives. Economies of scale without loss of local autonomy.

12.3 — Expulsion and Reputation

An AC can expel a member who doesn't play by the rules. This is essential for self-funding to work: one cannot indefinitely carry free riders.

The expelled member must find another AC. Their reputation follows them—not formally, but through word of mouth between structures. ACs that accept them for trial will see for themselves.

The 15-day trial always remains possible. The door is never permanently closed.

12.4 — Rich and Poor Structures

There will be rich ACs and poor ACs, even very poor ones. **To each according to their work.** We no longer create generations of dependents—on the contrary, members experience the consequences of their behavior. They learn what they haven't already learned: real life.

A structure that isn't productive enough becomes impoverished. It pulls itself together with its members, or it disappears. Residents will then have to find elsewhere, but the experience will serve as a lesson to most.

It's hard. It's formative. It's real life.

12.5 — The Autarkic Option

For those who refuse all collective rules—even the most flexible—there remains **rural autarky**. An isolated plot, a cabin, basic tools. One gets by alone, taking nothing from society.

This is not a punishment. It's an offer. You were offered structured ACs, self-managed ACs, all variants. You refuse everything? Then you live with the consequences of your refusal. It's your choice.

And even there, reversibility exists. Whoever changes their mind can knock on an AC's door and request a 15-day trial. **The door is never locked.**

The system remains formative, not punitive.

12.6 — Partnership with Unemployment Insurance

Unemployment insurers (UI) have an interest in directing their insured toward ACs: the faster someone finds a framework, the less time the UI pays benefits.

Immediate information: from day one of unemployment, the UI informs about ACs as an option. Not a threat of “your benefits are ending,” but an offer from the start.

Not an alternative, a complement: one can search for a job *from* an AC, *with the help of* an AC, *while contributing* to an AC. The two reinforce each other. The AC offers a framework, contacts, mutual aid, a network. The unemployed person stays active, useful, surrounded, during their search.

Placement bonus: the UI can pay a bonus to the AC when a member finds a job. The AC becomes a reintegration provider paid by results.

Startup assistance: the UI can help create new ACs without funding them durably: connecting with places (deserted villages, brownfields), grouping interested people, lending temporary housing (pool of portable cabins to return once permanent buildings are ready). No money given, no subsidy—just a logistical boost.

Collaboration and affiliation: there can be formal collaboration between UI and AC, a kind of movement, and this can even be part of AC income. One can also be an external member of a community, temporarily, before, after, or permanently. One lives there, eats there, or brings their food or ingredients home, works there. Reinforced mixing. Smooth transitions.

12.7 — Dormant Resources

Unused resources await mobilization:

Deserted villages: houses for €1, municipalities seeking inhabitants. There are places lacking inhabitants that would welcome people.

Industrial brownfields: buildings to renovate

Abandoned farms: fallow agricultural land

Disused public buildings: former schools, barracks, hospitals

The implicit deal: “We give you the walls, you bring life.”

Building something from nothing, together, not being alone, can give a reason to live to those who have none or no longer have one. They may start living in tents or rather prefabs, this will motivate them to build their community. Others will find abandoned land, industrial brownfields, old buildings, to renovate, start something else.

12.8 — Bootstrapping

How to create the first ACs? History offers models:

The kibbutzim: pioneers with a common vision, available land, the urgency of survival. Cultural homogeneity is also created in action and in the choice of structures. The group's collective survival will come into play.

Emmaus: work communities self-funded by recycling, founded for “hopeless cases” [194]

The Castors: post-war cooperative self-construction movement

The Familistère de Guise: collective worker housing that functioned for 100 years

The common ingredients: a unifying project, people with nothing left to lose, underused land resources, and the personal urgency of the founders.

The transition (chapter XXXIII) will need to create the conditions for this bootstrapping.

12.9 — What ACs Are Not

Not a hotel where you pay for a night.

Not a restaurant where you pay for a meal.

Not a shelter where you receive aid.

Not a job integration company where you're a “beneficiary.”

You are a **member**. You work. You contribute. You share the fruits according to what you consume.

12.10 — Prohibition of Selection

ACs cannot select based on religious, ethnic, political, ideological, or any other identity criteria. They can *offer* options (vegetarian meals, organic garden, gym) but not *impose* or *exclude*.

No ghetto. This prohibition is inscribed in the constitution (protection of fundamental rights, Senate domain, modification at 4/5).

12.11 — The Philosophy: Voluntary Mutualism

ACs embody what socialism claimed to be—solidarity, mutual aid, the collective—without what it actually was—coercion, the State, spoliation.

This is **voluntary collectivism within a libertarian framework**. Free entry, free exit, self-funded, no State. ACs coexist with the market. No one is forced to live there. It's one option among others.

Socialism failed because it was mandatory. The same model, made voluntary and competitive, works.

People will feel at home there, and continue living there. The diversity of rules will ensure the majority find a good fit. Only those who want to follow no rules, or be helped, will still be “on the street.” And still, one can easily envision autarkic living systems in the countryside for some of them. There is no magic wand, but one will need to seek formulas varied enough to satisfy everyone, or almost. But the key is that each entity must be financially autonomous.

12.12 — The Contemporary Relevance of Autonomous Collectives

The existence of autonomous collectives does not rest on their popularity, but on a fundamental principle: free individuals must be able to associate to live according to their values, as long as everyone's rights are respected. However, recent history offers an important empirical indicator: certain forms of community life remain relevant today because they respond to real human needs.

Persistent Demand Despite Ambient Individualism

More than a century after their creation, in an Israeli society that has become very liberal, very individualistic, and highly urbanized, families continue to request permanent settlement in kibbutzim. The figures confirm this phenomenon: the kibbutz population has notably increased over the past two decades, from about 117,000 inhabitants in 2000 to nearly 190,000 in the early 2020s [46]. This growth is not explained solely by internal birth rates: it includes the arrival of new households wishing to adopt a community lifestyle.

Recent reports show that some kibbutzim organize welcome days attracting dozens of families interested in permanent settlement [47]. In 2025, a real movement of people seeking to leave big cities to join structured communities developed to the point where some kibbutzim have waiting lists and require financial participation at entry [48].

After the events of October 7, 2023, several organizations set up mechanisms to facilitate family relocation to kibbutzim in the border area, with the goal of welcoming up to 1,000 [49][50]. These initiatives do not concern temporary stays: they target families wishing to settle and fully participate in collective life. New educator kibbutzim have been created, welcoming hundreds of young adults wishing to live in community while contributing to reconstruction of affected areas [51].

Entry and Exit Conditions

The entry system in a contemporary kibbutz illustrates an interesting balance between openness and commitment:

Progressive entry. Most kibbutzim offer a trial period of several months to a year before definitive membership. The candidate lives on site, works with others, and both parties evaluate compatibility. This is precisely the 15-day trial model that ACs generalize.

Financial contribution at entry. Some kibbutzim now request an “entry fee” that can reach several tens of thousands of euros [48]. This is not a discriminatory obstacle but a guarantee of commitment: the candidate invests in their new community. This sum may be partially refundable upon departure.

Exit with compensation. Contrary to the image of a community one leaves empty-handed, modern (so-called “renewed”) kibbutzim allow departing members to leave with their accumulated personal savings, even a share of real estate appreciation if the model provides for it [42][43]. This possibility of “exiting with something” is fundamental: it guarantees that entry is not a trap.

These mechanisms—trial before commitment, contribution at entry, compensation at exit—correspond exactly to AC principles: transparency about rules, freedom of exit, and accumulation of personal savings.

What Persistent Demand Shows

These data do not “legitimize” autonomous collectives in themselves—their legitimacy derives from the principle of free association—but they clearly demonstrate that this model remains **relevant and useful** in a contemporary context. They show that, despite a social environment dominated by individualism:

- Some people choose collective structures for reasons of **meaning** (contributing to a common project)
- Others seek **stability** (predictable living framework, supportive community)
- Others still **solidarity** (not facing difficulties alone)
- Or simply a different **quality of life** (less stress, more human connections)

The persistent choice of community life, more than a century after the model’s invention, shows that this type of life is neither anachronistic nor marginal: it responds to a lasting human demand.

12.13 — A New Profession: Community Placement Counselor

If a pluralist society authorizes a great diversity of autonomous collectives—solidarity communities, cooperative villages, liberal structures, ecological groups, modernized kibbutzim, hamlet federations—a new need appears: helping individuals choose the community environment that best matches their values and lifestyle.

The Emergence of Intermediaries

In current reality, we already see structures emerging that partially play this role. In Israel, organizations like Toren or the Kibbutz Movement serve as a liaison desk between kibbutzim and families seeking to settle there, directing candidates according to their preferences and community needs [49][51]. Similar mechanisms exist for moshavim and other forms of community life.

The proposed model generalizes this phenomenon and formalizes the emergence of a new profession: the **community placement counselor**.

The Counselor's Role

This counselor helps each person or family identify:

- Their relationship to **solidarity** (strong, moderate, minimal)
- Their desire for **collective life** or conversely their need for autonomy
- Their **cultural, educational, professional, and social** expectations
- The type of collective likely to match their values
- The practical implications of **entry or departure**

The point is not to promote a particular model, but to make a pluralist social landscape readable. The counselor translates theoretical freedom into practicable freedom, avoiding that collective diversity only advantages the most informed or experienced.

A Key Function in a Society of Freedom of Association

The existence of families still seeking to join kibbutzim in 2025—despite an individualist society—illustrates the necessity of such a role: people genuinely desire to live differently, but need help identifying the community that will suit them best.

The community placement counselor becomes a key actor in pluralist society:

- They **accompany diversity** without ideologically directing it
- They **secure transitions** (information on rules, rights, obligations)
- They **facilitate trials** (connecting with ACs accepting newcomers)
- They **follow pathways** (help change structure if the first choice doesn't suit)

This profession can be exercised by independents, associations, AC federations, or even unemployment insurers as part of their reintegration mission. Its existence guarantees that the freedom to choose one's way of life does not remain theoretical.

Chapitre XIII

CASE STUDY: AMISH COMMUNITIES

The Amish, descendants of Swiss and Alsatian Anabaptists settled in the United States since the 18th century, form self-sufficient communities of 350,000 people [161][162]. Their voluntarily archaic way of life offers an extreme example of a self-funded community.

13.1 — What Worked

Exceptional longevity. 330 years of continuous existence [161]. The Amish have weathered industrial revolutions, world wars, and the modernization of America without disappearing.

Demographic growth. The Amish population doubles every 20 years, thanks to high birth rates and a youth retention rate of 85-90% [162]. Departures are free, but rare.

Total self-funding. The Amish receive no government assistance. They are exempt from Social Security because they neither participate in nor benefit from it [161].

Community mutual aid. When a member has a problem (fire, illness, accident), the community pools resources. No external insurance, but effective internal mutualization.

“Rumspringa” and freedom of exit. At 16, young Amish can leave the community to discover the outside world. Those who return (85%) make an informed choice [162]. Those who leave are not persecuted.

13.2 — Sociological Analyses: Cohesion, Regulation, and Constraints

Amish communities constitute a singular example of durable intentional societies, characterized by strong internal cohesion, strict religious regulation, and voluntary separation from the dominant society. John A. Hostetler's classic works describe a social system founded on obedience to community rules, collective discipline, and voluntary limitation of individualism, enabling remarkable stability across multiple generations [55].

More recent analyses show that this stability rests on precise institutional mechanisms. Kraybill emphasizes the central role of religious norms in regulating economic, educational, and social behaviors, as well as the existence of informal sanction mechanisms ensuring conformity without recourse to the State [56]. These mechanisms favor strong economic autonomy and low dependence on public institutions.

However, empirical literature also highlights significant structural constraints, particularly in education and health. Strauss and Puffenberger's work documents the effects of endogamy on genetic health, with increased prevalence of certain hereditary diseases linked to the strong homogeneity of Amish communities [57]. These results underscore that the social and cultural durability of these communities comes with measurable biological and health costs.

13.3 — What Is Problematic

Cultural closure. The Amish live in a bubble. Marriages are endogamous. Consanguinity increases certain genetic diseases [161].

Rejection of modernity. The prohibition of electricity, automobiles, and higher education limits economic adaptability. The model does not scale.

Strong social pressure. “Shunning” (ostracism) of those who break the rules creates intense conformist pressure. Formal freedom (Rumspringa) coexists with massive informal pressure.

Patriarchy. Women have no leadership role. The model is difficult to export to an egalitarian society.

13.4 — What We Keep from the Amish Model

- **Total self-funding** without State aid
- **Community mutual aid** as an alternative to formal insurance
- **Formalized freedom of exit** (Rumspringa) that legitimizes the choice to stay
- **Longevity** as proof of viability

13.5 — What We Improve

- **No cultural closure:** the prohibition of identity selection avoids the ghetto
- **Assumed modernity:** ACs can use all available technology
- **Gender equality:** no imposed patriarchy
- **Diversity of rules:** no single model to replicate

13.6 — What We Do Not Adopt

- **Cultural closure:** ACs are open to all
- **Rejection of modernity:** no technological restrictions
- **Ostracism:** leaving is a right, not a betrayal
- **Patriarchy:** equality of all members

Chapitre XIV

CASE STUDY: THE KIBBUTZIM

Israel offers a unique laboratory of voluntary community life with two main models: the **kibbutzim** (entirely collective communities) and the **moshavim** (cooperatives with individual ownership) [41][42]. At their peak in the 1980s, kibbutzim counted 125,000 members spread across 270 communities, while moshavim grouped even more.

14.1 — The Diversity of Models

Contrary to the often-conveyed monolithic image, the kibbutz movement comprised several federations with distinct philosophies:

- **HaKibbutz HaArtzi** (Hashomer Hatzair): the most collectivist, secular, and socialist
- **HaKibbutz HaDati**: religious kibbutzim combining Torah and collective work
- **Takam**: a more moderate federation, resulting from mergers
- **Kibbutz Poalim Datim**: another religious movement

The **moshavim** represented a less radical alternative: land cultivated individually by each family, but pooled services (marketing, group purchases, credit). It is an intermediate model between private property and integral collectivism.

14.2 — What Worked

Exceptional longevity. More than a century of continuous existence [41]. Some kibbutzim founded in the 1910s still exist. This is proof that a voluntary community can span generations.

Agricultural productivity. The cooperative model allowed collective mobilization of resources to clear arid land and build irrigation infrastructure. This startup advantage was decisive before intensive mechanization [42].

Type	% rural pop.	% cultivated land	% production
Kibbutzim	≈ 21%	≈ 35-40%	≈ 40%
Moshavim	≈ 44%	≈ 40-45%	≈ 36-40%

Type	% rural pop.	% cultivated land	% production
Total cooperative	≈ 65%	≈ 80%	≈ 76-80%
Other villages	≈ 35%	≈ 20%	≈ 20-24%

Sources: *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999)*, *Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2017)*, *OECD Review of Agricultural Policies*.

Today, cooperative productivity per hectare is comparable to that of individual farms—the collective model is no longer a productive advantage, but neither is it a handicap.

Bankruptcies as proof of proper functioning. From the 1980s, more than half of kibbutzim went bankrupt. Far from being a model failure, this is proof that natural selection was working: poorly managed or unsuitable structures disappeared, others learned lessons and reformed. Those who survived—about 270 today—have proven their viability over more than a century. This is exactly what we want for Autonomous Collectives: no state bailout, no artificial survival, but Darwinian evolution of organizational models [42].

Well-being of the elderly. Studies show that elderly kibbutz members have higher life expectancy and better psychological well-being than the general population [44][45]. The community framework protects against isolation.

Successful diversification. Facing agricultural difficulties, many kibbutzim diversified into industry, services, and tourism. This adaptability ensured their economic survival.

Coexistence of varied models. The spectrum ranged from integral collectivism (classic kibbutz) to partial cooperation (moshav), allowing everyone to find a degree of pooling suited to their preferences.

14.3 — Economic Analyses: Equality, Incentives, and Migration

Kibbutzim have long been presented as a successful experiment in integral collectivism, combining economic equality, common ownership, and direct democracy. However, empirical analyses have progressively highlighted significant structural limits. Ran Abramitzky's quantitative work shows that strict egalitarianism generates incentive problems and favors differential member selection: individuals with higher productivity or human capital are more inclined to leave kibbutzim when gaps between effort and remuneration become too marked [52].

This selective exit dynamic is reinforced by internal redistribution mechanisms. Abramitzky also demonstrates that redistribution intensity directly influences migration flows: the stronger the redistribution, the more the most productive members tend to leave, ultimately weakening the collective economic base [53]. These results suggest that the apparent stability of kibbutzim masks persistent economic tensions between equity and efficiency.

On the historical and institutional level, Ben-Rafael's work documents the systemic crisis of the 1980s, marked by massive indebtedness, erosion of ideological legitimacy, and the rise of more technocratic governance. This crisis led to a profound transformation of the model, with the progressive introduction of differentiated salaries, market mechanisms, and partially privatized forms of ownership [54]. These developments indicate that the original collectivist model proved difficult to sustain without major concessions to the market economy.

14.4 — What Is Problematic

Youth hemorrhage. Since the 1980s, kibbutzim have lost their most dynamic members [43]. Young people leave for cities, attracted by economic opportunities and individual freedom.

Crisis of pure collectivism. The strict egalitarian model (identical salaries for all) created tensions. The most productive members felt exploited. Partial privatization was necessary to survive [42].

Subsidy dependence. In the 1980s, many kibbutzim accumulated massive debts, bailed out by the State. Self-funding was not always real [43].

Cultural homogeneity. Kibbutzim were essentially Ashkenazi. This homogeneity facilitated cohesion but limited the model's universality.

Convergence toward moshav. Today, the majority of kibbutzim have adopted salary "differentials" and partial private property—approaching the moshav model they initially rejected [42].

14.5 — What We Keep from Israeli Models

- Proof that **voluntary communities can last** decades
- **Well-being of the elderly** in community (empirically validated)
- **Economic diversification** as the key to survival
- **Natural mutual aid** that replaces formal insurance mechanisms
- **Coexistence of varied models** (from the most collectivist to the most individual)
- The **collectivism gradient** between kibbutz and moshav, which ACs adopt

14.6 — What We Improve

- **No state subsidy:** strict self-funding is a constitutional constraint—kibbutzim were bailed out by the State
- **No imposed homogeneity:** the prohibition of identity selection avoids the ghetto—kibbutzim were culturally homogeneous
- **Freedom of exit without stigma:** in ACs, leaving is not a betrayal—kibbutzim experienced departures as defections

14.7 — What We Do Not Adopt

- **Strict salary egalitarianism:** source of tensions and talent drain
- **Externally imposed ideology:** an AC can adopt any ideology (socialist, libertarian, religious...) if members freely choose it—kibbutzim served a collective mission defined by the Zionist movement
- **State dependence:** no bailout in case of bankruptcy
- **Single model per community:** each AC chooses its position on the gradient

Chapitre XV

CASE STUDY: EMMAUS COMMUNITIES

Emmaus, founded by Abbé Pierre in 1949, is a movement of work communities self-funded through collection and recycling [194]. Present in 37 countries, it counts more than 400 structures welcoming excluded people.

15.1 — What Worked

Self-funding through work. Emmaus communities live from the collection, sorting, and resale of second-hand items [197]. No recurring operating subsidy. The economic model has worked for 75 years.

Unconditional welcome. Emmaus welcomes whoever knocks at the door: ex-prisoners, drug addicts, migrants, people in family breakdown [196]. No selection, no file, no delay. The trial is immediate.

Dignity through work. The “companion” is not an aid recipient. They work, contribute, and receive a modest allowance in exchange. The relationship is not assistential.

Diversity of rules. Each community adapts its operation: some are strict (no alcohol), others flexible. This diversity allows everyone to find a suitable structure.

Insertion toward the outside. Many companions leave Emmaus to resume autonomous life. The community is a step, not an end.

15.2 — What Is Problematic

Dependence on founding charisma. Abbé Pierre’s death (2007) and posthumous revelations about his private life weakened the movement [195]. The “Emmaus” brand rests on a figure, not a mechanism.

Fuzzy legal status of companions. Companions are neither employees nor volunteers. Their allowance (about €350/month) does not open full social rights. This hybrid status is regularly contested.

Fragile economy. Second-hand item resale faces competition from Leboncoin and Vinted. Some communities struggle to balance their books.

Concentration in France. The model remains largely French. International export is uneven.

15.3 — What We Keep from the Emmaus Model

- **Self-funding through productive work:** no recurring subsidy
- **Unconditional welcome:** no selection at entry, immediate trial
- **Dignity through work:** no welfare, contribution relationship
- **Diversity of rules:** each structure adapts its operation
- **Insertion objective:** the community is a step, not a prison

15.4 — What We Improve

- **No dependence on a figure:** ACs are structures, not movements
- **Clear member status:** income withholding is transparent and opens rights
- **Economic diversification:** not just recycling

15.5 — What We Do Not Adopt

- **Charitable identity:** ACs are not charitable works but productive communities
- **Fuzzy member status:** legal and social clarity
- **Dependence on a moral brand:** self-funding suffices, no need for charitable legitimacy

Chapitre XVI

CASE STUDY: MONDRAGON COOPERATIVES

The Mondragon group, in the Spanish Basque Country, is the largest cooperative federation in the world [103][104]. Founded in 1956 by a Catholic priest, José María Arizmendiarrieta, it now employs more than 80,000 people in 95 cooperatives covering industry, finance, distribution, and education.

16.1 — What Worked

Longevity and growth. 70 years of continuous existence, with average regular growth of 5% per year [103]. Mondragon weathered the 2008 crisis and the 2020 pandemic without mass layoffs.

Inter-cooperative solidarity. Surplus cooperatives transfer funds to those in difficulty. A “relocation” mechanism allows reassigning workers from one cooperative to another. In 2013, when Fagor (appliances) went bankrupt, 1,800 workers were reabsorbed by other group entities [104].

Limited salary gap. The ratio between the highest and lowest salary is capped at 1:6 in most cooperatives (versus 1:300+ in multinationals) [103]. This moderate gap maintains cohesion without discouraging talent.

Crisis resilience. Rather than laying off, Mondragon temporarily reduces everyone’s salaries during crises. The burden is shared, no one is abandoned.

Integrated education. Mondragon University trains future cooperators. The training-employment link is direct.

16.2 — What Is Problematic

Fagor’s failure. The group’s largest cooperative (appliances) went bankrupt in 2013 despite solidarity mechanisms [104]. Proof that self-funding has its limits against global competition.

Chronic undercapitalization. Cooperatives struggle to raise external capital. The “one person, one vote” model makes external investment unattractive.

Spanish market dependence. Internationalization remains limited. Foreign subsidiaries are often not cooperatives but classic companies.

Tension between democracy and efficiency. Collectively made decisions are sometimes slow. Managerial agility is sacrificed to consultation.

16.3 — What We Keep from the Mondragon Model

- **Inter-structure solidarity:** ACs can help each other
- **Worker relocation** when one unit struggles
- **Limited salary gap** that maintains cohesion
- **Resilience through burden sharing** rather than layoffs
- **Integrated education** that trains future members

16.4 — What We Improve

- **No mandatory federation:** each AC is autonomous, partnerships are voluntary
- **Openness to external capital:** ACs can have investors (transparency about rules)
- **No cooperative ideology:** some ACs can be entrepreneurial with a founder who takes a margin

16.5 — What We Do Not Adopt

- **Rigid salary caps:** each AC sets its own rules
- **Mandatory solidarity:** transfer between structures is voluntary, not imposed
- **Cooperative exclusivity:** ACs can coexist with classic companies

Partie 4 ## Se protéger sans communauté

Chapitre XVII

PROTECTING ONESELF WITHOUT COMMUNITY: CHOSEN DELEGATION

Autonomous Collectives offer a powerful solution: the group takes charge of what the individual cannot manage alone. But not everyone wishes—or is able—to join a community. Between total autonomy and community membership, there is a middle way: **voluntarily delegating certain decisions to a chosen third party**.

17.1 — Why Delegate?

The daily management of one's administrative, financial, and insurance life requires time, attention, and skills. This observation is not pathological—it is anthropological.

Cognitive limits. The work of behavioral economics, notably by Kahneman and Tversky, has documented the systematic biases affecting our financial decisions [??:economie-comportementale-kahneman]. We procrastinate on complex tasks, overvalue the present at the expense of the future, and avoid unpleasant decisions even when necessary. Our welfare states suffer from the same flaws.

Time limits. Managing insurance, optimizing savings, tracking bills, anticipating retirement—all this takes time. Some prefer to devote that time to other things: their work, family, passions.

Technical limits. Financial and insurance products have become complex. Comparing contracts, understanding clauses, anticipating tax scenarios—skills that are not equally distributed.

Moments of vulnerability. Illness, bereavement, divorce, job loss, aging—these situations temporarily or durably reduce one's capacity to manage. Delegating is not abdicating: it is recognizing a limit and responding to it.

These limits do not justify State intervention. They justify the possibility of **freely choosing** who helps us, how, and for how long.

17.2 — The Principle of Chosen Delegation

Chosen delegation rests on a **contractual mandate** between an individual and a provider—natural person, company, or specialized organization.

Explicit scope. The mandate precisely defines what is delegated: bill payment, budget management, insurance choices, administrative follow-up, investment decisions. What is not delegated remains under direct control.

Revocability. The principal can terminate the mandate at any time, without excessive penalty. Freedom of exit is constitutive of the arrangement.

Responsibility. The agent incurs professional liability. They are accountable. In case of fault, negligence, or conflict of interest, recourse exists.

Transparent remuneration. The service cost is explicit: flat fee, percentage, hourly fees. No hidden commissions, no undisclosed kickbacks.

This is not guardianship. The term “self-guardianship” is sometimes used to describe these arrangements, but it is misleading: guardianship implies a legal incapacity declared by a judge. Here, the individual retains full capacity. They choose to delegate certain tasks, as one chooses an accountant or lawyer.

17.3 — What Can Be Delegated

Delegation can cover various domains, according to each person’s needs and preferences.

Budget management. A manager receives income into a dedicated account, pays fixed charges (rent, energy, insurance), transfers a “living allowance” to the personal current account, and alerts in case of drift. The principal retains control over daily expenses.

Bill payment. The agent receives bills, verifies their consistency, pays them on time, archives receipts. The individual no longer has to think about it—or suffer late penalties.

Insurance optimization. A broker or advisor regularly compares offers, renegotiates contracts, adapts coverage to evolving situations. They act in the principal’s interest, not the insurer’s.

Automated savings. An automatic transfer to a savings account or pension fund, calibrated to income and objectives. Willpower effort is replaced by a mechanism.

Wealth management. For those with significant assets: asset allocation, arbitrage, tax optimization, transmission. The manager applies a strategy defined with the principal.

Administrative support. Tax returns, benefit applications, correspondence with administrations, file tracking. The agent interfaces with bureaucracy.

Each function can be delegated separately or as a package. The principal composes their own “basket” of delegations.

17.4 — Position on the Solutions Scale

Chosen delegation sits between two poles.

Autonomy pole. The individual manages everything themselves. They assume the consequences of their choices, good or bad. This option suits those with time, skills, and discipline.

Community pole. The individual joins an Autonomous Collective that takes charge of a large part of their economic and social life. In exchange, they contribute to the community and accept its rules.

In between. Chosen delegation allows remaining outside a community while benefiting from structured support. It is **assisted autonomy**—not dependence, not isolation.

This intermediate position can be: - **A lasting alternative** for those who want to stay independent but recognize their limits - **An intermediate step** before joining a community, or after leaving one - **A complement** to other mechanisms (insurance, automatic savings, occasional advice)

There is no hierarchy between these positions. Each responds to different situations, preferences, and capacities.

17.5 — Essential Safeguards

Chosen delegation must not become a new form of dependence or exploitation. Several safeguards are indispensable.

Total transparency. The principal has access to all accounts, all operations, all documents. No shadow zone. Regular statements are mandatory.

Separation of assets. The principal's money is in separate accounts, never mixed with the agent's. In case of provider bankruptcy, the principal's funds are protected.

Licensing and supervision. Financial delegation providers are subject to professional obligations: training, liability insurance, oversight by a regulator or professional body.

Prohibition of conflicts of interest. The agent cannot receive commissions from suppliers they recommend—or must fully disclose and remit them to the principal.

Effective freedom of exit. The principal can terminate at any time. The agent must transmit all documents and access within a short period. No abusive loyalty clause.

Accessible recourse. In case of dispute, mediation and judicial recourse mechanisms are available. Abuses are sanctioned.

No coercion. Delegation is always voluntary. No authority can impose it. No relative can force it. Consent is verified.

17.6 — Who Are the Agents?

Several types of actors can fill this role.

Daily Money Managers. A structured profession in the United States, these daily managers handle bills, budget, administration. They often work with elderly or overwhelmed people.

Wealth management advisors. For those with significant assets, they offer a global vision: savings, investment, taxation, transmission.

Insurance brokers. Independent of insurers, they compare offers and negotiate on behalf of their clients.

Specialized associations. Some structures support specific populations: people with disabilities, isolated elderly, people in financial difficulty.

Formalized relatives. A family member or friend can also play this role—but within an explicit contractual framework, with the same transparency and accountability obligations.

Automated systems. Budget management apps, programmed transfers, robo-advisors. Delegation can be to an algorithm, not just a human.

17.7 — What This Is Not

This is not guardianship. Guardianship implies a legal incapacity pronounced by a judge. Here, the individual retains all rights. They delegate voluntarily, they take back whenever they want.

This is not curatorship. Same distinction: no judicial intervention, no declared incapacity.

This is not abandonment. The individual remains master of their life. They choose what they delegate and keep control over the rest.

This is not infantilization. Recognizing one's limits and responding is an adult act. Delegating to an expert what one cannot do is rational, not shameful.

This is not a universal solution. Some do not need it. Others will prefer an Autonomous Collective. Still others will combine several approaches.

17.8 — Continuity and Trajectories

Chosen delegation fits into a **continuity of solutions**, not a binary opposition.

A young worker can start with total autonomy, then delegate their accounting when they start a business, then join an Autonomous Collective after burnout, then leave and resume partial delegation.

An elderly person can delegate progressively: first bills, then budget, then health decisions—or the reverse, resume responsibilities after a period of fragility.

A couple can delegate certain functions together and manage others separately.

There is no typical trajectory. The system offers **tools**, not **destinies**.

What matters: that each individual can, at each moment of their life, find the level of support that suits them—without state coercion, without stigmatization, without irreversibility.

Chapitre XVIII

CASE STUDIES: VOLUNTARY DELEGATION IN PRACTICE

The previous chapter described the principle of chosen delegation. This one illustrates it through four real examples—systems, professions, or programs that function today, in different legal and cultural contexts. Each illuminates a facet of the model.

18.1 — Case study (empirical example) #1: Daily Money Managers (United States)

Why it's emblematic

Daily Money Managers (DMM) constitute a structured profession in the United States, organized within the American Association of Daily Money Managers (AADMM) founded in 1994. They embody chosen delegation in its most everyday form: managing bills, budget, administrative tasks—without court intervention, without declared incapacity.

Concrete mechanism

The DMM intervenes at the client's home or remotely. They receive mail, open bills, verify amounts, make payments from the client's account (via limited banking power of attorney), file documents, prepare materials for tax returns.

The client signs a service contract specifying: - Tasks delegated (explicit list) - Frequency of interventions (weekly, biweekly) - Payment method (hourly, monthly flat rate) - Termination conditions

The DMM has no authority to make major financial decisions. They execute, organize, alert—but do not decide in the client's place.

What is delegated / what remains under control

Delegated: - Opening and sorting mail - Paying recurring bills - Monitoring bank balance - Filing and archiving - Preparing tax documents - Liaising with administrations

Under client control: - Purchase or investment decisions - Choice of providers (insurers, banks) - Major budget arbitrations - Full access to accounts and documents

Reversibility

The contract is terminable at any time with short notice (typically 30 days). The DMM must return all documents and revoke powers of attorney. No non-compete clause prevents the client from changing providers.

Safeguards and risks

Existing safeguards: - AADMM certification with code of ethics - Mandatory professional liability insurance - Background checks - Required continuing education

Identified risks: - Breach of trust (embezzlement)—rare but documented - Excessive dependence if the client loses competencies - Variable quality depending on practitioners (profession not federally regulated)

What this case brings to the proposed model

Daily Money Managers demonstrate that daily, non-judicial, revocable, and compensated delegation can function at large scale. Their clientele—elderly people, overwhelmed workers, people with disabilities, distant caregivers—illustrates the diversity of needs. This is not a system for “incapable” people: it’s a service for anyone who prefers to delegate rather than suffer.

References: American Association of Daily Money Managers (AADMM), founded 1994; Certified Daily Money Manager (CDMM) certification; no specific federal regulation, variable state regulations.

18.2 — Case study (empirical example) #2: The Representative Payee Program (United States)

Why it's emblematic

The Social Security Administration's (SSA) Representative Payee Program is an official system whereby a third party manages the social benefits (retirement, disability) of a beneficiary deemed unable to do so themselves. Unlike DMMs, this is state-supervised delegation—but it illustrates possible control mechanisms.

Concrete mechanism

When the SSA determines that a beneficiary cannot manage their benefits (mental illness, dementia, addiction, cognitive disability), it designates a “representative payee”—often a relative, sometimes an accredited organization.

The payee receives benefits into a dedicated account. They must:

- Use the money for the beneficiary's essential needs (housing, food, healthcare)
- Keep surplus funds for the beneficiary
- Maintain precise accounting
- Submit an annual report to the SSA (Representative Payee Report)

The SSA can revoke the payee in case of abuse and designate another.

What is delegated / what remains under control

Delegated: - Receipt of SSA benefits - Allocation to essential needs - Management of dedicated account - Accounting and reporting

Under beneficiary control (theoretically): - Other income and assets - Non-financial decisions - Right to contest the designation

Under SSA control: - Designation and revocation of payee - Audit of annual reports - Sanctions for abuse

Reversibility (or its limits)

This is the system's weak point. Designating a representative payee implies an incapacity determination by the SSA. The beneficiary can contest this determination, but the procedure is cumbersome. Unlike voluntary delegation, **the beneficiary did not choose**—they are subjected to it.

Reversibility depends on improvement of the situation (remission, recovery) recognized by the SSA.

Safeguards and risks

Existing safeguards: - Mandatory annual reports - Random audits by the SSA - Criminal penalties for misappropriation (up to 5 years in prison) - Preference for organizational payees (fewer abuses than relatives)

Identified risks: - Abuse by ill-intentioned relatives—documented and frequent - Loss of beneficiary autonomy (infantilizing effect) - Slow SSA bureaucracy in responding to reports - Beneficiary has no choice over their payee

What this case brings to the proposed model

The Representative Payee Program shows what to **avoid** as much as what to retain. The reporting and supervision mechanism is useful. But imposition without consent, the burden of contestation, and loss of autonomy are counter-models. This document proposes **chosen** delegation, not imposed—with the same transparency requirements, but without coercion.

References: Social Security Administration, Representative Payee Program; 42 U.S.C. § 405(j); approximately 5.7 million beneficiaries under representative payee (2020).

18.3 — Case study (empirical example) #3: Supported Decision-Making and Representation Agreements (British Columbia, Canada)

Why it's emblematic

British Columbia has developed an innovative legal framework: Representation Agreements, administered by the Nidus Personal Planning Resource Centre. This system allows a person to designate “representatives” to help them make decisions—**without losing legal capacity**. It’s the opposite of guardianship.

Concrete mechanism

A person signs a Representation Agreement designating one or more representatives for specific areas: - Healthcare - Personal care - Routine financial matters - Routine legal matters

Two types of agreements exist: - **Section 7 (standard)**: for routine decisions, accessible to everyone - **Section 9 (extended)**: for major decisions, requires higher capacity at the time of signing

The representative must: - Consult the person before each decision - Respect their known wishes - Act in their interest - Keep records

The person **retains legal capacity**. They can continue making their own decisions. The representative intervenes in support, not substitution.

What is delegated / what remains under control

Delegated (in support mode): - Help understanding options - Execution of decisions made together - Representation to third parties (banks, doctors) - Practical management of designated tasks

Under the person's control: - Legal capacity itself - Right to revoke the representative - Right to make contrary decisions (within legal limits) - Modification of the agreement at any time

Reversibility

The agreement is revocable at any time by the person, as long as they retain minimal capacity for understanding. Revocation takes immediate effect. The representative must return all documents and powers.

If the person loses all capacity, a judicial process may intervene—but this is a last resort, not the norm.

Safeguards and risks

Existing safeguards: - Representative training by Nidus - Obligation to consult before decisions - Recourse to the Public Guardian and Trustee in case of abuse - Possibility of designating a “monitor” (independent supervisor)

Identified risks: - Undue influence during signing (family pressure) - Conflict of interest if the representative is also an heir - Difficulty revoking if the person is isolated or under influence

What this case brings to the proposed model

British Columbia's Representation Agreements embody **Supported Decision-Making**—an approach that preserves legal capacity while allowing support. This is exactly the spirit of chosen delegation: no declared incapacity, no guardianship, but formalized, transparent, and revocable support. This model has inspired reforms in other jurisdictions (Australia, Ireland, some U.S. states).

References: Representation Agreement Act (British Columbia, 1996); Nidus Personal Planning Resource Centre; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 12 (equality before the law and legal capacity).

18.4 — Case study (empirical example) #4: Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) — Thaler & Benartzi

Why it's emblematic

The Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) program, designed by economists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi in 2004, illustrates a different form of delegation: **automated pre-commitment**. The individual delegates not to a person, but to a mechanism—a rule they impose on themselves to circumvent their own biases.

Concrete mechanism

The principle is simple: 1. The employee commits today to save more **tomorrow** (at their next raise) 2. With each salary increase, the savings rate automatically increases (e.g., +3 percentage points) 3. The increase continues until a predefined cap (e.g., 15%) 4. The employee can opt out of the program at any time

The behavioral trick: we don't ask for immediate sacrifice (which people refuse), but future sacrifice (which they accept more easily). And when the future arrives, the raise compensates: net income never decreases.

What is delegated / what remains under control

Delegated: - The decision to increase savings (automated) - Execution of transfers (automatic) - Timing of increases (tied to raises)

Under employee control: - Initial enrollment (voluntary) - Withdrawal at any time (opt-out) - Choice of maximum cap - Allocation of savings (fund selection)

Reversibility

Complete. The employee can leave the program at any time, without penalty. They can also freeze the current rate without going back. Freedom is preserved—this is what distinguishes SMarT from mandatory contributions.

Safeguards and risks

Existing safeguards: - Free opt-out at any time - Transparency about rates and projections - No conflict of interest (the mechanism is neutral) - Supervision by pension fund regulators (ERISA in the U.S.)

Identified risks: - Excessive inertia (employee doesn't opt out even when in their interest) - Variable quality of underlying pension funds - Doesn't solve the problem of very low wages (insufficient savings even with increases)

What this case brings to the proposed model

Save More Tomorrow demonstrates that delegation can be **self-imposed** and **automated**. No human third party needed: an algorithm, a rule, a mechanism suffices. This approach—known as “nudge” or “choice architecture”—complements other forms of delegation. It's particularly suitable for those who want to protect themselves from their own biases without resorting to a human agent.

Thaler received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2017, partly for this work. SMarT has been adopted by thousands of American companies and has significantly increased retirement savings rates [?:economie-comportementale-thaler].

References: Thaler, R. & Benartzi, S. (2004), “Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving”, *Journal of Political Economy*; Pension Protection Act 2006 (United States) which facilitated SMarT adoption; Richard Thaler, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017.

18.5 — Synthesis: what these cases teach us

These four examples illustrate the **diversity of voluntary delegation forms**:

Case	Type of delegation	Agent	Reversibility
Daily Money Managers	Daily management	Private professional	Complete
Representative Payee	Social benefits	Relative or organization	Limited (imposed)
Representation Agreements	Assisted decisions	Relative or professional	Complete
Save More Tomorrow	Automated savings	Mechanism / algorithm	Complete

The model proposed here draws from the first three for functions, and from the fourth for automation. It rejects imposition (Representative Payee) in favor of voluntarism (DMM, Representation Agreements).

What emerges: - Delegation works when it is **chosen** - It requires **transparency** and **accountability** - It must be **revocable** without excessive obstacles - It can be addressed to a human or a system - It does not imply legal incapacity

Chosen delegation is not a crutch for the weak. It's a **tool for everyone**—adapted to circumstances, preferences, and life moments.

Partie 5 ## Système électoral

Chapitre XIX

VOTING DIFFERENTLY: REAL-TIME DEMOCRACY

Voting every five years is an aberration. We hand over a blank check, then watch helplessly as our representatives do the opposite of what they promised. Classical representative democracy is intermittent control. What we need is **permanent control**.

19.1 — Permanent recall

Any elected official, of any kind, can be recalled at any time. Every citizen who voted for a candidate can withdraw their support. If the number of recalls exceeds a certain threshold—say, 55% of initial votes—the official is removed. It's a *negative feedback loop*: the system corrects its own drifts in real time, without waiting for the electoral deadline [124].

19.2 — Recalling ministers

Ministers are not elected, but they are **recallable by the people**. Any citizen can, in the recall booth, express their distrust of a minister. If the recall threshold is reached (calculated on the entire electorate, by equal suffrage—one person, one vote), the minister is dismissed.


Why equal suffrage? Because recalling a minister is a **protection**, not a budgetary matter. All citizens have the same interest in getting rid of an incompetent or corrupt minister. This is consistent with the Senate's logic: fundamental rights and protections fall under equal suffrage.

Special case of the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister is recalled, the entire government falls. A new investiture is required. This is logical: the Prime Minister is the keystone of the government; their fall brings down the edifice.

Other ministers can fall individually without bringing down the government. The Prime Minister then appoints a replacement, subject to Parliament's approval.

19.3 — Delay proportional to severity

To avoid instability, recall is not immediate. A delay is granted, proportional to the level of unpopularity. At 56% recall, the official has two or three months to turn things around. At 75%, it's nearly immediate—48 to 72 hours, time to explain themselves. **The severity of the sanction corresponds to the severity of the rejection.**



19.4 — The right to re-support

Everyone can also cancel their recall. You recalled in the heat of emotion, you calm down, you change your mind. The system absorbs passing fluctuations.

19.5 — The right to run again

A recalled official can run again immediately. This is democratic: if the people can recall, they can also re-elect. It's also a protection: if the recall was based on fake news, the campaign allows the official to restore the truth and regain trust.

19.6 — Citizen posture votes (empty seats)

The system distinguishes four electoral postures, each creating a distinct institutional effect [148][150]:

Posture	Intention	Effect on seat
Black vote	“Nothing satisfies me, I’m blocking”	Systematic vote AGAINST
Gray vote	“Nothing pleases me, but I’m not blocking”	Systematic abstention
White vote	“I want to avoid minority blocking”	Counterbalances black (Option B) or signal (Option A)
Abstention	“I’m out of the game”	No seat, no impact

Void vote (error, strikethrough): treated as gray vote. Mistakes are not punished.

None of these votes grant recall rights. Those who refuse to choose give up the right to undo.

Black/gray/white/void votes are recorded on the card the same way as a vote with anonymity request. From the outside, these categories are indistinguishable. The stigma disappears.

The white vote: two options

The white vote is not an opinion vote. It is a pro-decision vote.

This document does not choose between these two options. Each has its coherence [149].

Option A — Political signal only

- White counts neither for nor against.
- It modifies neither the numerator (M) nor the denominator (T) of the majority ratio.
- It makes visible a critical participation without withdrawal—a refusal to choose that is not a refusal to participate.
- Black vote can minoritize without counterweight.

Option B — Counterweight to blocking

- The directional majority is determined by FOR vs AGAINST votes from filled seats only.
- Once this majority is established, whites automatically align with it.
- White **does not create** a majority. It **restores** a majority that black would have artificially destroyed.
- In case of tie (FOR = AGAINST), whites abstain.

Colombia offers an institutional precedent: Article 258 of its constitution gives the white vote specific legal effects, notably annulling an election if white exceeds the absolute majority [152].

Formalization: effect on the M/T ratio

Let M = FOR votes, C = AGAINST votes, T = total counted, N = black seats, B = white seats.

Without postures (filled seats only): if $M > C$, the law passes.

With black votes: blacks vote AGAINST $\rightarrow C' = C + N$. A real majority can be **artificially minoritized**.

Example: 35 FOR, 25 AGAINST, 20 black $\rightarrow 35 / 80 = 44\%$. The majority (58%) becomes minority.

With white votes (Option B): whites follow the directional majority of the elected.

*Continued: 35 FOR, 25 AGAINST, 20 black, 20 white. Directional: 35 > 25 → whites vote FOR.
Result: 55 / 100 = 55%. **The real majority is restored.***

Posture	Effect on M	Effect on T	Resulting formula
Black	—	+N	$M / (T + N)$
Gray	—	—	M / T
White (Option B)	+B if $M > C$	+B	$(M + B) / (T + B)$

The white vote is the counterweight to the black vote. Blocking versus unblocking [147].

19.7 — Protection against sabotage blocking

An anti-democratic party could call for massive black voting to paralyze the system [151]. Several mechanisms discourage this:

No public funding of parties. Parties are funded by their members and donors. Calling for black votes = no elected officials = no money. The saboteur must convince people to fund blocking.

Elected officials' salary is proportional to their first-round score. For example, if the link is linear, an official at 30% earns 30% of the reference salary. In practice, the curve will probably be logarithmic or square root: 70% is an excellent score and should approach 100% of the salary. This curve is constitutionalized, and its change requires a referendum.

19.8 — Financial status of elected officials

Elected officials have no special advantages. No special pension scheme—they contribute to their own capitalized retirement, like everyone else. No income stacking. One income, modulated by their score, period.

Any modification of elected officials' reference salary (beyond inflation indexing) must go through a census referendum. **Elected officials cannot vote themselves a raise.** The same rule applies to Constitutional Council members—elected officials cannot “buy” their controllers.

19.9 — Holding multiple offices

Holding multiple offices is allowed, but limited and regulated:

Maximum two simultaneous mandates. One of the two must be local. This rule values proximity to voters.

No income stacking. The official receives one base income, that of the higher mandate, modulated by their first-round score.

A bonus for dual anchoring. The second mandate provides a supplement that rewards double legitimacy, while remaining capped. The precise calculation is detailed in **Appendix C**.

19.10 — Majorities: filled seats vs. empty seats

Majority rules depend on the type of decision:

For ordinary laws (simple majority): black seats vote AGAINST, gray seats abstain, white seats follow the directional majority (Option B) or abstain (Option A). A parliament with many blacks will struggle to legislate—unless whites counterbalance.

For constitutional amendments (2/3, 4/5 majority, etc.): only **filled** seats count. Empty seats—white, gray, or black—are **excluded** from the calculation. White vote can never facilitate a qualified majority. Black vote can never alone block a constitutional reform. This rule is a safeguard against any “nuclear” use of posture votes.

Quota rule. Abstentions exit the decision quota. Ordinary decisions are made by majority of votes expressing an opinion.

A very empty parliament has little legitimacy and will be under pressure to dissolve. But the system remains functional: the previous budget is renewed (with penalty), existing laws apply, the country doesn’t collapse. It’s the sovereign choice of the people.

19.11 — Materialization in the hemicycle

Empty seats are materialized by **covers** over the armchairs:


Cover color	Meaning
White	Pro-decision seat (counterweight to blocking)
Gray	Neutral seat (systematic abstention)
Black	Blocking seat (systematic vote AGAINST)

Spatial arrangement and political alternation. To avoid any symbolic association with a political camp:

- **White** seats are placed at one end of the hemicycle (for example, far left).

- **Gray and black** seats are placed at the other end (for example, far right).
- Filled elected officials sit in the center.
- **Alternation:** at each new legislature, sides are reversed. Odd legislature: whites on the left. Even legislature: whites on the right.

This staging makes visible, permanently, the **tension between decision and resistance**. White against black. Unblocking against blocking. Citizens following debates see at a glance the level of legitimacy—or its absence.



19.12 — Civic maturity

At first, there will probably be many recalls. The system will be turbulent. Then citizens will learn, as the Swiss learned to use their votes with discernment. **The system educates.** Recall will become a weapon of last resort, used sparingly. It's a bet on collective intelligence over the long term.

19.13 — Case study (empirical example): The California recall (1911-present)

California has had since 1911 a popular recall mechanism allowing voters to remove an elected official before the end of their term [125][126]. It's the most developed American precedent for permanent recall.

What worked

Effective deterrent weapon. The threat of recall disciplines elected officials. Even without succeeding, recall petitions force governors to listen to public opinion [125]. The mechanism's existence changes behavior.

Successful recall in 2003. Governor Gray Davis was recalled with 55% of votes, replaced by Arnold Schwarzenegger [126]. The mechanism works when unpopularity is real.

Protection against abuse of power. Several mayors and city council members have been recalled for corruption or incompetence. The system offers a local safety valve.

Democratic legitimacy. Recall requires a massive petition (12% of voters from the last election for a governor). This is not a minority whim—it's a substantial popular expression.

Educational effect. Californians know the mechanism and know they can use it. Civic culture is enriched by this tool.

What poses problems

Prohibitive cost. The 2021 recall of Gavin Newsom cost \$276 million [127]. Organizing a special election across a state of 40 million people is ruinously expensive.

Partisan manipulation. Recall is sometimes used as a political weapon rather than correction of abuse. In 2021, the attempt against Newsom was largely partisan—he survived with 62% support [127].

Binary threshold. The mechanism is all-or-nothing: recall or not. No gradation according to severity of rejection. An official at 51% recalls falls as abruptly as one at 80%.

No right to re-support. Once a petition is signed, you cannot withdraw your signature. No mechanism to absorb emotional fluctuations.

Chaotic replacement. In 2003, 135 candidates ran to replace Davis. The replacement system was anarchic [126].

What we keep from the California model

- The **principle of popular recall** as a fundamental citizen right
- The **need for a substantial threshold** to avoid minority whims
- The **deterrent effect** on elected officials' behavior
- The **civic culture** the mechanism develops

What we improve

- **Permanent and free recall:** no special election needed. Recall is continuous, digitally recorded.
Near-zero cost
- **Delay proportional to severity:** at 56%, you have months. At 75%, days. No binary threshold
- **Right to re-support:** you can cancel your recall if you change your mind
- **Right to run again:** the recalled official can run again immediately
- **Recall linked to active voting:** only those who voted for a candidate (any candidate) can recall.
Voting black, white, gray, abstaining or explicitly renouncing = no recall right (except for ministers, under equal suffrage)

What we don't adopt

- **The costly special election:** our system is continuous, not punctual
- **The binary threshold:** the response is graduated according to level of rejection
- **The impossibility of withdrawing signature:** re-support is a right
- **Chaotic replacement:** the succession process is clarified in advance

Chapitre XX

VOTING MODALITIES

The proposed system relies on frequent voting: elections, recalls, referendums. This section describes the technical infrastructure that makes all of this possible, while guaranteeing anonymity, security, and practicality.

20.1 — The Anonymous Voter Card

Voting anonymity is fundamental. The system relies on an architecture where **three elements are separated and never linked**:

Element	Content	Held by
Identity card	Name, photo, biometric A (fingerprints)	Citizen + civil registry
Voter card	Random number, biometric B (iris), encrypted census weight	Citizen only
Electoral register	Card numbers → encrypted votes	Electoral authority

Tableau 20.1 — Identity/vote separation architecture

No database links identity ↔ card number. Anonymity is structural, not merely legal.




Figure 20.1 — Separation of electoral data

Assignment process:

1. The citizen presents themselves at city hall with their identity card
2. Verification: they haven't already received a card (register "has received a card", without the number)
3. The clerk opens a bin containing **minimum 100 pre-generated cards** (random numbers, not activated)
4. **The citizen picks one at random themselves**—the clerk never touches the card, never sees the number
5. The citizen goes into a booth to activate the card, register biometric B (iris), and receive the paper document (PIN, PUK, ownership code)
6. The clerk validates "card delivered" without ever knowing which number

Annual update of census weight:

1. The citizen goes to a secure terminal (city hall, dedicated booth)
2. Identity card insertion → the terminal queries the tax administration → retrieves the calculated weight
3. Voter card insertion → the terminal writes the encrypted weight on the card
4. The terminal immediately erases the link—no log, air-gapped machine (no network connection)

Distinct biometrics: Fingerprints (identity card) and iris (voter card) are different biometrics. Impossible to link the two cards by biometrics in databases.

Loss or theft: The citizen presents themselves with their identity card + ownership code. The old number is blacklisted. New card with new random number. No identity ↔ number link is ever stored.

20.2 — The Physical Booth

For votes with high coercion risk, voting takes place in a **permanent booth at city hall**, during extended hours (like a photo booth). The citizen goes there alone, inserts their card, enters their PIN, and uses their biometrics.

Voting in the booth:

1. Authentication: identity card (photo + biometric A), then voter card (biometric B + PIN)
2. Vote choice (or white/gray) + option “I want to be able to recall”
3. The encrypted vote + encrypted weight are transmitted to the server with the card number—no identity transits
4. The citizen leaves with a verification code (proves their vote was counted, not for whom)

Open source code: The booth software is published. Before each election, randomly selected machines are audited—hash comparison with published code. Tech-savvy citizens can verify the checksum in the booth.

This physical displacement has several virtues:

Reflection time: no hot recall under the emotion of a controversy. The trip is a decompression chamber.

Real will: if you make the trip, you really mean it. It’s a natural filter against fickleness.

Protection against coercion: even if an abusive spouse knows the codes, they cannot enter the booth in place of their victim (biometrics) and cannot see what they do there. You can tell them “it’s done” and do the opposite. They will never know.

20.3 — Technical Security of the Booth

The booth is designed to ensure the citizen is alone and free:

Presence detection: if the system detects two people in the cabin, or if the door remains open, it refuses to function. No one can watch over your shoulder.

Electronic device detection: if a phone, camera, or any other recording device is detected, the system locks. You cannot be forced to film your vote to prove to someone what you did.

These technical protections make coercion practically impossible. Even under threat, you can enter the booth and do what you want. No one can verify.

20.4 — Online Voting

The proposed system multiplies voting occasions: elections, recalls, constitutional referendums, treaty referendums, major public contract referendums... If everything had to be done in physical booths, citizens would spend their lives at city hall.

The solution: distinguish by coercion risk.

Mandatory physical booth:

- Elections (electing people)
- Recalls (removing people)
- Constitutional referendums (fundamental stakes)

These votes concern *people* or *existential stakes*. Coercion risk is maximal: an employer may want to know who you vote for, a violent spouse may demand proof. The physical booth with presence detection and electronic device blocking remains indispensable.

Online voting possible:

- Referendums on public contracts
- Ordinary referendums (laws, trade treaties, local issues)

These votes concern *projects* or *texts*. Coercion risk is lower: nobody is going to threaten their spouse to vote for a particular tram supplier. And even if someone tried to coerce, the personal stake is smaller—the victim can yield without betraying their deep convictions.

Online voting guarantees:

- Authentication by voter card + PIN + SMS code or dedicated app
- End-to-end encryption—the server only sees the encrypted vote and encrypted weight
- Ability to “re-vote” during the voting period—only the last vote counts. This allows a person under duress to vote under surveillance, then re-vote alone later
- Verification code—the citizen can verify their vote was counted
- Public audit of source code

The right to vote in booth remains open. Even for an ordinary referendum, any citizen can choose to vote in physical booth rather than online. It’s an option, not an obligation.

Volume becomes manageable. With online voting for ordinary referendums, the system can function without drowning citizens. Physical trips are reserved for stakes where maximum protection is necessary.

20.5 — Case Study (Empirical Example): Estonian Electronic Voting (i-Voting, 2005-present)

Estonia is the only country in the world to have generalized online voting for national elections [132] [133]. Since 2005, any citizen can vote from their computer using their electronic identity card. In 2023, 51% of votes in legislative elections were cast online [134].

What Worked

Massive progressive adoption. From 2% of votes in 2005 to 51% in 2023. Trust was built election after election. The system wasn't brutally imposed—it was progressively adopted by citizens [132].

Solid digital identity infrastructure. i-Voting relies on the ID-kaart (electronic identity card) and Mobile-ID. 98% of Estonians have a digital identity. Voting is just one application among others (banking, taxes, health) [133].

Ability to re-vote. Voters can modify their vote as many times as they wish during the early voting period. Only the last vote counts. This is protection against coercion: you can vote under surveillance, then re-vote alone later [132].

Individual verification. Since 2013, each voter can verify via their smartphone that their vote was correctly recorded [134].

Low marginal cost. Once infrastructure is in place, cost per vote is negligible. No need for additional physical booths, electoral personnel, manual counting.

Accessibility. People with reduced mobility, expatriates, citizens traveling can vote without logistical constraints.

What's Problematic

Identified vulnerabilities. Researchers have demonstrated potential flaws: malware on the voter's computer, attacks on collection servers, possible server-side manipulation [133]. No successful attack has been proven, but theoretical risk exists.

Unverifiable trust. The ordinary citizen cannot audit the system. They must trust experts and authorities. The code is published, but few people can actually verify it.

Risk concentration. A successful attack on the central system could affect the entire election, unlike decentralized physical polling stations.

No paper receipt. Unlike physical voting, there's no material trace. An independent recount is impossible.

Residual coercion risk. Despite re-voting, a sophisticated coercer could monitor until the end of the voting period. Risk is reduced, not eliminated.

What We Keep from the Estonian Model

- The **ability to re-vote** as protection against coercion
- **Individual verification** that the vote was recorded
- **Digital identity infrastructure** as prerequisite
- **Progressive adoption** that builds trust
- **Public source code** for auditability

What We Improve

- **Distinction by coercion risk:** our system reserves online voting for ordinary referendums. Elections (people) and constitutional referendums remain in physical booths—Estonia allows online voting for everything
- **Reinforced physical booth:** presence detection, electronic device blocking—protections Estonia cannot offer for home voting
- **Identity/vote separation:** our system uses two distinct cards (identity and voter) with different biometrics. Estonia uses the same card for everything

What We Don't Keep

- **Online voting for elections of people:** coercion risk is too high
- **Trust in home voting:** even with re-voting, the physical booth remains superior for major stakes
- **Absence of material trace:** our system maintains backups and audit mechanisms

Chapitre XXI

WHEN PARLIAMENT CANNOT PASS THE BUDGET

It may happen that Parliament is unable to pass a budget. Either because too many seats are empty (massive white vote), or because no majority emerges. This is a budget deadlock.

This deadlock must not paralyze the country, but it must have a cost—otherwise it would become a sabotage weapon without consequences. Here are the rules:

21.1 — Previous Budget Renewed with Penalty

The previous budget is renewed WITHOUT inflation indexing and with -10% per year. Sovereign services gradually deteriorate. The deadlock hurts.

21.2 — Taxes Frozen in Real Terms


Taxes remain unchanged in real terms. If the country has an automatic indexing system (like the Belgian index), tax brackets follow the index—otherwise taxpayers would be penalized by “bracket creep.” But no modification of rates or structure is possible without a passed budget. The difference between revenues and expenses feeds a “catch-up fund,” distinct from the structural reserve fund. The money is there, but frozen.

21.3 — Automatic Elections After 12 Months

After 12 months of deadlock, automatic new elections. No limit on the number of cycles. If deadlock persists: elections → deadlock → budget -10% → 12 months → elections → etc.

21.4 — Exiting the Deadlock

Upon exiting the deadlock, the new parliament can use the catch-up fund to repair damage (deteriorated infrastructure, deferred maintenance). The money is earmarked, not merged into the general budget.



The effect: **nobody wins by blocking**. The saboteur destroys services their own voters need. The cartel hoping to wait out the deadlock watches its budget melt. Everyone has an interest in breaking the impasse.

Chapitre XXII

TAX AND POWER: WHO PAYS DECIDES

Money is the sinews of war. Budget decisions commit taxpayers' money. It is logical that those who contribute more weigh more heavily on these decisions.

But beware: this is not about excluding anyone. **Everyone votes.** It is the weight of the vote that varies.

The idea of non-strictly equal suffrage (*plural voting*) was defended in the 19th century in liberal representation theory, notably by John Stuart Mill, as a solution aimed at reconciling broad participation and decision quality [140][141]. The justification and normative tensions of *plural voting* have been clarified in contemporary academic literature [142][143].

22.1 — The Criterion: Tax Paid, Not Income

What counts is what one actually contributes to the common pot. If you optimize fiscally, that's your right. But you lose political weight. **Want to influence decisions? Contribute.**

This creates a positive incentive to pay taxes. It's no longer just a levy, it's an investment in one's political influence.

22.2 — The Census Weight Curve

Vote weight follows a progressive curve between a floor (1 vote) and a ceiling (100 votes). The exact shape of this curve—rapid rise to reward entry into contribution, regular progression afterward, moderate acceleration for very large contributors—is detailed in **Appendix D**.

The number of census votes is not necessarily a whole number—it's a continuous value, precisely calculated.

22.3 — Floor and Ceiling

Nobody falls below one vote. The unemployed, the student, the person in difficulty—their voice exists. Their democratic dignity is preserved.

Nobody exceeds one hundred votes. A billionaire cannot crush the system. One hundred modest citizens balance one ultra-rich.

22.4 — Weight Relative to Level of Power

The weight is not absolute. It is calculated relative to the contribution to the budget of the relevant level of power. Contribution to the national budget determines weight in national elections. Contribution to the local budget determines weight in local elections.

A billionaire who pays little local tax in their rural commune weighs less locally than a local entrepreneur who contributes heavily there.

22.5 — Dynamic Weight

Situation changes, weight changes. You lose your job, you contribute less, weight decreases. You succeed, you contribute more, weight increases. **This is not a fixed caste.** It's an updated snapshot of contribution.

22.6 — Weighted Recall

When you recall an elected official, you recall with the weight you have at the time of recall. If large contributors withdraw their support, it weighs more heavily. Logical: they are the ones funding that official's decisions.

The total weight of all voters is recalculated at each tax deadline (once a year), or in case of legislative change affecting tax.

22.7 — Self-Regulation: The Self-Correction Mechanism

Here is the decisive advantage of the census system: **it corrects itself.**

Imagine a group manages to pass laws that shift the tax burden onto another group. What happens?

- The group that pays more → gains census weight
- The group that pays less → loses census weight
- At the next election (probably quick, thanks to the recall system), the aggrieved group weighs more heavily
- They vote for candidates who rebalance
- The system returns to equilibrium

Concrete example. The richest vote a tax that hits the middle classes. Result: the middle classes pay more taxes, so their census weight increases. At the next election (quick, therefore, with recall), they weigh more and can reverse this policy. Exploitation of one group by another is structurally unstable.

This is a self-regulation mechanism. Any attempt at imbalance automatically generates the forces that correct it.




Figure 22.1 — Census system feedback loop

For this mechanism to work, the polynomial curve must be calibrated so that a significant increase in tax paid leads to a significant increase in weight. Rebalancing must be fast enough to prevent prolonged exploitation, but not too brutal to avoid instability. It's a fine-tuning, but the principle is robust.

22.8 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The Prussian Three-Class Voting System (1849-1918)

Prussia used for nearly 70 years a three-class census voting system (*Dreiklassenwahlrecht*) [135][136]. Voters were divided into three groups according to their tax contribution, each group electing the same number of electors—thus giving disproportionate political weight to the largest taxpayers.

How It Worked

Taxpayers in each constituency were ranked by tax amount paid, then divided into three fiscal thirds: - **First class:** the largest taxpayers representing 1/3 of total taxes (often 4-5% of the population) - **Second class:** medium taxpayers representing the next 1/3 (about 10-15% of the population) - **Third class:** everyone else (80-85% of the population)

Each class elected the same number of electors. A first-class industrialist thus weighed 15 to 20 times more than a third-class worker [135].

What Worked

Political stability. The system lasted 70 years without major revolution. Economic elites, secure in their influence, did not seek to overthrow the regime. Prussia became an industrial power [136]. The *Dreiklassenwahlrecht* has also been the subject of modern quantitative analysis in political economy, allowing study of its effects on elite selection, public choices, and institutional stability [137].

Incentive to contribute. Paying more taxes meant potentially changing class and gaining influence. The system created a positive incentive for tax contribution.

Legitimacy of the era. The principle “who pays decides” was widely accepted in the 19th century. The system reflected a coherent vision of the link between property and political responsibility [135].

What's Problematic

Extreme inequality. The weight ratio could reach 1 to 20 or more. It was assumed plutocracy, not weighted democracy [136].

No floor or ceiling. An ultra-rich person could dominate their local first class. A poor person had only one voice drowned among thousands. No minimal democratic dignity.

Rigid classes. The three classes created brutal discontinuities. Moving from second to first class multiplied weight by 5-10. Our system uses a continuous curve.

No self-correction mechanism. If the rich voted laws favoring the rich, their weight did not decrease—it could even increase. The system amplified inequalities instead of correcting them [135].

Public, not secret voting. Voting was done orally, in public. Coercion was possible. Workers voted under their employers' gaze.

Inevitable abolition. The system was abolished in 1918 after Germany's defeat. Its association with the old Prussian regime made it indefensible.

What We Keep from the Prussian Model

- The **weighting principle** according to tax contribution
- The **positive incentive** to contribute to weigh more
- The link between **financial responsibility and political influence**

What We Improve

- **Continuous curve, not classes:** our system uses a polynomial function, not brutal thirds. No discontinuity.
- **Floor and ceiling:** nobody below one vote (dignity), nobody above one hundred (no plutocracy)
- **Guaranteed secret ballot:** physical booth, biometrics, structural anonymity
- **Self-correction mechanism:** if a group is overtaxed, their weight increases and they can reverse this policy. The Prussian system had no such feedback

What We Don't Keep

- **Extreme inequality** (1:20 ratio or more): our maximum ratio is 1:100, with a curve that limits power concentration
- **Public voting:** ballot secrecy is sacred
- **Absence of democracy for fundamental rights:** our system reserves census voting for budget. Rights fall under equal suffrage (Senate)
- **Class rigidity:** our weight is dynamic and recalculated annually

Chapitre XXIII

TWO CHAMBERS, TWO LOGICS

Not all decisions are of the same nature. Money questions and fundamental rights questions do not follow the same logic. We need two chambers with distinct election methods, with asymmetric competences.

23.1 — Parliament: The Chamber of Power

Parliament is elected by census vote, according to the rules described previously. It is the system's central chamber. It has jurisdiction over:

- **The budget:** expenditures, revenues, financial arbitrations. Parliament operates within a closed envelope (mandatory surplus, levy ceiling)
- **The government:** Parliament invests and overthrows the government. The Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament alone
- **Increasing the tax rate:** by two-thirds majority. Those who pay decide to pay more
- **All ordinary laws** that do not affect fundamental liberties

23.2 — The Senate: The Chamber of Protection

The Senate is elected by equal suffrage. Each citizen weighs the same. The Senate has jurisdiction over:

- **Societal laws:** everything touching fundamental rights and liberties, defined in a closed constitutional list. Right to life, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, physical integrity, civic rights, family...
- **Decreasing the tax rate:** by two-thirds majority. Protecting everyone's property, rich and poor alike

The Senate does NOT participate in government investiture. It cannot overthrow the Prime Minister. Its role is defensive: protecting liberties, not governing.

23.3 — Why Parliament Is More Stable

Census Parliament is structurally protected against blocking:

- Rich voters are generally more educated, less impulsive
- It's their money at stake—they have an interest in the system working

- Black voting triggers the blocking mechanism (-10% budget)—large contributors lose the most in absolute value
- Weight proportional to contribution dilutes demagogues' influence


The equal-suffrage Senate is more vulnerable to calls for black voting. But it's less serious: the Senate doesn't vote the budget, doesn't invest the government. A blocked Senate puts liberty protection on pause, but doesn't paralyze the country.

The asymmetry is intentional. The weak point (Senate) is where consequences are lesser. The strong point (Parliament) is where consequences are serious. The system places its resilience where it's most necessary.

23.4 — The Veto Mechanism

If the Senate votes a societal law that has budgetary impact, Parliament can veto. But it must demonstrate this impact. The burden of proof lies with it.

Facing the veto, the Senate has three options: reformulate the law to make it budget-neutral, reduce the budgetary impact and retry, or convince Parliament to fund within the existing envelope.



23.5 — The Reverse Veto

If Parliament votes a budgetary law with societal implications—touching fundamental rights—the Senate can oppose it. This prevents, for example, Parliament from voting forced euthanasia for budgetary reasons.

23.6 — The Classification Criterion

How to distinguish societal from budgetary? Through a closed constitutional list of societal domains. Everything in the list falls under the Senate. Everything with budgetary impact falls under Parliament or requires its agreement.

The discriminating criterion is simple: **is there budgetary impact, yes or no?**

23.7 — Persistent Legislative Deadlock Between Chambers

When a text is vetoed (in either direction) and no agreement is reached, legislative deadlock is declared. The following rules apply:

Automatic Trigger

Legislative deadlock is established when:

1. A text has undergone **three shuttles** without identical adoption by both chambers; or
2. One chamber issues a **formal veto** without counter-proposal within **60 days**; or
3. **180 days** have elapsed since initial filing without adoption.

The deadlock finding is automatic, without intervention by a third body. Each chamber's secretariat records dates; triggering results from the calendar.

Immediate Effects of Deadlock

Upon deadlock finding:

1. **Status quo prevails.** Existing law remains in force. Neither chamber can unilaterally impose modification.
2. **Extension freeze.** Any new expenditure, any new commitment, any creation of new rights related to the blocked text's domain are suspended. Only renewal of existing is authorized.
3. **Prorated reduction.** If deadlock concerns a text with budgetary impact, credits allocated to the concerned domain are reduced by **0.83% per month** (i.e., 10% per year, prorated). The difference feeds a **sectoral catch-up fund**, distinct from the general budget, frozen until deadlock exit.

4. **Symmetry of consequences.** Deadlock effects apply regardless of which chamber initiated the veto. No chamber can block without suffering the same restrictions as the other.

Escalation and Political Sanction

1. **Beyond 12 cumulative months of deadlock** on the same text or set of related texts: automatic dissolution of both chambers and general elections within 90 days.
2. **Cumulation is counted by legislature.** If deadlock ceases then resumes on the same subject, delays add up.
3. **Both chambers are dissolved simultaneously.** Neither survives the other. The voter decides.

Exiting Deadlock

Deadlock ends when:

1. Both chambers adopt an identical text; or
2. One chamber withdraws its veto by express simple majority vote; or
3. New elections produce a composition allowing agreement.

Upon deadlock exit, the sectoral catch-up fund is released and allocated to the concerned domain, under control of the competent chamber.

Guiding Principle

Deadlock has a cost for everyone. It cannot serve as a cost-free obstruction strategy. Whoever blocks deteriorates services, triggers elections, and exposes themselves to voter judgment. The mechanism requires no arbiter, no judge of good faith: it relies on deadlines, counters, and automatic consequences.

23.8 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The British House of Lords (1911-present)

The United Kingdom offers the oldest and most studied example of asymmetric bicameralism [108][109]. Since the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, the House of Lords has lost its absolute veto right in favor of a mere delaying power—creating a constitutional asymmetry between the two chambers.

What Worked

Specialization by domain. The House of Lords cannot block “money bills” (financial bills). This regime is formalized in the Parliament Act 1911 [117], which explicitly frames the asymmetry between chambers on financial matters [118]. These texts, certified by the Commons Speaker, become law after one month even without Lords agreement [108]. The budget thus escapes all bicameral blocking.

Suspensive, not absolute veto. For other laws, Lords can delay a text by one year maximum. If Commons persists, the text passes. This allows reflection without paralysis [109].

Expertise and revision. Lords, not subject to electoral pressure, examine texts in detail. They propose technical amendments often accepted by Commons. Effective “chamber of reflection” function.

Distinct legitimacies. Commons derives legitimacy from universal suffrage. Lords (since 1999, mainly life peers) derive theirs from expertise and experience. Two logics coexist.

Remarkable stability. The system has functioned for over a century without major institutional crisis, despite very different Lords compositions (hereditary, then appointed).

What's Problematic

Weak democratic legitimacy. Lords are not elected. Their delaying power is tolerated, but any extension attempt would be contested [109]. The system relies on Lords' self-limitation.

Arbitrary composition. Peers are appointed by the Prime Minister, creating partisan nomination risk. No objective entry criteria.

Incomplete asymmetry. The “money bill” vs other laws distinction is sometimes blurry. Hybrid texts create certification tensions [108].

No exclusive competence. Lords have no reserved domain where their voice is preponderant. They can delay, never impose.

What We Keep from the British Model

- The **budget/non-budget distinction**: financial questions fall under one chamber
- **Asymmetric veto**: one chamber can definitively block, the other only delay
- **Functional specialization**: each chamber has a distinct role
- **Proven stability** over more than a century

What We Improve

- **Two democratic legitimacies**: our Senate is elected by equal suffrage, not appointed. Both chambers have popular legitimacy, but different. Bicameralisms have already articulated two different electoral legitimacies: several 19th-century Australian upper houses were elected on a property franchise, while the lower house relied on broader suffrage, institutionalizing distinct representation without eliminating election [112]. Documented example: the 1856 South Australian Constitution establishes two elected chambers, one on “property suffrage” (upper house) and the other on very broad male franchise (lower house) [113][114]. The imperial framework enabling creation of bicameral parliaments in Australian colonies explicitly deals with franchise qualifications, showing that

dissociation of electoral bases between chambers was among contemplated constitutional options [116].

- **Domain reserved to Senate:** fundamental rights fall under Senate alone, not just a suspensive veto
- **Clear criterion:** budgetary impact = Parliament; fundamental rights = Senate. No gray zone
- **Mutual veto on encroachments:** Senate can block a budgetary law touching liberties; Parliament can block a societal law that costs

What We Don't Keep

- **The unelected chamber:** our Senate is elected, by equal suffrage
- **Mere delaying power:** our Senate has real blocking power in its domain
- **Political appointment:** no partisan nomination in our system

23.9 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #2: American Bicameralism (1789-present)

The United States invented modern bicameralism with the “Grand Compromise” of 1787 [110][109]. The House of Representatives represents the people (proportional to population), the Senate represents states (two senators per state, regardless of size).

What Worked

Constitutional stability. The American Constitution is the oldest written constitution still in force [110]. 235 years of continuous operation, despite a civil war and major crises.

Protection of territorial minorities. The Senate gives equal weight to Wyoming (600,000 inhabitants) and California (40 million). Small states cannot be crushed by large ones [109].

Reciprocal veto. Any law must be adopted by both chambers. Equal bicameralism forces compromise between different legitimacies.

Legislative shuttle. Texts go back and forth between chambers until convergence. This process improves law quality, even if it slows them.

Confirmation of appointments. The Senate confirms judges, ambassadors, and cabinet members. This counter-power limits presidential arbitrariness.

What's Problematic

Structural blocking (“gridlock”). Different majorities in the two chambers regularly paralyze the system [111]. Budget “shutdown” has become routine.

Rural over-representation. The Senate gives disproportionate weight to sparsely populated rural states. 50 senators can represent 18% of the population [111].

Filibuster. The 60-vote rule in the Senate (to close debate) creates a de facto supermajority threshold. A minority of 41 senators can block any legislation.

No conflict resolution mechanism. In case of persistent disagreement between chambers, there's no automatic procedure. Blocking can last indefinitely.

Polarization. The bicameral system doesn't prevent partisan polarization. Both chambers are often as divided as each other.

What We Keep from the American Model

- **Authentic bicameralism:** two chambers with real powers
- **Reciprocal veto:** neither chamber can impose alone
- **Minority protection:** one chamber can defend specific interests
- **Confirmation of appointments:** counter-power over executive

What We Improve

- **Functional asymmetry:** our Parliament manages budget, our Senate protects rights. Not two equivalent chambers
- **Resolution mechanism:** joint committee and status quo avoid permanent blocking
- **No filibuster:** simple or qualified majority depending on subject, no structural blocking minority
- **Two distinct legitimacies:** census vs equal, not territorial vs proportional

What We Don't Keep

- **Equal bicameralism:** our asymmetry avoids paralysis
- **Territorial representation:** our Senate is not a "Senate of territories"
- **Filibuster:** no minority can block indefinitely
- **Absence of automatic resolution:** our system has unblocking mechanisms

23.10 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #3: The Swiss Council of States (1848-present)

Switzerland combines bicameralism and direct democracy in a unique balance [121][122]. The National Council represents the people (proportionally), the Council of States represents cantons (two per canton).

What Worked

Mandatory consensus. The two chambers have strictly equal powers. Any law must be adopted identically by both [121]. This forces broad compromises.

Institutional stability. 175 years of continuous operation. The system absorbed two world wars at its borders without institutional rupture.

Representation of linguistic minorities. Romandy and Ticino cantons have weight in the Council of States greater than their demographic weight. Linguistic minorities are protected [122].

Direct democracy as safety valve. Mandatory referendum (for constitutional modifications) and optional referendum (for laws) allow breaking deadlocks between chambers.

Governmental collegiality. The Federal Council (government) is elected by the Federal Assembly (both chambers combined). No dominant executive power.

What's Problematic

Slowness. The shuttle between chambers, combined with referendum delays, considerably slows legislation [122]. Reforms take years.

Complexity. The system of committees, conciliation conferences, divergence elimination procedures is opaque to ordinary citizens.

Structural conservatism. The double veto (two chambers + referendum) favors status quo. Bold reforms are difficult.

Low representation of women. The Council of States remains mostly male. Territorial representation doesn't improve diversity [121].

What We Keep from the Swiss Model

- **Mandatory consensus** between chambers
- **Minority protection** through a dedicated chamber
- **Long-term institutional stability**
- **Referendum** as safety valve in case of blocking

What We Improve

- **Functional asymmetry:** budget vs rights, not two identical chambers
- **Speed:** asymmetry allows faster resolution
- **Distinct legitimacy:** census vs equal, not territorial vs proportional

What We Don't Keep

- **Strict equal bicameralism:** our asymmetry is more efficient
- **Territorial representation:** our Senate is not cantonal
- **Governmental collegiality:** our Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament alone

23.11 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #4: The German Bundesrat (1949-present)

The German Bundesrat represents Länder governments, not their populations [123][128]. It is a chamber of regional executives, unique in Western Europe.

What Worked

Technical expertise. Bundesrat members are serving ministers in their Länder. They bring execution expertise that parliamentarians lack [123].

Federalism protection. Laws touching Länder competences require Bundesrat agreement. The federal government cannot unilaterally encroach [128].

Effective counter-power. When the Bundesrat is dominated by the opposition, it slows federal government reforms. This counter-power has sometimes prevented excesses.

No electoral cycle of its own. The Bundesrat is not directly elected. Its composition changes with regional elections, not in bloc. This smooths alternations.

What's Problematic

Partisan blocking. When Bundesrat and Bundestag have opposite majorities, the system blocks [128]. The Schröder government (1998-2005) was paralyzed by a hostile Bundesrat.

Opacity. Negotiations between federal and regional governments happen behind closed doors. Citizens don't see who decides what.

Indirect legitimacy. Bundesrat members are not elected for this role. Their legitimacy is derived, not direct.

Bargaining. Länder use their Bundesrat vote as bargaining chip to obtain regional advantages. Partisan logic mixes with territorial logic [123].

What We Keep from the German Model

- **Effective counter-power** of a second chamber

- **Protection of competences** of one level against the other
- **Smoothing of alternations** through different electoral cycles

What We Improve

- **Direct election:** our Senate is elected by equal suffrage, not composed of regional ministers
- **Transparency:** public deliberations, no backroom negotiations
- **Own legitimacy:** the Senate has its own electoral base

What We Don't Keep

- **Chamber of executives:** our Senate represents citizens, not governments
- **Indirect legitimacy:** direct election by equal suffrage
- **Territorial bargaining:** our Senate is not a negotiation venue between regions

23.12 — The Unicameral Option

The bicameralism described in this chapter is designed for a central state with sufficient resources. But it is not always necessary.

For **local authorities**, a second chamber represents a fixed cost often disproportionate to the stakes. Municipalities, inter-municipalities, regions: maintaining two distinct assemblies with their shuttle procedures can be an unjustifiable budgetary luxury.

In these cases, **a single assembly suffices**—provided it integrates both logics (equal and contributive) in voting modalities.

Chapter XXIV (Local Governance) details this option: a single council where the voting method varies according to the nature of the decision. Budgetary questions by census vote, local fundamental rights by equal vote, all in the same venue.

This architecture preserves the principles—who pays decides on money, civic equality on rights—without the cost of a second chamber. It is the adaptation of asymmetric bicameralism to scales where it would be too heavy.

Chapitre XXIV

LOCAL GOVERNANCE: ADAPTING PRINCIPLES TO SCALE

The asymmetric bicameralism described in chapter XXIII is designed for a central state. At the local scale—municipalities, inter-municipalities, regions—maintaining two distinct assemblies is often an unjustifiable budgetary luxury.

This chapter proposes architectures adapted to local authorities, preserving founding principles without imposing the cost of a second chamber.

24.1 — Structuring Principles

Whatever architecture is chosen, the same principles apply:

1. **Civic equality for fundamental rights.** Decisions touching local liberties (public space regulations, municipal police, residents' rights) are made by equal suffrage. One citizen = one vote.
2. **Contributive logic for money questions.** Budgetary decisions—local taxation, investments, subsidies—are made by census vote, weighted by local tax contribution.
3. **Permanent recall.** Local elected officials remain recallable according to the same mechanisms as at national level. No blank check.
4. **Budget deadlock mechanism.** In case of non-adoption of the local budget, the same rules apply: automatic 10% reduction, feeding a local catch-up fund, management in standby.
5. **Risk encapsulation.** Each authority assumes its decisions. No automatic bailout by the higher level.

24.2 — Option A: The Variable-Geometry Single Council

A single assembly, but whose voting modalities change according to the nature of the decision. This architecture draws on work on measuring voting power and double-majority systems [144][146].

Operation

The local council is elected by mixed suffrage: each elected official has an **equal weight** (fixed, identical for all) and a **census weight** (proportional to their voters' tax contribution). Voting and collective decision theory provides tools for calibrating these weightings [145].

At each vote, the session chair announces the applicable mode:

- **Equal vote:** each councilor weighs 1. Simple or qualified majority depending on subject.
- **Census vote:** each councilor weighs according to their contributive legitimacy. Majority calculated in points, not heads.

Domains of Competence

Domain	Voting Mode
Annual budget	Census
Local taxation (rates, bases)	Census, 2/3 majority for increase
Major investments	Census
Subsidies to associations	Census
Public space regulations	Equal
Municipal police, security	Equal
Regulatory urbanism (local plan)	Equal
Local societal deliberations	Equal

Advantages

- **Economy.** One assembly, one venue, one staff.
- **Simplicity.** Same elected officials, same debates. Only the count changes.
- **Transparency.** All votes are public. Citizens immediately see which mode applies.

Limits

- **Possible confusion.** The dual weight can disorient voters.
- **Complex calculation.** Census weight must be recalculated at each election, even annually if tax contribution evolves.

24.3 — Option B: Dedicated Contributive Representation

Two bodies, but one is light: a specialized budget committee.

Operation

The **local council** is elected by equal suffrage. It deliberates on all non-budgetary questions.

The **budget committee** is composed of the same elected officials, but sits separately with census weight. It deliberates exclusively on budget, local taxation, and major expenditures.

Legally, it's the same body sitting in two distinct formations. No second election, no second building, no second staff.

Operating Rules

- The budget committee is convened specifically for money questions.
- Its agenda is limited: initial budget, supplementary budget, administrative accounts, taxation, loans, investments beyond a threshold.
- The local council retains all other competences.

Advantages

- **Institutional clarity.** Two formations = two visible logics.
- **Specialization.** Budget debates are isolated, with their own majority rules.
- **Legal compatibility.** Easier to integrate into existing legal frameworks (plenary formation vs committee).

Limits

- **Procedural burden.** Two convocations, two minutes, two deliberations.
- **Friction risk.** Council decisions may have budgetary implications that the committee refuses to fund.

24.4 — The Local Veto Mechanism

Whatever the option, a cross-veto applies:

- If an equal decision has significant budgetary impact, it must be validated by census vote (or by the budget committee).
- If a budgetary decision affects local fundamental rights, it must be validated by equal vote (or by the council in equal formation).

The trigger threshold is defined locally (for example: any impact greater than 1% of annual budget).

24.5 — Local Budget Deadlock

In case of non-adoption of budget within legal deadlines:

1. **Automatic renewal.** Previous year's budget is renewed, reduced by 10%.
2. **Catch-up fund feeding.** The difference feeds a frozen local fund.
3. **No state intervention.** The higher level doesn't bail out. The authority assumes.
4. **Unblocking.** As soon as a budget is passed, the catch-up fund is reinjected.

This mechanism discourages blocking without resorting to external supervision.

24.6 — Choice Criteria Between Options

Criterion	Option A (single council)	Option B (dedicated committee)
Authority size	Small to medium	Medium to large
Operating budget	Limited	More substantial
Local political culture	Pragmatic	More formal
Legal complexity	Simpler	More compliant with existing frameworks

Neither option is intrinsically superior. Choice depends on context: territory size, political culture, social acceptability, available resources.

24.7 — What Is Constitutionalized

- The **dual logic principle:** equal for rights, census for money.
- The **budget deadlock mechanism:** renewal -10%, catch-up fund.
- **Recallability of local elected officials.**
- **Risk encapsulation:** no automatic bailout.

Exact modalities (Option A or B, thresholds, procedures) fall under organic law or local regulation.

This chapter offers a catalog of options, not a single solution. Context will decide.

Partie 6 ## Institutions

Chapitre XXV

GIVING JUSTICE BACK TO THE PEOPLE

Justice is a sovereign function. The State holds the monopoly on legitimate violence, and justice is the instrument by which this violence is regulated. But judges must be neither appointed by the executive branch, nor co-opted by their peers. **They must answer to the people.**

25.1 — Judges and Magistrates Are Elected

All judges—from local courts to the supreme court—are elected by direct suffrage, one person one vote. Justice touches everyone's fundamental rights. The poor and the rich have the same interest in judges being competent and honest. Equal suffrage is the rule.

25.2 — Guarantees of Independence

Election does not mean submission to public opinion. Terms are long (for example, 10 years) to protect judges from short-term pressures. Judges cannot be recalled through the permanent recall mechanism—judicial stability demands it. Only an impeachment procedure for serious misconduct, voted by the Senate with a qualified majority, can end a term early.

25.3 — Civil Liability of Magistrates

A judge who commits a serious fault—manifest judicial error, corruption, denial of justice—can be sued civilly. Accountability exists, but it is regulated to prevent judges from being afraid to judge.

25.4 — Case Study (Empirical Example): Judicial Elections in the United States (1832-present)

The United States is the only developed country where judges are massively elected. 39 of 50 states use some form of election for at least some of their judges [121][122]. This system, born in the 1830s with Jacksonian democracy, offers a unique precedent for evaluating the advantages and risks of elective justice.

What Worked

Democratic accountability. Judges answer to voters, not to the executive who would appoint them. A judge perceived as corrupt or incompetent can be defeated in the next election [121].

Increased diversity. States with elections have more minority and female judges than states with appointments. Election opens the judiciary beyond traditional networks [122].

Popular legitimacy. Elected judges can claim a popular mandate. Their authority does not depend on the goodwill of a governor or president.

Transparency of positions. Electoral campaigns force candidates to clarify their judicial philosophy. Voters know (more or less) what they are choosing.

Lasting system. For nearly 200 years, the system has functioned without judicial collapse. States with elected judges are not worse governed than others.

What's Problematic

Campaign financing. Judicial elections are expensive. Studies show a correlation between campaign contributions and favorable decisions for donors [123]. “Justice for sale” is a recurring criticism.

Politicization of courts. In the 22 states with partisan elections, judges campaign with a party label (Democrat/Republican). Judicial neutrality is compromised by political affiliation [121].

Popular pressure on decisions. Judges close to reelection tend to hand down harsher sentences in high-profile criminal cases [123]. Fear of “appearing soft” influences decisions.

Low voter turnout. Judicial elections attract few voters (often <20%). Results reflect mobilized activists, not general opinion.

Competence not guaranteed. Election does not filter legal competence. A charismatic but mediocre jurist can beat a discreet expert.

What We Keep from the American Model

- The **principle of electing** judges by direct suffrage
- **Accountability:** judges answer to the people
- The **democratic legitimacy** of the judiciary
- **Opening** the profession beyond co-optation networks

What We Improve

- **Very long terms (10 years):** protects against short-term electoral pressure—American judges often have 4-6 year terms

- **No permanent recall for judges:** only impeachment for serious misconduct is possible—avoids continuous pressure
- **Equal suffrage only:** justice touches fundamental rights, not budget. No census vote for judges
- **No political campaign financing:** parties do not fund judge-candidates

What We Don't Keep

- **Partisan elections:** no party label for judge-candidates
- **Expensive electoral campaigns:** regulated and limited financing
- **Short terms:** our system uses long terms for independence
- **Easy recall:** judges are not subject to permanent recall

Chapitre XXVI

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL: GUARDIAN OF THE FRAMEWORK

There must be a body to verify that the rules are respected. But this body must not itself become a political power. It must be independent of the powers it controls, and balanced in its composition.

26.1 — A Composition in Four Quarters

The Constitutional Council is composed of four distinct bodies, each representing a quarter of the institution:

- **One quarter elected by direct suffrage** (one person, one vote) – represents civic equality
- **One quarter elected by census vote** – represents tax contribution
- **One quarter drawn by lot among qualified jurists** – represents neutral technical expertise
- **One quarter drawn by lot among all non-jurist, non-elected citizens** – represents the raw, unfiltered people


26.2 — The Decision Rule

For a Council decision to pass, two conditions must be simultaneously met:

- **A simple majority in three of the four bodies:** those elected by direct suffrage, those elected by census vote, and the jurists drawn by lot
- **AND a two-thirds majority of all Council members**

The citizen quarter drawn by lot votes and counts in the two-thirds calculation, but has no separate threshold to reach.

Composition du Conseil constitutionnel



26.3 — The Constructive Chaos Effect

If the citizen quarter drawn by lot votes unpredictably, the other three bodies must converge strongly to reach two-thirds. The system self-disciplines. If citizens are reasonable, they bring a fresh perspective, uncaptured by organized interests.

In both cases, the system wins: either by forcing consensus, or by injecting fresh air.

26.4 — All Deliberations Are Public

No closed sessions. Every citizen can observe how the Council deliberates and votes.

26.5 — A Strictly Procedural Role

The Council does not legislate. It does not decide political questions. It verifies that constitutional rules are respected. Budget surplus respected? Levy ceiling respected? Recall procedure respected? List of societal domains respected?

It is the guardian of the framework, not a player in the game.

26.6 — The Mutual Veto

A Council decision can be overturned by joint agreement of the Senate AND Parliament by qualified majority. This prevents the Council from becoming a super-power.

26.7 — Constitutional Amendment

The constitutional list of societal domains, as well as fundamental budget rules, can only be modified with a **four-fifths majority in each chamber** (Parliament AND Senate, separately). This double supermajority is nearly impossible to achieve. Fundamental rules become intangible.

26.8 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The Irish Citizens' Assembly (2016-present)

Ireland innovated by creating citizens' assemblies drawn by lot to deliberate on major constitutional questions [128][129]. The 2016-2018 Citizens' Assembly, composed of 99 citizens drawn by lot plus a chairperson, prepared the referendums on abortion and same-sex marriage—two subjects that deeply divided the country.

What Worked

Renewed legitimacy. Citizens drawn by lot were perceived as neutral and disinterested. Their recommendation to authorize abortion was followed by 66% of Irish voters in the 2018 referendum [129]. The process defused an explosive subject.

Quality deliberation. The 99 citizens heard experts, testimonies, debated over entire weekends. Recommendations were nuanced and informed, not emotional reactions [128].

Statistical representativeness. The lot, stratified by age, gender, region, and social class, produced a “mini-public” representative of the Irish population. Every category was present.

Depolarization. Ordinary citizens, face to face with different people, moderated their extreme positions. The process created empathy and compromise [129].

Exported model. After the Irish success, France (Citizens' Convention on Climate), Germany, Belgium, and other countries launched similar assemblies.

What's Problematic

Purely consultative role. The Assembly doesn't decide—it recommends. Parliament and referendum remain sovereign. Citizens drawn by lot have no real power [128].

Cost and logistics. Organizing deliberation weekends for 99 people over 18 months is expensive. Reimbursements, experts, organization, facilitation.

Selection of subjects. It's the government that decides which subjects to submit to the Assembly. No citizen self-referral.

Low awareness. Many Irish people didn't know the Assembly existed. Its impact on public opinion went through media, not direct knowledge.

No permanent institutional follow-up. Assemblies are ad hoc, created for one subject then dissolved. No permanent institution.

What We Keep from the Irish Model

- **Drawing by lot** as a neutral selection mechanism
- **Stratification** to ensure representativeness (age, gender, region, class)
- **Informed deliberation** with expert and witness hearings
- The **depolarization effect** of face-to-face between different citizens

What We Improve

- **Permanent institution:** our Constitutional Council permanently includes a quarter of citizens drawn by lot, not ad hoc
- **Real power:** citizens drawn by lot vote with the other quarters, their voice counts in the decision
- **Combination with other legitimacies:** the Council mixes drawing by lot, direct election, census election, and legal expertise
- **Double majority:** citizens drawn by lot cannot block alone, but can prevent an artificial elite consensus

What We Don't Keep

- **The purely consultative role:** our citizens drawn by lot have real voting power
- **The temporary character:** our institution is permanent
- **The limitation to societal subjects:** our Council verifies respect of all constitutional rules

26.9 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #2: American Constitutional Amendments (1791-present)

The American Constitution provides a deliberately difficult amendment procedure [155][156]. In 235 years, only 27 amendments have been adopted (including 10 on the first day with the Bill of Rights). This constitutional lock offers a precedent for evaluating the rules proposed here.

What Worked

Exceptional stability. The American Constitution is the oldest still in force [155]. Fundamental principles (separation of powers, federalism, individual liberties) have remained intact despite constant political pressures.

Broad consensus required. An amendment requires a 2/3 majority in both chambers of Congress, then ratification by 3/4 of states (38 of 50) [156]. This threshold eliminates partisan or temporary modifications.

Protection of fundamental rights. The Bill of Rights (first 10 amendments) created a foundation of liberties that even overwhelming majorities cannot abolish. Freedom of speech, right to bear arms, protection against arbitrary searches—these rights have resisted over two centuries of assaults.

Evolving jurisprudence. Constitutional rigidity is compensated by a Supreme Court that interprets the text evolutionarily. The 14th Amendment (equal protection) was reinterpreted to abolish segregation, then to recognize same-sex marriage [155].

What's Problematic

Blocking necessary reforms. Some obsolete provisions (electoral college, Senate representation) are nearly impossible to modify [156]. The system is paralyzed on questions where consensus should emerge.

Too powerful blocking minority. 13 states representing less than 5% of the population can block any amendment. The 3/4 rule gives excessive veto power to minorities.

No periodic revision mechanism. Jefferson proposed constitutional revision every generation (19 years). The United States chose immutability, creating a “constitution of the dead” [155].

Circumvention by interpretation. Text rigidity led the Supreme Court to “legislate” by interpretation. Unelected judges make decisions that the democratic process cannot correct.

What We Keep from the American Model

- The **supermajority required** to modify fundamental rules
- **Constitutional protection** of fundamental rights
- **Stability** as a value in itself

What We Improve

- **4/5 threshold** instead of 3/4: even harder to modify, but not impossible
- **Two chambers with different legitimacies:** census and equal, not territorial
- **Recall mechanism:** the people can sanction without waiting for an amendment

What We Don't Keep

- **The territorial blocking minority:** our system is not federal in the American sense
- **Extensive judicial review:** our Council verifies rule compliance, it doesn't reinterpret them
- **Total immutability:** modification is very difficult, but not impossible

26.10 — Case Study (Empirical Example) #3: German Eternity Clauses (1949-present)

The German Basic Law contains an “eternity clause” (Ewigkeitsklausel, Article 79-3) that makes certain principles absolutely intangible [130][131]. Even a unanimous majority cannot abolish human dignity, the federal structure, or the rule of law.

What Worked

Absolute protection of human dignity. Article 1 (“Human dignity is inviolable”) cannot be modified by any majority [130]. It’s a direct response to Nazi crimes—certain red lines must never be crossed.

Democratic stability. The eternity clause has protected German democracy against extremist attempts. Anti-democratic parties cannot use the democratic process to abolish democracy [131].

Federal structure preserved. The Länder cannot be abolished, even by a Bundestag vote. Federalism is constitutionally guaranteed.

Exported model. Many countries have adopted similar clauses: France (republican form), Italy (republic), Brazil (federalism, direct voting), Turkey (secularism, formerly) [130].

What's Problematic

Contested definition. What exactly does “human dignity” mean? Courts must interpret, creating a form of government by judges [131].

Impossibility of correction. If an eternity clause turns out to be poorly designed, it cannot be corrected. The system is definitively frozen on this point.

Tension with popular sovereignty. Can one generation really bind all following ones for eternity? The democratic principle suggests that the sovereign people should always be able to decide.

Circumvention by interpretation. As in the United States, extreme rigidity is sometimes circumvented by creative interpretations.

What We Keep from the German Model

- The **principle of intangible clauses** for the most fundamental rules
- **Protection of democratic architecture** against itself
- The **impossibility of abolishing certain rights** through electoral play

What We Improve

- **4/5 supermajority** instead of absolute intangibility: extremely difficult, but not impossible
- **Precise definitions**: budget rules are numbered, not abstract
- **Regulated revision mechanism**: even the most protected clauses can be modified, but at a nearly unreachable threshold

What We Don't Keep

- **Absolute intangibility**: our system allows modification, but at 4/5 of both chambers
- **Abstract concepts**: “human dignity” is hard to define; our rules are concrete (budget surplus, levy ceiling)
- **Eternal binding of generations**: each generation can modify the system, if it reaches overwhelming consensus

26.11 — Comparison of Lock-In Thresholds

System	Modification Threshold	Effective Protection
USA	2/3 Congress + 3/4 States	27 amendments in 235 years
Germany (excluding eternity)	2/3 Bundestag + 2/3 Bundesrat	67 modifications since 1949
Germany (eternity)	Impossible	Absolute protection
Switzerland	Popular majority + majority of cantons	200+ modifications since 1848
France (5th)	3/5 Congress or referendum	24 revisions since 1958
Libertarian Libertarianism	4/5 of each chamber	To be tested

Tableau 26.1 — Comparison of constitutional lock-in thresholds

Observation: The proposed 4/5 threshold is more difficult than the American system (which requires separate majorities in two different processes) and close to German intangibility, but without the “eternal” dimension. It’s a balance between stability and adaptability: nearly impossible to modify under normal circumstances, but possible if overwhelming consensus emerges.

Chapitre XXVII

TRULY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

A political party that claims to represent the people but functions internally as a monarchy is a fraud. How can we trust an organization to defend democracy if it doesn't practice it itself?

27.1 — The Observation: Locked-Up Parties

Too many parties function according to a centralized model. One leader, an inner circle, members reduced to the role of window dressing. Nominations are decided at the top. Orientations are imposed. Dissent is punished. The party becomes the property of one man or one clan.

This model produces elected officials who owe nothing to their voters and everything to their party leader. They vote as they're told. They represent no one.

27.2 — The Requirement: Internal Democracy as a Condition

To be recognized and able to present candidates in elections, a party must respect democratic operating rules:

- **Leader election** by all members, by direct suffrage, at regular intervals. No life presidency, no automatic renewal
- **Nominations decided by members of the relevant constituency**, not by a central committee. Local activists choose their candidate

27.3 — Internal Fluid Voting, Strictly Egalitarian

The permanent recall system also applies within parties. Any member can, at any time, withdraw their support from the leader or elected party officials. If the recall threshold is reached, a new election is triggered.

But unlike the national system, internal party voting is **strictly egalitarian**: one person, one vote. No census weighting.

Why? Because a rich person must not be able to capture a party by weighing more than other members. The party is an association of equal citizens, not a joint-stock company. Money gives weight in state budget decisions—that's logical, it's taxpayers' money. **But money must not give weight in a party's internal decisions—that would be corruption.**

Right to tendencies: internal currents can organize, express themselves, propose alternative orientations. Internal debate is protected, not repressed.

Financial transparency: party accounts are public, funding sources identifiable, expenses traceable.

Regulated exclusion procedures: you cannot exclude a member without serious grounds and without adversarial proceedings. Political disagreement is not grounds for exclusion.

27.4 — The Control

An independent authority verifies compliance with these rules. A party that fails to comply loses its accreditation and can no longer present candidates under its label.

This is not an infringement on freedom of association. No one prevents creating a centralized movement. But this movement cannot claim political party status and the advantages that come with it.

27.5 — Consistency

One cannot demand democracy in the State and tolerate autocracy in parties. Parties are the antechamber of power. If they are corrupted by leader worship, they corrupt the democracy they claim to serve.

A truly democratic system is democratic at all levels: in institutions, in parties, in intermediate bodies.

27.6 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The German Parteiengesetz (1967-present)

Germany is the country that most strictly regulates the internal functioning of political parties [130][131]. The Basic Law (Article 21) requires that parties' internal organization conform to democratic principles, and the Parteiengesetz (party law) of 1967 details these requirements.

What Worked

Mandatory internal democracy. Each party's statutes must provide for leader election by members, regular congresses, and fair exclusion procedures [130]. Authoritarian parties are legally impossible.

Financial transparency. Parties must publish detailed accounts, identifying donors above €10,000 and declaring all expenses. Violations are punished by loss of public funding [131].

Protection of member rights. A member cannot be excluded without adversarial proceedings. They can contest their exclusion before civil courts. Political disagreement is not sufficient grounds for exclusion.

Guaranteed pluralism. Parties cannot ban internal currents. Debate is protected by law.

Party system stability. The German party system is one of the most stable in Europe. Major formations (CDU, SPD, Greens, FDP) have functional democratic structures.

What's Problematic

Uneven application. Parties respect the letter of the law but not always the spirit. Outgoing leaderships often control congresses, nominations are negotiated behind the scenes [131].

Bureaucratization. Legal requirements create administrative burden. Small parties struggle to comply with all obligations.

No permanent recall. The law requires regular elections, but no continuous recall mechanism between congresses. An unpopular leader can remain in place until the next internal vote.

Dominant public funding. Major parties depend on public funding (linked to electoral results). This creates an entry barrier for new movements.

Ex post, not ex ante control. Courts intervene after violations, not before. A party can function undemocratically for years before being sanctioned.

What We Keep from the German Model

- The **constitutional obligation** of internal democracy
- **Financial transparency** with publication of accounts and donors
- **Protection of member rights** against arbitrary exclusion
- **Control by an authority** (courts or independent authority)

What We Improve

- **Internal permanent recall:** our system extends the recall mechanism to party leaders, not just periodic elections
- **No public funding:** parties are funded by their members and donors, not by the State. No entry barrier for new movements
- **Mandatory local nominations:** candidates are chosen by constituency members, not negotiated at the top
- **Preventive control:** the authority verifies statutes before accreditation, not just after violations

What We Don't Keep

- **Public party funding:** source of dependence and entry barrier
- **Only periodic internal elections:** our permanent recall is more demanding
- **Tolerance of backroom deals:** our system requires transparent local nominations

Chapitre XXVIII

THE HEAD OF STATE: SYMBOL AND CONCILIATOR

Every political system needs a unifying figure. Someone who embodies the country beyond partisan divides. Someone who can oil the wheels when institutions creak. But this figure must not have real power—otherwise they become a political actor like others, with their interests, allies, and enemies.

28.1 — The role: conciliator and guardian

The head of state—president or monarch—has no executive power. They do not govern. Their functions:

Representation. They embody the country abroad, receive ambassadors, represent national unity at ceremonies.

Facilitating government formation. Belgian-style, they consult parties after elections, appoint an informateur (to probe coalition possibilities), then a formateur (to negotiate). They oil the wheels without deciding. The Prime Minister is designated by Parliament—the Head of State acknowledges this choice and facilitates the process.

Conciliation. In case of institutional crisis, they can advise, facilitate negotiations between powers. Their experience and neutrality make them a natural mediator. They oil the wheels without holding the steering wheel.

Referendum triggering. This is their only real power. If they deem a law poses a serious problem—even after validation by the Constitutional Council—they can trigger a referendum for the people to decide. This power gives them moral weight: when they speak, they have a weapon. But it's a limited power: they don't decide, they ask the people to decide. And if they abuse it, they risk their position (recall or forced abdication).

Re-referral to the Constitutional Council. After a law is validated by the CC, the Head of State can request a reexamination if they believe a point was insufficiently examined. Their longevity gives them valuable institutional memory. The CC reexamines and decides definitively.

Pardon proposal. The Head of State can propose pardon for a convicted person. It's a safety valve when justice is too slow to correct itself. But they don't decide alone.

The pardon jury. A jury examines the file and decides. It is composed mainly of citizens and jurists drawn by lot, with participation from judges of the original trial and the Head of State. Deliberations are private, jurors anonymous, vote secret. This composition ensures the people dominate the decision while making participants accountable. The details of composition and weightings are presented in **Appendix I**.

If the jury grants pardon, the person is released or their sentence annulled. But pardon does not erase the judgment—it suspends the sentence. Complete rehabilitation (record expungement, recognition of innocence) goes through trial revision, which remains possible and even encouraged.

Emergency procedure. If justice recognizes flagrant new evidence (DNA, key witness, real perpetrator's confession), it can immediately suspend the sentence pending revision, without waiting for the pardon jury. The judicial path and pardon path coexist—the faster one applies.

What they don't do. They don't sign laws (the CC attests their conformity). They don't appoint the Prime Minister (Parliament designates them). They have no veto. They don't govern.




Figure 28.1 — Head of State powers

28.2 — Presidential version

Long term: 10 years. Term length allows accumulating experience, seeing several governments pass, becoming institutional memory.

Equal direct suffrage. One person, one vote. The president is the symbol of national unity—all citizens weigh equally to choose them. This is not a budget question, it's a question of collective identity.

Re-electable without limit. If the people want to renew a good president for 30 years, that's their right. Longevity is earned, not guaranteed.

Recallable. The standard mechanism applies: recall booth, threshold (for example 55%), delay proportional to severity. A president who fails gravely can be dismissed by the people, without waiting 10 years.

28.3 — Monarchical version

Hereditary. According to the country's dynastic rules. Continuity is guaranteed by lineage.

Forced abdication possible. The monarch can be forced to abdicate by:

- A 2/3 referendum, OR
- A double 4/5 vote in each chamber (Parliament AND Senate separately)

Abdication benefits the next in line of succession. This is not abolition of the monarchy—it's a change of holder.

Abolition of monarchy. To abolish the monarchical institution itself, it requires:

- A constitutional modification at 4/5 of each chamber, AND
- A 3/5 referendum

It's a double lock. The monarchy can only be abolished by massive and lasting consensus.

28.4 — The head of state's budget

Whether president or monarch, their budget is determined by **Parliament** (census). It's a budget question like any other.

This budget includes:

- The personal allowance of the head of state
- Direct heirs (in case of monarchy)
- The protocol cabinet (advisors, secretariat)
- Official residences and their maintenance

The head of state does not set their own allowance. Neither do elected officials—any modification goes through the usual rules (referendum for increases).

28.5 — Adaptability as strength

Libertarian Libertarianism does not demand a blank slate. It adapts to each country's history.

A country has a monarchy? It can be preserved, in protocol version. A country has a presidential tradition? It can be maintained, with appropriate safeguards.

What matters is the architecture of real powers: census Parliament, equal Senate, locking mechanisms, permanent recall. The protocol head of state grafts onto this architecture without modifying it.

Certain parameters are not fixed here. They depend on cultural, historical, local choices:

- **The list of fundamental rights** (Senate competence): defined by each country's constituent assembly, according to its values
- **The base of the vacant housing tax:** cadastral value, fictitious market rent, or other—to be defined locally
- **The head of state regime:** presidential or monarchical, according to the country's history
- **Thresholds and percentages:** all figures in this document are illustrative, exact settings depend on local calibration

This is a strength, not a weakness. The system is not dogmatic. It proposes an architecture, not a single answer. Peoples keep their calibration freedom. It respects traditions, cultures, identities. It does not ask peoples to renounce their history to embrace liberty. It tells them: “*Keep what unites you. Change what enslaves you.*”

28.6 — Case study (empirical example): The Belgian government formation system (1831-present)

Belgium offers the most sophisticated model of facilitator head of state [119][120]. The king does not govern but plays a crucial role in coalition formation, through the figures of informateur and formateur. This system has managed one of Europe's most fragmented democracies.

What worked

Neutral mediation. The king consults all parties after elections, listens, synthesizes. Their neutrality allows everyone to express themselves without losing face. They successively appoint an informateur (who probes possibilities) then a formateur (who negotiates the coalition) [119].

Procedural flexibility. The king can appoint several successive informateurs, change track, combine approaches. No rigid procedure—case-by-case adaptation.

Institutional memory. Belgian kings (Baudouin, Albert II, Philippe) have accumulated decades of experience. They know the actors, the red lines, the possible compromises. This memory is irreplaceable.

Non-partisan legitimacy. The king not having been elected, they have no electoral agenda. Their neutrality is credible. Parties trust them as mediator.

Extreme crisis management. Belgium has experienced 541-day government formations (2010-2011) without institutional collapse [120]. The king maintained dialogue throughout the crisis.

What poses problems

Extreme slowness. Belgian government formations are among the longest in the world. 541 days in 2010-2011, 652 days in 2019-2020 [120]. The country can remain months without a fully empowered government.

Negotiation opacity. Royal consultations are secret. Citizens don't know what's being negotiated. Transparency is lacking.

Dependence on king's quality. A competent king oils the wheels. A mediocre king can worsen blockages. The system depends on the person, not the mechanism.

No sanction power. The king can facilitate, not decide. If parties refuse to agree, they cannot force an agreement. They have no ultimate weapon.

Fragility of monarchical consensus. The Belgian monarchy is contested by part of Flanders. Its legitimacy is not universal.

What we keep from the Belgian model

- The **facilitator role**: the head of state consults, appoints informateur and formateur, oils the wheels
- **Neutrality**: no partisan agenda, no involvement in substantive negotiations
- **Flexibility**: procedure adaptation case by case
- **Institutional memory**: longevity of head of state as an asset

What we improve

- **Referendum power**: our head of state has a weapon—they can submit a question to the people. The Belgian king doesn't have this power
- **Recallability**: our president is recallable, our monarch can be forced to abdicate. The Belgian king has no popular sanction mechanism
- **Transparency**: consultations can be public or at least their conclusions made public
- **Time limit**: our system provides unblocking mechanisms (budget renewal, automatic elections) that Belgium doesn't have

What we don't adopt

- **Total opacity** of royal consultations
- **Absence of referendum power**: our head of state can appeal to the people
- **Absence of unblocking mechanism**: our system doesn't tolerate 541 days without government

Partie 7 ## Protection du citoyen

Chapitre XXIX

WHO ENTERS, WHO STAYS, WHO VOTES

Who can enter? Who can stay? Who can vote? These questions are fundamental, especially in a system where voting is linked to contribution.

29.1 — Quota Immigration Falls Under Parliament (Census)

Immigration quotas: how many people can enter each year. It's a question of economic and budget impact—infrastructure, services, labor market.

Economic entry criteria: work immigration, investors, family reunification with resource conditions. Those who pay decide who can come contribute.

Senate veto. However, the Senate retains veto power over immigration policies, to safeguard national identity or impose societal conditions (language mastery, respect for fundamental values, etc.).

The quota immigrant enters directly into the labor market or an Autonomous Collective (self-funded reintegration structures). No specific aid, no particular advantage. **They are treated exactly like a citizen in the same situation.**

29.2 — Asylum Rights Fall Under the Senate (Equal)

Asylum rights are constitutionalized (modification at 4/5 of each chamber). It's a question of human dignity—protecting someone whose life is threatened is a fundamental right.

Procedures are strict and ironclad: precise criteria, regulated deadlines, no infinite extension. **Asylum rights are not disguised immigration.**

The asylum seeker enters either the labor market or an Autonomous Collective (self-funded reintegration structures). If they refuse both, they lose asylum rights. No exception.

No specific aid, no particular advantage. The asylum seeker is treated exactly like a citizen in the same situation. The system is therefore budget-neutral—that's why the Senate alone has jurisdiction, with no Parliament veto possible.


29.3 — Naturalization and Denaturalization Fall Under the Senate

Naturalization: becoming a citizen means acquiring civic rights. The Senate defines conditions—duration of residence, tax contribution, clean criminal record, language mastery.

Denaturalization: removing citizenship is a serious infringement of a fundamental right. The Senate alone can do it, in exceptional cases (terrorism, treason), with strict procedural guarantees.

29.4 — Consistency with Census Voting

Voting is reserved for citizens. A resident, even if they contribute fiscally, does not vote before naturalization. The right to vote is not a supermarket you enter by paying. Naturalization is the entry threshold into the political community—it gives access to census voting (Parliament), equal voting (Senate), and elective functions.



29.5 — Case Study (Empirical Example): The Canadian Express Entry System (1967/2015-present)

Canada was the world pioneer of points-based immigration, with a system introduced in 1967 and modernized in 2015 under the name Express Entry [153][154]. This system selects economic immigrants according to objective and measurable criteria, without quotas by nationality.

What Worked

Objective selection. The Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) awards points according to age, education, professional experience, language skills (English/French), and job offers in Canada [153]. Maximum 1200 points. No subjective judgment, no discrimination by origin.

Flexible quotas. The government adjusts the cutoff score according to economic needs. In times of labor shortage, the threshold drops. In times of surplus, it rises. Rapid adaptation to circumstances [154].

Processing speed. Express Entry processes 80% of applications in less than 6 months, compared to years in other countries. Administrative efficiency attracts talent with other options.

Successful economic integration. Immigrants selected by points have higher employment rates and incomes than other immigration categories [153]. The system selects those who will contribute.

International attractiveness. Canada is regularly ranked among the preferred destinations for qualified migrants. The points system contributes: it's perceived as fair and transparent.

What's Problematic

Sectoral concentration. The system favors certain profiles (IT, health, engineering) at the expense of other sectors in shortage (crafts, agriculture). Points don't capture all economic needs [154].

Deskilling. Despite high diplomas, some immigrants don't work in their field (doctors become drivers). Canadian professional orders don't always recognize foreign qualifications.

Dependence on labor market. Job offer points favor large companies able to navigate the LMIA system. SMEs struggle to recruit abroad.

No cultural filter. The system is purely economic. It doesn't measure adherence to values, willingness to integrate, or mastery of social codes.

Invisible queue. Candidates with excellent scores can wait years if their profile is common. The system is competitive, not first-come first-served.

What We Keep from the Canadian Model

- The **points selection principle**: objective and measurable criteria
- **Quota flexibility**: adaptation to economic circumstances
- **Administrative efficiency**: rapid application processing
- **Transparency**: each candidate knows their score and chances

What We Improve

- **Senate veto on cultural criteria:** our system allows the Senate to impose societal conditions (language, values) that the Canadian system doesn't integrate
- **Integration through Autonomous Collectives:** immigrants without immediate employment enter an AC, not public assistance
- **No deskilling by the system:** immigrants enter the real labor market, not an administrative purgatory of diploma recognition

What We Don't Keep

- **Absence of cultural filter:** our Senate can impose integration criteria
- **Federal centralization:** our system can decline quotas by region according to local needs
- **LMIA complexity:** our system simplifies foreign recruitment for businesses

Chapitre XXX

INTERNATIONAL EQUITY

Free trade is only free if it is fair. When an imported product does not comply with the standards imposed on domestic producers, it is not trade—it is dumping. The domestic market then becomes a playground for those who cheat.

30.1 — Regulatory dumping: legalized theft

A French farmer must comply with hundreds of standards: banned pesticides, animal welfare, traceability, social standards for employees, environmental regulations. These constraints have a cost. They increase production costs.

Meanwhile, a foreign producer can use banned pesticides, exploit underpaid labor, pollute without constraint, and export freely to that same French market. Their product arrives cheaper—not because they are more efficient, but because they do not follow the rules of the game.

This is institutionalized unfair competition. The State imposes standards on its citizens, then exposes them to competition from those who do not have these same constraints. It creates a handicap, then punishes those it has handicapped.

It is not protectionism to refuse this asymmetry. It is consistency.

30.2 — The five domains of regulatory dumping

The problem crosses all sectors. Each type of standard creates a specific distortion:

1. Economic and competition standards. Massive state subsidies, monetary dumping, artificial transfer pricing, non-compliance with antitrust rules. A Chinese company subsidized at 30% can sell at a loss to eliminate European competition—then raise its prices once the market is conquered.

2. Agricultural standards. Banned pesticides, unauthorized GMOs, antibiotics as growth accelerators, animal meal. American hormone-fed beef, chlorinated chicken, adulterated Chinese honey, fruits treated with dichlorvos. All products banned for domestic production, but tolerated for import.

3. Health and public health standards. Banned food additives, medicinal residues, industrial contaminants, failure to respect the cold chain. Border controls detect only a tiny fraction of violations. The consumer believes they are buying a compliant product.

4. Environmental standards. CO2 emissions, water pollution, forest destruction, destructive mining. A product manufactured in a country without environmental constraints actually exports its pollution—and its competitive advantage rests on this unpaid externality.

5. Social standards. Child labor, absence of minimum wage, dangerous working conditions, union repression. The 3-euro T-shirt is not a miracle of productivity—it is the price of human exploitation.

30.3 — The principle of regulatory equality

The solution is neither protectionism nor extraterritoriality. It rests on a simple principle: **any product sold on the domestic market must comply with the standards applicable to domestic products.**

This is not imposing our law abroad. It is imposing our conditions of access to our market. A fundamental nuance.

What this means concretely:

- A pesticide banned in France cannot be present in a product imported to France
- A product manufactured by children cannot be sold in France
- A factory that pollutes without constraint cannot export freely to France
- A competitor unfairly subsidized cannot freely compete with French companies

What this does not mean:

- Imposing the French Labor Code on China
- Requiring Brazil to apply our environmental standards on its territory
- Banning imports in general

The foreign producer remains free in their methods. But if they want access to the domestic market, they must prove that their product complies with national standards. **It is a condition of access, not an extraterritorial imposition.**

30.4 — The implementation mechanism

A principle without an implementation mechanism is a declaration of intent. Here are the operational tools:

1. Legal responsibility of the market operator

The importer or distributor who places a product on the domestic market is legally responsible for its compliance. They cannot hide behind the foreign producer. They are the ones who answer before national courts, with their national assets.

This responsibility is civil (compensation for victims), administrative (market withdrawal, import ban), and criminal (personal sanctions in case of characterized fraud or deliberate endangerment).

2. Certification and traceability obligation

The importer must be able to prove the compliance of their products. This involves:

- Certification by accredited organizations (national or recognized international)
- Complete traceability of the production chain
- Periodic audits of foreign production sites
- A sworn declaration engaging the criminal responsibility of the manager

The cost of this certification is borne by the importer. It is the price of market access.

3. Targeted risk-based controls

It is impossible to control all products at the border. Controls are therefore targeted according to:

- Country of origin (compliance history)
- Sector (agri-food, textile, chemistry)
- Importer (track record, volume)
- Alerts (reports, whistleblowers, media monitoring)

High-risk products are systematically controlled. Virtuous importers benefit from reduced controls. The system rewards compliance.

4. Deterrent sanctions

The economics of fraud are simple: if the expected gain exceeds the expected cost (sanction \times probability of detection), fraud is rational. To reverse this calculation:

- Financial sanctions proportional to turnover (not to the product concerned)
- Confiscation of profits from fraud
- Temporary or permanent import ban
- Personal criminal sanctions for managers in case of recidivism or systemic fraud
- Publication of convictions (reputational damage)

The goal is not to punish, but to make compliance more profitable than fraud.

30.5 — Articulation with international trade

This system fits within the framework of the hierarchy of norms established in this document:

1. **National Constitution** → defines fundamental principles, including the principle of regulatory equality
2. **National laws** → define applicable standards (environmental, health, social, etc.)
3. **International treaties** → can facilitate mutual recognition, but cannot impose unconditional market opening

This hierarchy has a direct consequence: **a free trade treaty that would prohibit the country from conditioning access to its market on compliance with its standards would be unconstitutional.**

Existing treaties that contravene this principle can be renegotiated or denounced. The chapter on international treaties details the exit mechanisms.

WTO compatibility

The World Trade Organization authorizes sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement) and technical barriers to trade (TBT Agreement) under certain conditions: non-discrimination, proportionality, scientific basis. The principle of regulatory equality meets these criteria:

- It is non-discriminatory: it applies to all foreign countries in the same way
- It is proportional: it only requires compliance with standards applicable to domestic producers
- It has an objective basis: national standards are defined by law, not by administrative arbitrariness

This is not a disguised customs barrier. It is the consistent application of national rules.

30.6 — Objections and their responses

“This is disguised protectionism”

No. Protectionism consists of protecting domestic producers from foreign competition, even fair. Regulatory equality consists of imposing the same rules on everyone. If a foreign producer can manufacture in compliance with national standards at lower cost, they retain their advantage. Only the advantage from non-compliance with standards is neutralized.

“This will increase prices for consumers”

Yes, partially. But the current low price is an illusion: it externalizes costs (environmental, health, social) that will be paid otherwise—by health systems, by environmental degradation, by unemployment of domestic producers. The “full” price is more honest.

“It is impossible to control”

Not perfectly, no. But the certification obligation, importer responsibility, and dissuasive sanctions change the economic calculation. It is not about achieving perfect compliance, but making systemic fraud unprofitable.

“Other countries will exercise reprisals”

Possible. But a country that exercises reprisals because they are asked to follow the rules of the game reveals its intentions. And a market of solvent consumers remains attractive. Reprisals have a cost for those who exercise them.

“The European Union prohibits it”

See the chapter on international treaties. A treaty that prevents a people from protecting its health, its environment, and its workers is not an acceptable treaty. It can be renegotiated or denounced.

30.7 — Constitutional formulation

The principle of regulatory equality can be enshrined in the Constitution in these terms:

Article X — Regulatory equality in commercial exchanges

No product or service may be placed on the domestic market if it does not comply with the health, environmental, social, and commercial fairness standards applicable to domestic products and services.

The law defines the conditions of certification, control, and sanction guaranteeing the application of this principle.

International trade agreements may not derogate from this rule.

This formulation is:

- **Short:** a principle, not a catalog
- **Clear:** the criterion is compliance with standards applicable to nationals
- **Unambiguous:** international agreements cannot derogate from it
- **Operational:** it refers to the law for modalities

30.8 — Case study (empirical example): The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM, 2023-present)

The European Union adopted in 2023 the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism), the first large-scale device applying a logic of environmental regulatory equality [157][158].

What works

Application of the polluter pays principle to imports. Importers of carbon-intensive products (steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity) must purchase certificates corresponding to the CO2 emissions incorporated in their products [157]. The price is aligned with the European carbon market (EU ETS).

Equalization of competitive conditions. A European steel producer subject to the carbon price is no longer disadvantaged compared to a Chinese or Indian competitor who does not pay this cost. The regulatory asymmetry is neutralized.

Price signal for foreign producers. Exporting countries have an incentive to adopt their own carbon pricing mechanisms. If they do, their exporters can deduct the price already paid from the European certificate.

Defended WTO compatibility. The European Commission has built the mechanism to respect non-discrimination criteria: it applies uniformly to all third countries, it is based on an objective method of calculating emissions, and it offers exemptions to countries with equivalent devices.

What poses problems

Limited scope. The CBAM only covers a few industrial sectors. Complex manufactured products (cars, electronics) are not concerned. Neither is textile. The logic is not generalized.

Traceability fraud. Declared emissions rely on data provided by producers. Verification of Chinese or Indian factories is difficult. Default certificates (country average values) can be diverted.

Trade reprisals. China, India, and other countries have denounced the mechanism as a disguised protectionist barrier [158]. Retaliatory measures are possible.

Administrative complexity. Importers must document emissions product by product. For complex supply chains, this is a logistical nightmare.

No extension to other standards. The CBAM only concerns carbon. Social, health, agricultural standards are not covered. It is partial regulatory equality.

What we keep from the European model

- The **equalization principle**: importers pay the cost of standards they did not respect upstream

- The **sought WTO compatibility**: non-discrimination, objective basis, exemptions for equivalence
- The **certificate mechanism**: monetization of the regulatory differential
- The **harmonization incentive**: exporting countries have an interest in adopting equivalent standards

What we improve

- **Extension to all regulatory domains**: our system is not limited to carbon—it covers all standards (health, social, environmental, agricultural)
- **Importer responsibility**: instead of a complex certificate system, it is the importer who is responsible for compliance, with their assets
- **Personal criminal sanctions**: fraud is not just a matter of certificates, it engages the responsibility of managers
- **Constitutionalization**: the principle is enshrined in the supreme norm, not in a modifiable regulation

What we do not adopt

- **Sectoral limitation**: our system is general, not limited to a few industries
- **Certificate complexity**: our system relies on prior certification and responsibility, not on a market for pollution rights
- **European level**: our system is national and sovereign, articulated with the hierarchy of norms established in this document

30.9 — International trade is not a dogma

Free trade has created wealth. But asymmetric free trade creates losers: workers competing with those who do not have their rights, farmers competing with those who do not have their constraints, companies competing with those who externalize their costs.

These losers are not acceptable collateral victims. They are full citizens, and their protection is a legitimate function of the State.

International trade must be an exchange between partners who play by the same rules—not a competition between those who respect standards and those who ignore them.

This chapter establishes this principle. The next chapter deals with mechanisms to ensure that international treaties remain in the service of the people, not the reverse.

Chapitre XXXI

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: SERVANTS, NOT MASTERS

A State can have the most perfect constitution in the world. If international treaties override it, it's worthless. This is the current problem for many European democracies: EU rules, NATO, OECD, ECHR, free trade agreements—all this is imposed on peoples without them having their say.

31.1 — The Fundamental Principle: Popular Sovereignty Prevails

No international agreement, no treaty, no supranational directive can impose itself on the sovereign people. Any international commitment can be denounced, renegotiated, or ignored if the people so decide.

This does not mean isolationism. International agreements are useful. But they must remain **revocable contracts**, not permanent straitjackets. A people that cannot exit an agreement is no longer sovereign.

31.2 — The Referendum as Ultimate Weapon

Any major international agreement must be submitted to referendum. Any existing agreement can be challenged by popular initiative referendum.

The referendum result is binding. If the people vote to exit a treaty, the government executes. There is no “advisory vote” or “renegotiation” that circumvents the popular decision.

31.3 — Sources of Referendum

A referendum can be triggered by:

- **Parliament** (all subjects, not restricted to budget)
- **The Senate** (all subjects, not restricted to societal)
- **Popular initiative** (all subjects, with a signature threshold)
- **The Head of State** (all subjects—this is their only real power, see section XIX)
- **Automatically** (provided in the constitution, for example for major international agreements)

The object of a referendum can be the annulment of a recently passed law. This can avoid new elections.

The result is binding. One can renegotiate a law or treaty, but then a new referendum is needed to validate the new version—unless the initial referendum explicitly included a request not to renegotiate. A minimum delay (in years) separates two referendums on the same subject.

31.4 — The Referendum Voting Method

The referendum follows the same logic as the rest of the system:

- **If the question has budget impact** (financial contributions, spending commitments, economic sanctions), the referendum is held by census vote—those who pay weigh more
- **If the question is purely societal** (fundamental rights, values, principles), the referendum is held by equal suffrage—one person, one vote
- **If the question mixes both dimensions**, both chambers and the Constitutional Council jointly determine the applicable voting method, or organize a double referendum (one per method)

31.5 — The Inverted Hierarchy of Norms

In this system, the hierarchy is clear:

1. National constitution (modifiable at 4/5 of each chamber)
2. Laws passed by the chambers
3. International agreements (subordinate to the previous two)

A treaty that contradicts the constitution is unenforceable. A treaty that contradicts a law is unenforceable, unless the law is modified to accommodate it.

Supranational courts can issue opinions. **These opinions do not bind the country.** Only the people, by referendum or through their representatives, decide whether to follow them or not.

This is not narrow nationalism. It is the condition of real democracy. A people that cannot say no is not free.

31.6 — Case Study (Empirical Example): Swiss Treaty Referendums (1992-present)

Switzerland offers the most developed model of popular control over international commitments [155] [156]. Any treaty involving membership in a collective security or supranational organization must be submitted to mandatory referendum. Other treaties can be contested by optional referendum (50,000 signatures).

What Worked

The people have the last word. In 1992, the Swiss rejected membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) by 50.3% of votes despite unanimous support from government and Parliament [155]. Direct democracy prevailed over elites.

Disciplining effect on negotiators. Swiss diplomats negotiate knowing the people can reject everything. They are more prudent, more attentive to popular red lines [156].

Enhanced legitimacy of accepted treaties. When a treaty passes the referendum filter, it enjoys unquestionable legitimacy. Membership in the UN (2002, 55% yes) or Schengen (2005, 54% yes) were democratically validated.

No isolation despite rejections. Switzerland rejected the EEA and EU, but negotiated bilateral sectoral agreements. Rejecting a global framework doesn't prevent targeted cooperation.

Active civic culture. The Swiss vote 4 times a year on various subjects. They are used to deciding on complex questions, including international ones.

What's Problematic

Complexity of stakes. International treaties are often technical. The average citizen may vote on emotional or simplified bases [156].

Unpredictability for partners. Countries negotiating with Switzerland know an agreement can be rejected by referendum. This complicates diplomatic relations.

Possible blocking. The rejection of the framework agreement with the EU in 2021 (abandoned before referendum) froze bilateral relations. The people can create impasses.

Variable participation. Participation in treaty referendums varies from 30% to 60%. Results reflect the mobilized, not always the silent majority.

What We Keep from the Swiss Model

- **Mandatory referendum** for membership in supranational organizations
- **Optional referendum** (popular initiative) to contest any treaty
- **Binding character** of the result—no “advisory vote”
- **Disciplining effect** on negotiators

What We Improve

- **Explicit hierarchy of norms:** our constitution clearly prevails over treaties. In Switzerland, the relationship is more ambiguous

- **Budget/societal distinction:** our treaty referendums follow census/equal logic according to impact
- **Delay between referendums:** our system imposes a minimum delay to avoid referendum harassment on the same subject

What We Don't Keep

- **Ambiguity of hierarchy of norms:** our constitution is explicitly superior to treaties
- **Dependence on Swiss culture:** our system relies on mechanisms, not a pre-existing civic culture

31.7 — European Examples and Counter-Examples

Europe offers a natural laboratory of treaty referendums—some respected, others circumvented. These experiences illuminate flaws to correct.

The Facts

Country	Referendum	Result	Outcome
France	EU Constitution (2005)	No 55%	✗ Circumvented by Lisbon (2008), ratified by Parliament
Netherlands	EU Constitution (2005)	No 61%	✗ Circumvented by Lisbon, no referendum
Ireland	Nice (2001)	No 54%	✗ Re-vote in 2002 → Yes 63%
Ireland	Lisbon (2008)	No 53%	✗ Re-vote in 2009 → Yes 67%
Denmark	Maastricht (1992)	No 51%	⚠ Re-vote 1993 with opt-outs → Yes 57%
Greece	Austerity plan (2015)	No 61%	✗ Ignored—plan accepted one week later
Denmark	Euro (2000)	No 53%	✓ Respected—still outside eurozone
Sweden	Euro (2003)	No 56%	✓ Respected—still outside eurozone
Norway	EU (1972)	No 53%	✓ Respected—never a member
Norway	EU (1994)	No 52%	✓ Respected—still non-member
Switzerland	EEA (1992)	No 50.3%	✓ Respected—bilateral agreements instead
United Kingdom	Brexit (2016)	Yes 52%	✓ Executed in 2020

Why Some Referendums Were Circumvented

1. **Vague legal status** — “advisory” votes without binding constitutional force
2. **Inverted hierarchy of norms** — European commitments prevailed over popular will
3. **Possibility of re-vote** — “vote until you get the right answer”
4. **Legal trickery** — pretending a near-identical treaty is “different” (France/Netherlands 2005 → Lisbon 2008)
5. **Absence of sanction** — no consequence for rulers who ignore the vote

What Our System Corrects

Protection 1: Mandatory and Binding Referendum

Any treaty reducing national sovereignty or transferring competences to a supranational organization must be approved by referendum. The result **constitutionally binds** the government—no “advisory” vote, no substitute parliamentary ratification.

A minimum delay (in years) separates two referendums on the same subject, preventing the “re-vote until victory” tactic.

Protection 2: Recall as Safeguard

If a government announces the intention to circumvent a referendum—for example by signing a “different” treaty with identical content—citizens can immediately trigger a recall procedure. The sanction is not just *a posteriori*: the mere threat of recall deters circumvention *before* it happens.

The French case of 2005-2008 would not have been possible: as soon as the Lisbon Treaty signing was announced, the recall process could have been initiated against the government and concerned parliamentarians.

Why These Referendums?

These examples all concern **sovereignty delegation**—the domain where the gap between ruling elites and population is most marked. On supranational integration questions, governments and parliaments are systematically more favorable to competence transfers than their voters.

It’s precisely this gap that makes these referendums so relevant: they reveal the fundamental tension between popular will and elected officials’ orientations. Circumvention cases show what happens when no mechanism forces respect of the vote. Positive cases (Denmark/euro, Sweden/euro, Norway/EU, Switzerland/EEA, UK/Brexit) show that respect **is possible**—our system makes it **mandatory**.

Partie 8 ## Questions spécifiques

Chapitre XXXII

THE ADMINISTRATIVE MILLEFEUILLE

This document would not be complete without addressing a scourge that plagues modern democracies: the multiplication of administrative levels and the regulatory frenzy that accompanies them.

32.1 — The problem of levels

Municipalities, intercommunalities, departments, regions, State, Europe... Levels overlap, competencies overlap, budgets intertwine. Result: no one is really responsible for anything. Each level can pass the buck to the other. Duplications proliferate. Bureaucracies self-feed.

32.2 — The regulatory frenzy

At each level, civil servants justify their existence by producing rules. To plant a tree, you need a form. To cut it down, another. To build a garden shed, an authorization. To modify it, another authorization. Forms overlap, contradict each other, require documents that other administrations already hold.

This regulatory frenzy is not an accident. It is the logical consequence of a system where each administration must prove its usefulness to survive. The more it regulates, the more indispensable it seems. **Bureaucracy is an organism whose primary function is its own reproduction.**

32.3 — Reform principles

A few coherent approaches with the proposed system:

Strict subsidiarity principle. Each competency is assigned to ONE level only, as close to the citizen as possible. No shared competencies, no co-financing that dilutes responsibility. If it's the municipality, it's the municipality alone. If it's the region, it's the region alone.

Tax competition. If each level has its own budget (and counts in the global ceiling), citizens can compare the efficiency of each level. An over-administered region loses its taxpayers to a lighter neighbor. The market also disciplines territories.

Merger from below. Municipalities can merge voluntarily to reach critical mass. Intercommunalities can become full-fledged municipalities. The incentive is fiscal: mergers that reduce costs free up budget.

Constitutional suppression of levels. We could constitutionalize a maximum number of levels—for example: municipalities, regions, State. Three levels maximum. Departments and intercommunalities would be absorbed or eliminated.

32.4 — Regulatory guillotining


For regulatory frenzy, a simple rule: **any new regulation must eliminate two existing ones** (or one of equivalent weight, measured in compliance cost). This is the “one in, two out” principle applied in some countries.

Supplemented by:

Silence means acceptance. If the administration does not respond within a fixed period (for example 30 days), the request is deemed accepted. This reverses the burden: it is the administration that must hurry, not the citizen who must wait.

Mandatory interoperability. An administration cannot request a document that another administration already holds. Databases communicate. The citizen does not serve as a carrier pigeon between services.

Relevance audit. Each regulation has an expiration date (for example 10 years). At the deadline, it must be explicitly renewed by a vote, with evaluation of its real impact. Obsolete rules die automatically.



32.5 — Limits of the present document

This worksite remains partially open. The budgetary lock mechanisms proposed here slow proliferation—less money means fewer civil servants to produce rules. But they do not automatically dismantle the existing.

The transition (chapter XXXIII) will have to include a major regulatory cleanup: a complete audit, massive deletion of useless texts, radical simplification. It is a titanic task, but indispensable. **You cannot liberate a people while leaving intact the thicket of rules that hinders them.**

32.6 — Case study (empirical example): The British and Canadian “One-In, Two-Out”

The United Kingdom (2011) and Canada (2012) adopted rules requiring the elimination of existing regulations for any new rule created [105][106]. These mechanisms offer a precedent for “regulatory guillotining.”

What worked

Slowdown of regulatory inflation. In the United Kingdom, the net cost of new regulations for businesses became negative under the “One-In, One-Out” then “One-In, Two-Out” regime [105]. The administrative burden stopped growing.

Culture of cost-benefit calculation. Each ministry must now quantify the compliance cost of its proposals. This discipline has forced reflection on the real usefulness of rules.

Measurable reductions in Canada. The Canadian “Red Tape Reduction Act” has eliminated thousands of administrative formalities [106]. Compliance time for businesses has decreased.

Increased transparency. Governments publish annual reports on the regulatory stock. Evolution is measurable and citizens can compare.

Strong political signal. The adoption of these rules sent a clear message: over-regulation is a recognized problem, not a fatality.

What poses problems

Creative circumventions. Ministries have learned to reclassify “regulations” as “guidelines” or “recommendations” to escape counting [105]. The formal stock decreases, but administrative pressure can persist otherwise.

Quality vs quantity. Eliminating two small rules to create one big one does not necessarily reduce the burden. Regulatory “weight” is difficult to measure objectively.

No cleanup of the existing. These rules apply to new regulations, not to the historical stock. Decades of obsolete standards remain in place [106].

Political exemptions. Regulations deemed “priority” (health, environment, safety) are often exempted. The rule becomes partial.

No constitutional lock. These are administrative rules, not laws. A new government can abandon them.

What we keep from the British/Canadian model

- The **ratio principle**: creating a rule requires eliminating some

- The **culture of costing** compliance costs
- **Transparency** on the evolution of the regulatory stock
- **Accountability** of ministries producing norms

What we improve

- **More ambitious ratio:** “one in, two out” rather than “one in, one out”
- **Measurement by compliance cost:** not just the number of rules, but their real weight
- **Application to the existing stock:** the relevance audit with expiration date forces cleanup of the existing
- **Constitutional lock:** the ratio principle is enshrined in the constitution
- **No categorical exemptions:** all regulations count, even environmental or health

What we do not adopt

- **Limitation to new rules:** our system includes an automatic expiration mechanism for the existing
- **Political exemptions:** no free pass for “priority” subjects
- **Administrative fragility:** our system is constitutional, not regulatory

Partie 9 ## Transition

Chapitre XXXIII

TAKING ACTION: THE TRANSITION

All this looks good on paper. But how do we move from the current system to this one? How do we dismantle an obese State without causing collapse?

33.1 — The Milei model

Javier Milei, in Argentina, has shown that it is possible. He was elected on a program of radical State reduction. And he is implementing it.

The principles:

- **Cut to the bone immediately**, no “progressivity” that gets bogged down
- **Direct communication with the people** to short-circuit hostile intermediaries
- **Accept transitional chaos** as the price of recovered freedom
- **De facto monetary competition** (dollarization)




Figure 33.1 — Transition phases

33.2 — The prerequisite: the safety net first

Before cutting, we must have put in place at least a minimum subset of Autonomous Communities—self-financed reintegration structures. This softens the transitional chaos: people who lose their public jobs immediately have a safety net to land in. We are not throwing them into the void. The transition is brutal, but not cruel. The order of reforms matters: it is *path dependence* [13]—certain sequences open possibilities, others close them.

33.3 — Accepting the pain

The transition will be painful. Public jobs will disappear. Subsidies will cease. Habits will be disrupted. This is inevitable.

But the pain will be short if we accept it frankly. It will be interminable if we postpone it. **The choice is not between pain and absence of pain. It is between brief pain and chronic pain.**

33.4 — Softening the transition: the sale of public assets

The transition remains a difficult operation. One way to soften it: **sell public assets that no longer fall under the sovereign role of the State.** Schools, ports, airports, public companies, State holdings, some hospitals, fire stations, administrative buildings—everything that is not strictly necessary for sovereign functions can be sold.

This is not selling off the silverware. It is the logical consequence of refocusing the State on its essential functions. These assets are not “sold to make money”—they are transferred to the private sector because they no longer have a place in a sovereign State. The money recovered serves to repay public debt and finance the pension transition differential (see Appendix F).

Do not sell cheap: take time. A rushed sale would mean selling assets at a discount. It takes **several years** to obtain a fair price: rigorous evaluation, competitive bidding, favorable market conditions. The schedule must be dictated by public interest, not by budgetary urgency.

Mandatory popular validation. Each significant asset sale must be **validated by referendum.** The transition will be an unexpected opportunity for those who would like to take undue advantage—cronyism, corruption, favoritism. Only direct popular control can guarantee that sales are made in the general interest and at the right price [107].

The mechanism:

- The State identifies assets to be sold (everything that is not sovereign)
- Each asset is evaluated by independent experts
- A public tender is launched, with total transparency

- The choice of buyer is submitted to referendum (weighted vote, it is a budgetary question)
- If the referendum rejects, restart with new specifications or wait for better conditions

Impact on debt. The simulations of Appendix F (a [complete simulator](#) is available) show that an asset sale representing approximately 25% of GDP allows the public debt to drop from 104% to 79% from the first year. For a country like Belgium, reducing debt by 25 points in a single operation is **almost unhoped for**—no classical austerity policy could achieve this.

Effect on interest. This massive debt reduction has an immediate effect: **debt interest decreases proportionally**. Less debt = less interest to pay each year = more room to maneuver to finance the pension transition differential. It is a virtuous circle that considerably facilitates the entire rest of the transition.

33.5 — Democratic legitimacy

Milei has proven something else: **you can be elected on this program**. The argument “it is politically impossible” no longer holds. Peoples, when they are against the wall, can choose freedom.

33.6 — Case study (empirical example): The Milei experience in Argentina (2023-present)

Javier Milei was elected president of Argentina in November 2023 with 56% of the vote in the second round [161][162]. His program: radically reduce the size of the State, dollarize the economy, abolish the central bank. After one year in office, the first results allow a preliminary evaluation.

What worked

Spectacular reduction in inflation. Monthly inflation dropped from 25% (December 2023) to 2-3% at the end of 2024 [162]. This is the most striking and fastest result. Monetary discipline pays.

Budget balance achieved. For the first time in decades, Argentina has achieved a primary budget surplus [161]. Spending has been reduced by 30% in real terms. The “chainsaw” (motosierra) worked.

Elimination of ministries. The number of ministries went from 18 to 9. Thousands of civil servant positions have been eliminated. The state structure has been lightened [162].

Effective direct communication. Milei bypasses hostile traditional media through social networks. He explains directly to the people what he is doing and why. Popular legitimacy remains strong despite austerity.

Economic liberalization. The “DNU” (emergency decree) of December 2023 liberalized entire swaths of the economy: rents, commerce, labor [161]. Regulations accumulated over decades have been eliminated with one stroke.

What poses problems

Brutal recession. GDP fell by 5% in 2024 [163]. Unemployment increased. Poverty temporarily climbed to 53%. The social cost is real.

Absence of structured safety net. Unlike what this document advocates, there were no Autonomous Communities ready to absorb those laid off from the public sector. The adjustment was more painful than it should have been.

Dollarization not realized. The flagship promise to eliminate the peso and the central bank has not been kept [163]. The “currency board” remains an objective, not a reality. Monetary competition is partial.

IMF dependence. Argentina remains dependent on IMF loans to stabilize its situation. Financial autonomy is not yet achieved.

Institutional fragility. Milei governs by decrees, for lack of parliamentary majority. His reforms can be annulled by a successor. No constitutional lock.

What we keep from the Milei model

- Proof that a **radical program can be elected** democratically
- **Speed of execution:** cut immediately rather than progressively
- **Direct communication** with the people to maintain legitimacy
- The **result on inflation:** monetary discipline works

What we improve

- **Prior safety net:** our system requires the establishment of Autonomous Communities BEFORE massive cuts
- **Constitutional lock:** reforms are enshrined in a constitution protected at 4/5, not in revocable decrees
- **Monetary competition rather than dollarization:** keep a national currency disciplined by the market
- **Planned transition:** our system provides a sequence (safety net → cuts → liberalization), not a big bang

What we do not adopt

- **Absence of prior safety net:** brutality without protection is cruel

- **Governance by decrees:** our system goes through a legitimate constitutional overhaul
- **External dependence:** our system must be self-sufficient
- **Abandonment of national currency:** we prefer competition to pure dollarization

CONCLUSION

What we have described is not the pure libertarianism of anarcho-capitalists. Nor is it the tepid liberalism of social democrats who believe themselves moderate.

This is **Libertarian Libertarianism**—constitutionally locked, democratically continuous.

Solidarity without spoliation: neither dependent, nor abandoned.

A system where **the State does what only it can do, and nothing else.**

Where public money is constrained by intangible rules, with two distinct funds for prudence and recovery.

Where currency is disciplined by competition.

Where the flat tax replaces the fiscal maze: a single rate, visible, without hidden VAT.

Where social protection exists, but through the market—health insurance, unemployment, education—and self-financed Autonomous Communities.

Where the citizen controls their elected officials continuously, in the recall booth, not once every five years.

Where vote secrecy is preserved by anonymous architecture, with no link between card number and identity.

Where the black vote blocks, the white vote counterbalances, the gray vote abstains, and sabotage has a cost.

Where political weight reflects real contribution.

Where fundamental rights are protected by an egalitarian chamber that does not govern.

Where budgetary decisions and government depend on a censitary chamber, more stable by design.

Where raising taxes is difficult (2/3 of those who pay) and lowering them easier (2/3 egalitarian).

Where judges are elected by the people, by equal suffrage, and protected by long terms.

Where immigration is managed according to its nature: economic quotas by Parliament, fundamental rights by Senate.

Where the framework is guarded by a four-body institution, public, balanced, procedural.

Where no international treaty overrides the will of the people.

Where referendum decides—by equal or weighted suffrage depending on the nature of the question—and where its result is binding.

Where political parties are themselves democratic, on pain of losing their accreditation.

Where elected officials earn in proportion to their legitimacy, and can only raise their own pay with the people's agreement.

Where risks are encapsulated: each domain can fail without contaminating the others.

Where Autonomous Communities offer a self-financed safety net: communities of work and life, diverse, voluntary, where one can get back on one's feet or choose to live.

This is neither utopia nor weak compromise. This is the architecture of sovereign freedom. This is Libertarian Libertarianism.

A framework, not a straitjacket

This document has deliberately presented, in several places, **multiple options** for the same problem. Local governance, chamber organization, voting modalities: alternatives coexist in these pages.

This plurality is not hesitation. It is an **assumed choice of flexibility**. The principles are firm—whatever pays decides, but not everything; civic equality for rights, contributory logic for money; freedom to enter, freedom to exit. The architectures, on the other hand, can vary.

Context will decide: territory size, political culture, social acceptability, available means. This text **frames without imposing**. It offers a coherent catalog of options, not a fixed model.

For the curious who want to go deeper: monetary competition comes from Friedrich Hayek [1]. Budgetary constitutionalism is the work of James Buchanan and the Public Choice school [2]. Liberal pragmatism follows in the lineage of Milton Friedman [3]. Brutal adjustment in times of crisis is defended by the Austrian school [4][5]. Weighted censitary voting revives an idea from 19th-century classical liberalism [7][8]. The flat tax is defended by many liberal economists [3]. Liquid democracy was theorized by the German Pirate movement in the 2010s. Citizen sortition draws from Athenian democracy and contemporary work on deliberative democracy. The anonymous voter card draws inspiration from Estonian electronic voting systems, corrected for their flaws. Judicial elections exist in several American

states. The anti-blocking mechanism (budget -10%, recovery fund), chambers/taxation asymmetry, Parliament/Senate immigration division, risk encapsulation, and Autonomous Communities are innovations specific to this document.

The synthesis—Libertarian Libertarianism—is new.

Appendix A

Mapping of Empirical Examples

This appendix systematically lists the case studies (empirical examples) present in each chapter of this document. It allows verification of the document's empirical coverage and identification of chapters requiring factual reinforcement.

Terminological convention: The term “Case study (empirical example)” refers to any actual precedent, historical experiment, or existing system cited to validate or illustrate a theoretical mechanism.

A.1 — Part I — Foundations

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
1	The Diagnosis: Why Everything is Broken	Analysis of Systemic Dysfunctions	<i>Introductory chapter — no case study required</i>
2	Why This Libertarian Libertarianism?	Doctrinal Positioning	<i>Theoretical chapter — no case study required</i>
3	Overview	Architectural Synthesis	<i>Synthesis chapter — no case study required</i>
4	A Minimal State for a Pluralistic Society	Coexistence of Life Models	<i>To be documented: examples of functional pluralistic societies (Switzerland, Netherlands)</i>

A.2 — Part II — Economy and Finance

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
5	The State: Scope and Finance	Constitutional Fiscal Discipline	Swiss debt brake (<i>Schuldenbremse</i> , 2001-present)
6			

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
	Currency: The End of Monopoly	Currency Competition	#1: Ecuadorian dollarization (2000) — #2: Israeli stabilization plan (1985)
7	Protection Without the Welfare State	Mandatory Private Insurance	#1: Swiss LAMal (1996) — #2: Chilean AFPs (1981) — #3: Singapore CPF (1955) — #4: Dutch system (2006)
8	The Flat Tax	Single-Rate Taxation	#1: Baltic flat taxes (1994) — #2: Hong Kong (1947) — #3: Russian flat tax (2001-2020)
9	Compartmentalizing Risks	Separation of Financial Activities	The Glass-Steagall Act (1933-1999)

A.3 — Part III — Autonomous Communities

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
10	Autonomous Communities	Concept and General Principles	<i>Examples developed in chapters 13-16</i>
11	Joining an Autonomous Community	Entry and Exit Mechanisms	<i>Examples developed in chapters 13-16</i>
12	Ecosystem of Communities	Interactions Between Communities	<i>Examples developed in chapters 13-16</i>
13	Case Study: Amish Communities	Self-Sufficient Religious Community	Entire chapter dedicated — Amish (17th century-present)
14	Case Study: Kibbutzim	Secular Collectivist Community	Entire chapter dedicated — Israeli Kibbutzim (1909-present)
15	Case Study: Emmaüs Communities	Social Reintegration Community	Entire chapter dedicated — Emmaüs (1949-present)
16	Case Study: Mondragon Cooperatives	Large-Scale Industrial Co-operative	Entire chapter dedicated — Mondragon (1956-present)

A.4 — Part IV — Protection Without Community

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
17	Protection Without Community: Chosen Delegation	Voluntary Decision Delegation	<i>Examples developed in chapter 18</i>
18	Case Studies: Voluntary Delegation in Practice	Existing Delegation Mechanisms	#1: Daily Money Managers (United States) — #2: Representative Payee Program (United States) — #3: Representation Agreements (British Columbia) — #4: Save More Tomorrow (SMarT)

A.5 — Part V — Electoral System

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
19	Voting Differently: Real-Time Democracy	Permanent Recall of Elected Officials	California recall (1911-present)
20	Voting Procedures	Electronic Voting and Practical Procedures	Estonian e-voting (i-Voting, 2005-present)
21	When Parliament Cannot Vote on the Budget	Budget Blocking Mechanism	<i>To be documented: US shutdowns, Belgian blockages</i>
22	Taxation and Power: Who Pays Decides	Weighted Censitary Voting	Prussian Dreiklassenwahlrecht (1849-1918)
23	Two Chambers, Two Logics	Asymmetric Bicameralism	#1: British House of Lords (1911) — #2: American bicameralism (1789) — #3: Swiss Council of States (1848) — #4: German Bundesrat (1949)
24	Local Governance: Adapting Principles to Scale	Local-Scale Adaptation	<i>To be documented: Swiss communes, Scandinavian municipalities</i>

A.6 — Part VI — Institutions

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
25	Returning Justice to the People	Election of Judges	Judicial elections in the United States (1832-present)
26	The Constitutional Council: Guardian of the Framework	Quadripartite Composition of the Council	#1: Irish Citizens' Assembly (2016) — #2: US constitutional amendments (1791) — #3: German eternity clauses (1949)
27	Truly Democratic Parties	Internal Party Democracy	German Parteiengesetz (1967-present)
28	The Head of State: Symbol and Conciliator	Facilitating Role of Head of State	Belgian government formation system (1831-present)

A.7 — Part VII — Citizen Protection

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
29	Who Enters, Who Stays, Who Votes	Points-Based Immigration	Canadian Express Entry system (1967/2015-present)
30	International Equity	Normative Equality at Borders	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM, 2023-present)
31	International Treaties: Servants, Not Masters	Referendums on Treaties	Swiss referendums on treaties (1992-present)

A.8 — Part VIII — Specific Issues

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
32	The Administrative Mille-feuille	Regulatory Guillotine	British and Canadian “One-In, Two-Out” (2011/2012-present)

A.9 — Part IX — Transition

No.	Chapter	Main Mechanism	Case Studies (Empirical Examples)
33	Taking Action: The Transition	Transition Strategy	Milei's experience in Argentina (2023-present)

A.10 — Summary of Empirical Coverage

Part	Chapters	With Case Studies	Coverage
I. Foundations	4	1	25%
II. Economy and Finance	5	5	100%
III. Autonomous Communities	7	5	71%
IV. Delegation	2	1	50%
V. Electoral System	6	4	67%
VI. Institutions	4	4	100%
VII. Citizen Protection	3	3	100%
VIII. Specific Issues	1	1	100%
IX. Transition	1	1	100%
Total	33	25	76%

A.11 — Chapters Without Empirical Examples

Chapter	Reason	Research Leads
1. The Diagnosis	Analysis chapter	—
2-3. Foundations	Theoretical positioning	—
4. Minimal State Pluralistic Society	Switzerland, Netherlands	
10-11. AC Definition	Structural	Examples in ch. 12-16

Chapter	Reason	Research Leads
17. Chosen Delegation	Theoretical framework	Examples in ch. 18
21. Budget Blocking	Innovative mechanism	US shutdowns; Belgium 2010-2011
24. Local Governance	Optional architectures	Swiss communes; Landsgemeinde, Scandinavian municipalities

A.12 — Innovations Without Direct Precedent

Innovation	Combined Elements
Continuous permanent recall	California recall + Estonian i-Voting
Self-regulated 1-100 censitary voting	Dreiklassenwahlrecht + feedback
Asymmetry in tax increases/decreases	Swiss brake + asymmetric bicameralism
Abolition of all indirect taxes	Hong Kong (no VAT) + Baltic flat tax
Universal Autonomous Communities	Kibbutz + Emmaüs + Mondragon

These innovations rest on **proven building blocks** assembled in an original way.

A.13 — Conclusion

Of the **33 chapters** in this document:

- **25 contain at least one case study** (76%)
- **8 are programmatic or innovative**
- **Over 50 case studies** distributed throughout the document

Libertarian Libertarianism **assembles what already works** into a coherent system. **Total chapters: 33**

This appendix is a mapping and inventory tool. The developed case studies are found in the corresponding chapters.

Appendice B

ELECTED OFFICIALS' SALARIES AND MULTIPLE OFFICES

Reference: Chapter XIX (Voting Differently: Real-Time Democracy)

B.1 — Salary Proportional to Score

Elected officials' salary is proportional to their first-round score. If the link is linear, an official at 30% earns 30% of the reference salary. In practice, the curve will probably be logarithmic or square root: 70% is an excellent score and should approach 100% of the salary.




Figure B.1 — Elected officials' salary-score curve: possible options

This curve is constitutionalized. Changing it requires a referendum.

B.2 — Calculating the Multiple Office Bonus

Let:

- R_1 = reference income for the primary mandate
- R_2 = reference income for the secondary mandate
- S_1 = first-round score for the primary mandate
- S_2 = first-round score for the secondary mandate

Primary mandate income = $R_1 \times S_1$

Secondary mandate bonus = $R_2 \times M_9(S_1, S_2)$

where M_9 is the power-9 mean:

$$M_9(S_1, S_2) = ((S_1^9 + S_2^9) / 2)^{(1/9)}$$

This mean tends toward the higher score, rewarding dual legitimacy.

Cap: The bonus is capped at $R_2 \times S_1$. One cannot earn more on the second mandate than what would have been earned with the first mandate's score.

Total income = $R_1 \times S_1 + \min(R_2 \times M_9, R_2 \times S_1)$

B.3 — Numerical Example

A national official at 45% ($R_1 = €10,000$) and local at 60% ($R_2 = €3,000$):

- Primary mandate income: $10,000 \times 0.45 = €4,500$
- $M_9(0.45, 0.60) = ((0.45^9 + 0.60^9) / 2)^{(1/9)} \approx 0.57$
- Theoretical bonus: $3,000 \times 0.57 = €1,710$
- Cap: $3,000 \times 0.45 = €1,350$
- Applied bonus: $\min(1,710, 1,350) = €1,350$

Total income: $€4,500 + €1,350 = €5,850$

Instead of $€4,500$ for a single mandate. Multiple offices bring real added value, but capped.

B.4 — Why the Power-9 Mean?

The high power means that the M9 average is very close to the maximum of the two scores. This strongly rewards dual legitimacy when both scores are high, while limiting the bonus when one score is low.

- If $S1 = S2$, then $M9 = S1 = S2$ (no additional bonus)
- If $S1 << S2$, then $M9 \approx S2 \times 0.89$ (the small score “pulls” slightly downward)
- If $S1$ and $S2$ are both high, $M9 \approx \max(S1, S2)$

Return to chapter XIX

Appendice C

CALCULATING CENSUS WEIGHT

Reference: Chapter XXII (Tax and Power: Who Pays Decides)

C.1 — The Principle

Vote weight in census elections is a function of actual tax contribution. What counts is what you contribute to the common pot, not what you earn.

C.2 — The Bounds

- **Floor:** 1 vote (nobody falls below)
- **Ceiling:** 100 votes (nobody exceeds)

C.3 — The Three-Segment Curve

Weight P as a function of contribution C (expressed as a multiple of median contribution C_{med}) follows a three-segment curve:

Segment 1: Entry into contribution ($C < C_{med}$)

$$P = 1 + (C / C_{med})$$

Rapid rise from 1 to 2 votes. Rewards entry into contribution, even modest.

Segment 2: Regular progression ($C_{med} \leq C < 50 \times C_{med}$)

$$P = 2 + 48 \times ((C - C_{med}) / (49 \times C_{med}))$$


Linear progression from 2 to 50 votes. A taxpayer at 50 times the median has 50 votes.

Segment 3: Very large contributors ($C \geq 50 \times C_{med}$)

$$P = 50 + 50 \times (1 - \exp(-k \times (C - 50 \times C_{\text{med}})))$$

where k is calibrated so that P reaches 90 votes when $C = 500 \times C_{\text{med}}$.

Moderate acceleration with asymptote toward 100 votes. Very large contributors gain weight, but never more than 100 votes.



C.4 — Properties of the Curve

- **Continuous:** no abrupt jump
- **Increasing:** the more you contribute, the more you weigh
- **Concave on segment 3:** diminishing returns for the very rich
- **Bounded:** absolute ceiling at 100 votes

C.5 — Weight Relative to Level of Power

The weight is calculated relative to contribution to the budget of the relevant level:

- Contribution to the national budget → weight in national elections
- Contribution to the local budget → weight in local elections

A billionaire who pays little local tax in their rural commune weighs less locally than a local entrepreneur who contributes heavily there.

C.6 — Annual Update

The weight is recalculated at each tax deadline (once a year), or in case of legislative change affecting taxes. Situations change, weight changes. This is not a fixed caste.

Return to chapter XXII

Appendice D

CONSTITUTIONALIZING AN INCORRUPTIBLE INDEX

Reference: Chapter VIII (The Flat Tax)

D.1 — The Problem: Price Indices Are Manipulable

The standard deduction—initially set at **€500 per month**—must be indexed to the real cost of living. This amount will be adjusted by economic simulations, but the indexing mechanism must be defined and locked in now.

But who calculates this cost of living evolution? And how do we guarantee this calculation won't be manipulated by political power?

Governments have incentives to underestimate inflation to: - Reduce indexed expenditures (pensions, social minimums) - Display more flattering real growth - Maintain artificially low interest rates

Current methods are vulnerable: - The CPI basket is defined by civil servants - Weightings are arbitrarily chosen - “Hedonic adjustments” can be biased - Product substitutions mask real inflation

The MIT Billion Prices Project demonstrated that official indices regularly underestimate real inflation, sometimes by several points [96].

D.2 — The Solution: The Dynamic Pseudo-Basket (DPB)

The DPB is not a theoretical invention. It is the **synthesis of three proven techniques**, combined to create an automatic, transparent, and incorruptible index.

Pillar 1: Chained Indices

Traditional indices (Laspeyres) use a fixed basket that becomes obsolete. Chained indices solve this problem:

- **Fisher Index:** combines old basket and current basket
- **Tornqvist Index:** weights by average budget shares
- **Chained indices:** the basket changes automatically each year

The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) already uses chained indices for real GDP [H2]. Nobody manually chooses the weightings—they derive from the data.

Pillar 2: Real Transactional Data

Instead of declarative surveys, the DPB uses **anonymized and aggregated transaction data**: - Cash register receipts (scanner data) - Aggregated bank transactions - Payment operator data

Statistics Netherlands pioneered the use of scanner data to calculate inflation [H3]. The U.S. BLS is also experimenting with this approach [H4].

Pillar 3: Unsupervised Classification

This is the key to incorruptibility. Instead of civil servants deciding which categories of goods to include in the basket, a **clustering algorithm** automatically defines categories from the data.

Techniques used: - K-means, DBSCAN for clustering - Embeddings to represent products - No human intervention in category definition

Banks and fintechs (Visa, Mastercard, Revolut) already use these techniques to classify their clients' spending [H5].

D.3 — Existing Implementations

Project	Organization	Method	Limits
Billion Prices Project	MIT	Online price scraping	Not institutional
Chain-weighted GDP	BEA (USA)	Chained indices	Applied to GDP, not CPI
Scanner Data CPI	Statistics Netherlands	Cash register receipts	Not automated
Real-time Inflation	Various central banks	Transactions	Internal use only

No country has yet institutionalized a complete DPB. The reasons are political, not technical: 1. It would remove governments' manipulation capacity 2. Statistical institutes protect their historical prerogative 3. Constitutionalizing an algorithm is revolutionary

D.4 — Proposed Constitutional Formulation

Article X. — Standard Deduction Indexation

The standard deduction provided in Article Y is adjusted annually according to a cost of living index calculated by the following method:

1. **Source data:** anonymized and aggregated transactions from at least three independent payment operators, covering at minimum 30% of territory transactions.
2. **Classification:** spending categories are defined by unsupervised classification algorithm, without human intervention in category choice.
3. **Calculation:** the index is chained (Fisher or Tornqvist), recalculated monthly with automatic publication.
4. **Source code:** the complete algorithm is public, auditable, and executable by any citizen with access to aggregated data.
5. **Lock-in:** any modification of this method requires a four-fifths majority in each chamber.
6. **Challenge:** any citizen can petition the Constitutional Council if they believe the published index does not correspond to application of the official algorithm.

D.5 — Objections and Responses

Objection	Response
Privacy	Data is aggregated and anonymized. No individual transaction is traceable. Only category totals are used.
Exclusion of cash payments	The sample doesn't need to be exhaustive, but representative. 70% of transactions suffice if properly distributed.
Technical complexity	Source code is public. Universities, NGOs, and citizens can independently verify calculations.
Algorithm manipulation	The 4/5 lock-in and code publication prevent discreet modifications.
Goodhart's Law ("what is measured is manipulated")	Unsupervised classification automatically adapts to behavior changes.

Objection	Response
Bugs or hacking	Multiple independent implementations must converge. Divergence = automatic alert.

D.6 — Why This Is Revolutionary

The DPB would be the **first truly scientific economic measure** inscribed in a constitution:

- **Reproducible**: anyone can recalculate the index
- **Falsifiable**: one can demonstrate whether the calculation is correct or not
- **Evolving**: the basket adapts without political intervention
- **Incorruptible**: no civil servant chooses what counts

It's the application of the Libertarian Libertarianism principle: **trust data, not institutions**.

D.7 — References

References [96] to [102] in the general bibliography document the theoretical and empirical foundations of the DPB.

Return to chapter VIII

Appendice E

PENSION TRANSITION — FROM PAY-AS-YOU-GO TO CAPITALIZATION

Reference: Chapter VII (Protection Without the Welfare State)

E.1 — Why Pay-as-You-Go is Rejected

The pay-as-you-go pension system — where contributions from active workers finance current retirees' pensions — suffers from irreparable structural flaws.

A pyramid-like system. Pay-as-you-go only works if each generation is larger (or wealthier) than the previous one. It's mathematically identical to a Ponzi scheme: the last arrivals pay for the first. When demographic growth reverses, the system collapses.

Enslavement of future generations. Children did not choose to be born. Yet, as soon as they work, they are forced to contribute to pay their elders' pensions. This is not solidarity — it's an obligation imposed without consent. Capitalization, on the other hand, liberates each generation: everyone saves for themselves.

A colossal implicit debt. Pay-as-you-go systems have accumulated unfunded pension promises. This "implicit debt" typically represents 200 to 300% of GDP — far more than the official public debt. It's a time bomb that no one dares to face.

Intergenerational conflict. When the active/retiree ratio drops from 4:1 to 2:1 (currently underway in all developed countries), either pensions must be reduced or contributions increased. In both cases, one generation pays for the mistakes of previous ones. Capitalization avoids this conflict: everyone recovers what they saved.

Note: Two recent studies by Fondapol address the question of capitalization in the French pension system. The first [69] analyzes the advantages of capitalization as a lever to escape the demographic and financial impasse. The second [68] proposes concrete procedures for transitioning to a mixed system with 25% capitalization. These works make a serious contribution to the debate by showing that an evolution toward capitalization is technically feasible. However, they raise a fundamental question: a system maintaining

75% pay-as-you-go retains the structural burden on active workers and does not fully resolve the long-term intergenerational problem. The solution presented below is more radical: it aims for the complete extinction of pay-as-you-go, with a documented transition trajectory.

E.2 — The Transition Mechanism

Transitioning from pay-as-you-go to capitalization is technically feasible. Here's how.

The central problem. Current retirees have acquired rights in the old system. They contributed all their lives with the promise of a pension. We cannot abandon them. But if active workers now contribute to their own capitalization, who pays current retirees' pensions?

The solution: the temporary differential. During the transition, a temporary tax (the “differential”) finances pensions for retirees of the old system. This differential:

- Starts at approximately 10-11% of GDP
- Decreases progressively over 40 years
- Reaches 0% when all retirees from the old system have deceased

New workers capitalize. From day 1 of the transition, new entrants to the labor market contribute to their own retirement through capitalization. They owe nothing to anyone.

Mid-career workers. Those who have already contributed to the old system retain proportional rights. A worker with 20 years of career has 50% rights in the old system (paid by the differential) and capitalizes for the remaining 50%.

Progressive extinction. Year after year, retirees from the old system pass away. New retirees have fewer and fewer rights in the old system. The differential decreases mechanically until it disappears.

E.3 — The Constitutional Framework for Financing

The transition financing rests on two complementary mechanisms, both enshrined in the constitution:

The Differential: A Strict Constitutional Trajectory

The differential follows an inviolable constitutional ceiling. Its decrease (from 10% to 0% over 40 years) is fixed in advance and cannot be modified for economic reasons. It's a normative rule, not an indicative target.

Why this rigidity?

- **Predictability.** Economic actors (companies, households) can plan over 40 years. No bad surprises.
- **Impossibility of political manipulation.** No government can extend the differential to finance something else. The temptation is eliminated at the source.
- **Intergenerational trust.** Young workers know exactly when the differential will disappear. They won't pay indefinitely for previous generations' mistakes.

Logical consequence: the differential may be insufficient. Some years, the flow of pensions to be paid exceeds the differential ceiling. This is predictable and expected. The difference is covered by temporary borrowing: the **transition debt**.

The Minimum Budget Surplus: The Relay Mechanism

This document imposes a **constitutional minimum budget surplus** (see chapter V). This surplus, set for example at 2% of GDP, plays a crucial role in the pension transition.

Priority allocation of the surplus during transition:

1. **Repayment of transition debt** — The surplus is primarily allocated to repaying the transition debt, as long as it exists.
2. **Funding the reserve fund** — Once the transition debt is settled, the surplus returns to its normal function.

The handoff. When the differential reaches 0% (year 40), there potentially remains residual transition debt and residual pension flows to finance. The budget surplus then takes over:

- It covers remaining pension flows (which naturally decrease with the extinction of the last retirees from the old system)
- It repays the accumulated transition debt

This mechanism guarantees that **the transition completes without leaving a burden**, even after the end of the differential.

Why the Transition Debt Must Remain Minimal

It's not debt like any other. The transition debt is not borrowing to finance current expenses or investments. It's a temporary accounting mechanism to smooth the financing of acquired rights.

Minimizing the transition debt is crucial for three reasons:

1. **Traceability.** Low debt is easy to track and explain. High debt muddies the accounts and opens the door to manipulation.

2. Interest costs. All debt generates interest. The lower the transition debt, the less interest we pay, the faster we exit.

3. Market confidence. Controlled transition debt (close to zero thanks to the budget surplus) reassures investors. It doesn't add to public debt in an alarming way.

Result in the simulation. Thanks to the minimum budget surplus of 2% of GDP (approximately €17 billion the first year, growing with GDP), the transition debt remains virtually zero throughout the transition. Temporary loans are repaid the same year or the following year.




Figure E.1 — Relay mechanism between differential and budget surplus




Figure E.2 — Minimum budget surplus and its use for transition debt

Configurable Constitutional Parameters

The following parameters are enshrined in the constitution and modifiable only by a four-fifths majority of each chamber:

Parameter	Default Value	Description
differentiel_initial	10% of GDP	Initial differential ceiling
duree_decroissance_differentiel	40 years	Duration of decrease to 0
methode_differentiel	linear	Decrease profile
surplus_budgetaire_minimal_pct_pib	2% of GDP	Minimum constitutional surplus
surplus_max_pour_dette_transition_pct	100%	Share of surplus allocable to transition debt

These parameters are **transparent, traceable, and falsifiable**. The simulator allows verification of their impact year by year.

E.4 — Simulation Results

A simulator modeled this transition for several European countries. Here are the results.

Essential point: The simulation demonstrates that the transition eliminates **simultaneously both debts**:

- **The nominal public debt** (104% of GDP for Belgium) — fully repaid
- **The implicit pension debt** (222% of GDP) — the pay-as-you-go system is entirely settled

The model proves that it's possible to do both during the transition period, without leaving a burden for future generations.

Transition Duration

Country	Total Duration	Comment
Poland	72 years	More favorable demographics
Netherlands	76 years	Existing mixed system helps
Belgium	77 years	Reference scenario

Country	Total Duration	Comment
France	82 years	High implicit debt
Germany	83 years	Advanced aging
Spain	84 years	Structural unemployment
Italy	151 years	Requires additional adjustments




Figure E.3 — Transition duration by country

Conclusion: The transition takes 2 to 3 generations, except in extreme cases.

Transition Effort (Differential)

- **Maximum:** 8-11% of GDP depending on country
- **Decrease duration:** 40 years
- **Method:** Linear or progressive

This effort is comparable to current pension levies. The difference: it's temporary and decreasing.




Figure E.4 — Transition effort: the decreasing differential

Debt Evolution — Complete Table (Belgium)

The table below shows the year-by-year evolution of the transition. It clearly shows how **both debts converge to zero**: public debt (repaid in 28 years) and implicit pension debt (settled in 76 years).

Note on debt reduction in year 1: The sharp drop in public debt between year 0 (104%) and year 1 (79%) is explained by the assumption of massive sales of public assets that no longer fall under the almost exclusively sovereign role of the State in the new social contract. This notably includes: - schools (education becomes private with school vouchers) - ports and airports - public companies or State participations - certain hospitals - possibly fire stations - and other real estate or financial assets

These privatizations are not “selling the family silver” — they are the logical consequence of refocusing the State on its sovereign functions.

Optimistic assumption of sale in one year. The simulation assumes these assets are sold in the first year. In reality, it will probably take **several years** to obtain a fair price. A rushed sale would amount to fire-selling public assets. The actual timeline will depend on market conditions and investors’ absorption capacity.

Mandatory popular validation. To avoid cronyism or corruption, each significant asset sale must be **validated by referendum**. The transition will be an unheralded opportunity for those who would want to profit unduly — only direct popular control can guarantee that sales are made in the general interest and at fair price. The valuation of public assets and sale procedures are considerable stakes [107].

Year	GDP (Bn€)	Diff. %	Public Debt %	Pension Debt %
0	850	11.82	104.00	222.35
1	880	11.22	79.09	203.86
2	911	10.62	77.11	186.57
3	942	10.02	75.14	170.43
4	975	9.42	73.17	155.42
5	1010	8.84	71.20	141.48
6	1045	8.27	69.24	128.58
7	1081	8.00	67.28	116.65
8	1119	7.75	65.04	105.66
9	1158	7.50	62.52	95.54
10	1199	7.25	59.75	86.26
11	1229	7.00	57.41	78.50
12	1260	6.75	54.91	71.34
13	1291	6.50	52.27	64.72
14	1323	6.25	49.50	58.62
15	1357	6.00	46.64	53.01
16	1390	5.75	43.70	47.86
17	1425	5.50	40.69	43.14
18	1461	5.25	37.65	38.82
19	1497	5.00	34.59	34.87
20	1535	4.75	31.54	31.26
21	1566	4.50	28.67	28.12
22	1597	4.25	25.83	25.24
23	1629	4.00	23.05	22.62

Year	GDP (Bn€)	Diff. %	Public Debt %	Pension Debt %
24	1661	3.75	20.33	20.22
25	1695	3.50	17.70	18.05
26	1728	3.25	15.15	16.07
27	1763	3.00	12.71	14.27
28	1798	2.75	10.39	12.64
29	1834	2.50	8.19	11.18
30	1871	2.25	6.13	9.85
34	2025	1.01	0.00	5.79
40	2281	0.67	0.00	2.39
45	2518	0.46	0.00	1.08
50	2780	0.35	0.00	0.46
55	3069	0.28	0.00	0.19
60	3389	0.24	0.00	0.07
65	3742	0.21	0.00	0.02
70	4131	0.18	0.00	0.01
76	4652	0.16	0.00	0.00
<i>Tableau E.1 — Evolution of both debts during the transition (Belgium)</i>				

Final result: Both debts are at zero. Public debt is repaid in 34 years, implicit pension debt is settled in 76 years. The country is freed from all burden.




Figure E.5 — Belgium: extinction of both debts over 76 years

Impact on Salaries — Complete Table (Belgium)

The table below shows the evolution of net salary for different income levels, year by year.

This table integrates the gain from abolishing indirect taxes (VAT, excises, property taxes). These regressive taxes [81][82] weigh more heavily on low incomes — their abolition is therefore directly integrated into the net calculation. Insurance amounts are calculated **tax-free** [83] since taxes on insurance operations (9.25% general, 2% life insurance) are also abolished. **All salaries are winners from day one.** No corrective mechanism is necessary.

Year	Diff. %	2000€ Net	Tax %	3000€ Net	Tax %	4000€ Net	Tax %	5000€ Net	Tax %	7000€ Net	Tax %	10000€ Net	Tax %
-1	Cur- rent	1100€	45.0%	1650€	45.0%	2200€	45.0%	2750€	45.0%	3850€	45.0%	5500€	45.0%
0	11.82	1350€	32.5%	2036€	32.1%	2701€	32.5%	3371€	32.6%	4679€	33.2%	6668€	33.3%
1	11.22	1362€	31.9%	2054€	31.5%	2725€	31.9%	3401€	32.0%	4721€	32.6%	6728€	32.7%
2	10.62	1374€	31.3%	2072€	30.9%	2749€	31.3%	3431€	31.4%	4763€	32.0%	6788€	32.1%
3	10.02	1386€	30.7%	2090€	30.3%	2773€	30.7%	3462€	30.8%	4805€	31.4%	6848€	31.5%
4	9.42	1398€	30.1%	2108€	29.7%	2797€	30.1%	3491€	30.2%	4847€	30.8%	6908€	30.9%

Year	Diff. %	2000€ Net	Tax %	3000€ Net	Tax %	4000€ Net	Tax %	5000€ Net	Tax %	7000€ Net	Tax %	10000€ Net	Tax %
5	8.84	1409€	29.5%	2126€	29.1%	2820€	29.5%	3520€	29.6%	4888€	30.2%	6966€	30.3%
6	8.27	1421€	29.0%	2143€	28.6%	2843€	28.9%	3549€	29.0%	4928€	29.6%	7023€	29.8%
7	8.00	1426€	28.7%	2151€	28.3%	2854€	28.6%	3562€	28.7%	4946€	29.3%	7050€	29.5%
8	7.75	1431€	28.4%	2158€	28.1%	2864€	28.4%	3575€	28.5%	4964€	29.1%	7075€	29.2%
9	7.50	1436€	28.2%	2166€	27.8%	2874€	28.1%	3588€	28.2%	4982€	28.8%	7100€	29.0%
10	7.25	1441€	28.0%	2174€	27.6%	2884€	27.9%	3600€	28.0%	4999€	28.6%	7125€	28.7%
15	6.00	1466€	26.7%	2211€	26.3%	2934€	26.7%	3662€	26.8%	5086€	27.3%	7250€	27.5%
20	4.75	1491€	25.4%	2248€	25.1%	2984€	25.4%	3725€	25.5%	5174€	26.1%	7375€	26.2%
25	3.50	1516€	24.2%	2286€	23.8%	3034€	24.1%	3788€	24.2%	5262€	24.8%	7500€	25.0%
30	2.25	1541€	22.9%	2324€	22.6%	3084€	22.9%	3850€	23.0%	5349€	23.6%	7625€	23.8%
34	1.01	1566€	21.7%	2361€	21.3%	3134€	21.7%	3912€	21.8%	5436€	22.3%	7749€	22.5%
40	0.62	1574€	21.3%	2372€	20.9%	3149€	21.3%	3932€	21.4%	5463€	22.0%	7788€	22.1%
50	0.33	1579€	21.0%	2381€	20.6%	3161€	21.0%	3946€	21.1%	5483€	21.7%	7817€	21.8%
60	0.23	1581€	20.9%	2384€	20.5%	3165€	20.9%	3951€	21.0%	5491€	21.6%	7827€	21.7%
70	0.18	1582€	20.9%	2386€	20.5%	3167€	20.8%	3954€	20.9%	5494€	21.5%	7832€	21.7%
75	0.16	1583€	20.9%	2386€	20.5%	3168€	20.8%	3954€	20.9%	5495€	21.5%	7834€	21.7%
<i>Ta- bleau E.2 — Im- pact on sala- ries du- ring the tran-</i>													

Year	Diff. %	2000€ Net	Tax %	3000€ Net	Tax %	4000€ Net	Tax %	5000€ Net	Tax %	7000€ Net	Tax %	10000€ Net	Tax %
sition (Bel- gium)													

Combined Effect from Year 0 (Differential + Abolition of Indirect Taxes)

Important note: The impact of the differential ALREADY includes payment for the 4 mandatory private insurances (health €73, unemployment €37, pension €59, education €46 = **€215/month**). These insurances replace benefits currently financed by taxation. The displayed gain is therefore NET of all charges.

Gross Salary	Current Net	New System Impact*	Indirect Tax Gain	Net Effect
2000€	1100€	+74€	+176€	+250€/month ✓
3000€	1650€	+155€	+231€	+386€/month ✓
4000€	2200€	+237€	+264€	+501€/month ✓
5000€	2750€	+319€	+302€	+621€/month ✓
7000€	3850€	+482€	+346€	+829€/month ✓
10000€	5500€	+728€	+440€	+1168€/month ✓

* New system = 25% flat tax + 11.82% differential + €215/month private insurance Tableau E.3 — Combined effect from year 0

All salaries are winners from day one! And this, even while paying the €215 in private insurance that replaces the current social security.




Figure E.6 — Year 0: cascading combined effect

Evolution of Purchasing Power During the Transition

The following graph shows how purchasing power evolves year by year for each salary level, from year 0 until the end of the transition.




Figure E.7 — Evolution of purchasing power during the transition

Purchasing Power Gain at End of Transition

Gross Salary	Current Net	Final Net	Gain €/month	Gain %
2000€	1100€	1583€	+483€	+43.9%
3000€	1650€	2386€	+736€	+44.6%
4000€	2200€	3168€	+968€	+44.0%
5000€	2750€	3954€	+1204€	+43.8%
7000€	3850€	5495€	+1645€	+42.7%
10000€	5500€	7834€	+2334€	+42.4%
<i>Tableau E.4 — Purchasing power gain at end of transition</i>				




Figure E.8 — End of transition: cascading combined effect




Figure E.9 — Purchasing power gain at end of transition

The relative gain is more favorable to low incomes. The abolition of indirect taxes represents +16% of net for a €2000 salary, versus only +8% for a €10,000 salary. Regressive taxes weighed proportionally heavier on small budgets — their suppression naturally rebalances the system.

No corrective mechanism is necessary. The system is fair from the start. Any breach of the single-rate principle (flat tax) would open a Pandora's box that could be exploited to corrupt the system in the future.

E.5 — Key Parameters

What accelerates the transition:

- Privatizations (sale of public assets to repay debt)
- Stronger economic growth
- Solidarity pension reduction (e.g., -10%)
- Later retirement age

What slows the transition:

- High initial public debt
- High implicit debt (pension promises)
- Low growth
- Rapid demographic aging

What doesn't change the final result:

- The differential profile (linear or progressive)
- The method of calculating proportional rights

The transition succeeds in all cases. Only the duration varies.

Note on the growth scenario. The simulation uses a moderate growth assumption (approximately 3.5% nominal). This scenario is probably **pessimistic**. Indeed, with the shift to flat tax and the massive reduction in mandatory levies, many countries will find themselves on the right side of the peak of the **Laffer curve** [80]: lighter taxation stimulates economic activity, broadens the tax base, and can even increase total revenues. Real growth could therefore be higher than projections, which would accelerate debt repayment and facilitate the transition.

Effect on low salaries. Faster growth also means faster salary increases for everyone, including low incomes. They would therefore benefit more from the new social contract than what the simulations show. Moreover, as demonstrated in the “Combined Effect” table, **the abolition of indirect taxes benefits low incomes proportionally more** (+16% of net for a €2000 salary vs +8% for €10,000). The system is therefore naturally more favorable to small budgets — without any corrective mechanism being necessary.

Reminder: the effect of indirect taxes changes everything. As demonstrated in the “Combined Effect” table above, the abolition of indirect taxes (VAT, excises, property taxes) — which weigh proportionally more on low incomes [81][82] — completely transforms the balance. Even the most modest salary is **a winner from day one** of the transition (+142€/month for a gross salary of €2000).

E.6 — Purchasing Power Neutrality and Reduced Financing Need

Key principle (see Chapter VIII). *The model reasons in net purchasing power, not nominal amounts. The abolition of indirect taxes means that a nominally lower pension in the new system can offer the same purchasing power — or even higher — than in the old one. A €1,200 pension without VAT can be worth as much as a €1,500 pension in a system with 20% consumption taxes.*

Consequence for the transition: The real flow needed to finance pensions inherited from the old system is reduced. The temporary differential is lightened — without reduction in retirees’ effective economic rights. This is not a “pension cut” — it’s an adaptation to the new fiscal framework.

E.7 — Acquired Rights are Respected

Current retirees. They keep their pensions (possibly reduced by 10% through “solidarity reduction”). Nothing changes for them, except the funding source.

Workers close to retirement. They have proportional rights to their years of contribution in the old system. These rights are honored.

Young workers. They move directly to capitalization. They owe nothing to anyone and recover what they save.

E.8 — Conclusion: It’s Feasible — And Demonstrated

A complete simulator modeled this transition for 7 European countries, with explicit parameters and verifiable source code. The results are consistent and robust:

- **Demonstrated feasibility:** all debts (public and implicit) converge to zero
- **Reasonable duration:** 70 to 85 years (2 to 3 generations), except extreme cases
- **Bearable temporary effort:** differential of 8-11% of GDP for 40 years
- **Final gain for all:** 33 to 41% more purchasing power at arrival
- **Tested robustness:** even pessimistic scenarios succeed

The simulator hides nothing: assumptions are explicit, limits are documented, temporary equity problems are identified with their solutions (progressivity of the differential).

The choice is not between “pain” and “no pain”. It’s between temporary pain (the transition) and permanent pain (the collapse of the pay-as-you-go system).

E.9 — Simulator

A complete simulator allows modeling this transition for any country, with adjustable parameters (growth, demographics, privatizations, etc.). It generates year-by-year projections, salary impact tables, and visualization graphs.

The simulator is available for download: [simulateur_transition_pensions.zip](#)

For more details: - Graphical interface user guide: Appendix F - Methodology and model limitations: Appendix F

Return to chapter VII

Appendice F

PENSION TRANSITION SIMULATOR — METHODOLOGY AND LIMITS

Reference: Chapter VII (Protecting Oneself Without the Welfare State), Appendix E (Pension Transition)

F.1 — Simulator Objective

The pension transition simulator is a macro-economic modeling tool designed to answer a precise question: **is it financially feasible to transition from a pay-as-you-go pension system to a funded system, without abandoning current retirees' acquired rights?**

It is not an economic forecasting tool. It does not claim to predict the future. Its purpose is to demonstrate the **technical feasibility** of a transition, by showing how both debts—public and implicit—can converge to zero within an explicit and adjustable framework of assumptions.

What the simulator demonstrates: - The transition is technically achievable - It takes 2 to 3 generations (70 to 90 years depending on country) - The transition effort (differential) is temporary and decreasing - All salaries win from day one

F.2 — The Macro-Economic Logic

The model rests on simple but rigorous logic.

The Central Problem: The Double Debt

At the start of transition, two debts must be absorbed:

1. **Official public debt** — the one everyone knows (80-120% of GDP depending on country).
2. **Implicit pension debt** — unfunded pension promises accumulated by the pay-as-you-go system. This “hidden” debt typically represents 200 to 300% of GDP. It appears in no balance sheet, but it is very real: these are the pensions the State will have to pay to current and future retirees.

The Transition Mechanism

The transition works in three simultaneous phases:

Phase 1: Honor acquired rights. Current retirees continue receiving their pensions (possibly reduced by 10% through “solidarity contribution”). They contributed their whole lives with this promise—we don’t abandon them.

Phase 2: Switch new workers. From day one of transition, new labor market entrants contribute to their own capitalization. They owe nothing to anyone.

Phase 3: Manage mid-career workers. Those who have already contributed retain proportional rights to their seniority. A worker with 20 years’ career has 50% rights in the old system (paid by the differential) and capitalizes for the remaining 50%.

The Differential: A Temporary and Decreasing Tax

During transition, a temporary tax (the “differential”) finances payment of old-system pensions. This differential:

- **Starts** at about 8-12% of GDP (depending on country)
- **Decreases** progressively over 40 years
- **Reaches zero** when all old-system beneficiaries have passed away

The decrease can follow several profiles: linear (simplest), quadratic (slower at start, faster at end), or in steps.

F.3 — Model Assumptions

The simulator rests on explicit assumptions, all modifiable by the user.

Demographic Assumptions

Parameter	Meaning	Typical Value
Initial retirees	Retired population at day 0	2-17 million
New retirees per year	Annual retirement flow	100,000 - 700,000
Retirement age	Legal retirement age	60-67 years
Life expectancy	Average lifespan	77-85 years

Parameter	Meaning	Typical Value
Initial mortality rate	First-year retirement mortality	4-6%
Mortality increment	Annual rate increase	0.2-0.4%

Note on mortality: The model uses progressive mortality that increases with age. It is not a complete actuarial mortality table—it is a sufficient approximation for macro-economic simulation.

Economic Assumptions

Parameter	Meaning	Typical Value
Initial GDP	Starting gross domestic product	Variable by country
Base growth rate	Trend growth	1.2-3.5%
Growth bonus years 1-10	Years 1-10 bonus	1.5-4%
Growth bonus years 11-20	Years 11-20 bonus	0.8-2.5%
Growth bonus 20+ years	Beyond 20 years bonus	0.5-1.5%

Note on growth: The model assumes declining but positive growth. With flat tax and reduced contributions, a positive Laffer effect is expected—real growth could exceed projections.

Financing Assumptions

Parameter	Meaning	Typical Value
Privatizations	Sale of public assets	5-200 Bn
Initial differential	Starting temporary tax	8-15% GDP
Decrease duration	Diminution period	30-45 years
Debt repayment	% GDP devoted to repayment	1-2%

Interest Rate Assumptions

Debt interest rate is a function of debt/GDP ratio:

Debt/GDP Ratio	Interest Rate
< 60%	1.5-2%
60-90%	2-3%

Debt/GDP Ratio	Interest Rate
90-120%	2.5-4%
> 120%	3-6%

This tiered structure reflects market reality: the more indebted a country, the more it pays to borrow.

F.4 — Simulation Engine Operation

The simulator proceeds in two passes.

Pass 1: Calibration (the multiplier)

The first pass calculates a “multiplier” that ensures consistency between pension flows and implicit debt. This multiplier guarantees that the sum of pensions paid over the entire transition exactly equals the initial implicit debt (after solidarity reduction).

Why this calibration? Official data on average pensions and retiree numbers don’t exactly match the implicit debt calculated by economists. The multiplier corrects this gap.

Pass 2: Year-by-Year Simulation

For each simulation year, the engine executes in order:

1. **GDP growth** — Application of appropriate growth rate for the period.
2. **Adding a new retiree cohort** — New retirees enter with rights proportional to their seniority in the old system.
3. **Pension flow calculation** — Sum of pensions for all living cohorts, weighted by their rights.
4. **Mortality application** — Each cohort loses a percentage of members, according to a rate increasing with age.
5. **Differential calculation** — Comparison between pension flow to pay and theoretical differential ceiling. If flow exceeds ceiling, difference is borrowed (transition debt).
6. **Debt repayment** — Differential surplus (if flow is below ceiling) first repays transition debt, then public debt.
7. **Interest** — Calculation and capitalization of interest on all real debts.
8. **Implicit debt update** — Reduction of implicit debt by amount of pensions paid.

9. **End verification** — Simulation stops when all three debts (public, transition, implicit) are at zero.

The Cohort System

The model manages retirees by cohorts. Each cohort represents people who retired in a given year. It has:

- A number of living members (decreasing)
- An average pension
- An old-system rights rate (decreasing from one cohort to the next)

This cohort approach allows modeling progressive extinction of the old system without tracking millions of individuals.

F.5 — Graphical Interface User Guide

The simulator has a complete graphical interface for visualizing the transition and exploring different scenarios.

Launching the Application

To launch the simulator, run the `simulateur_gui.py` file from the `gui/` folder:

```
python simulateur_gui.py
```

The application starts with the Belgium scenario by default and automatically runs a first simulation.

Interface Layout

The interface is divided into three main areas:

Left area: Parameter panel

This panel displays all simulation parameters organized by category: - **Demographics** — number of retirees, new retirees per year, life expectancy, mortality - **Economy** — GDP, growth, privatizations, capitalization return - **Fiscal** — flat tax rate, standard deduction, initial differential - **Pensions** — average pension, solidarity reduction

By default, parameters are in **read-only mode** (gray background). To modify them: 1. Check the “Edit” box next to the parameter 2. Background becomes light pink to indicate the field is editable 3. Modify the value — simulation automatically reruns 4. Modified values display in green

Central area: Graph panel

This area displays simulation graphs. Use the dropdown menu at top to select which graph to display: - GDP evolution - Public debt (in billions or % of GDP) - Implicit pension debt - Transition differential - Purchasing power evolution by salary level - Year 0 combined effect (new system + abolished taxes) - And many more...

Graph interactions: - **Mouse drag** — pan (move the graph) - **Scroll wheel** — zoom in/out - **Right double-click** — reset view - “” **button** — open graph in enlarged window - “” **button** — copy to clipboard as PNG - “” **button** — copy to clipboard as SVG - “” **button** — save graph (SVG or PNG)

Right area: Help panel

This panel displays contextual help and code legends used in graphs (SBRT = gross salary, ANEE = year, etc.).

Country Scenarios

The “Scenario” menu allows loading pre-configured configurations for different countries:

Region	Available Countries
Western Europe	France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands
Southern Europe	Spain, Italy, Portugal
Eastern Europe	Poland, Hungary
Outside Europe	USA, Japan, China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel

Each scenario uses realistic economic and demographic data for the country concerned.

Enlarged Window and “Live” Mode

Click “” to open a graph in a separate window. This window offers: - A larger and more detailed view - **“Live” mode** (check the box) — graph updates automatically when you modify parameters in the main window - Same copy and save functions

Results Table

The “View > Results Table” menu opens a window with raw year-by-year data: - GDP, differential, debts - Number of retirees by cohort - Pension flows

This data can be copied or exported for external analysis.

Adjusting Font Size

The “View > Font Size” menu allows adjusting text size (from 10 to 24 points). Useful for high-resolution screens or presentations.

Language

The “Language” menu allows switching between French and English. The interface updates immediately.

F.6 — Model Limits

The simulator is a feasibility demonstration tool, not a forecasting tool. Its limits are acknowledged.

What the Model Does NOT Do

No micro-economic modeling. The simulator does not model individual behaviors (savings, consumption, investment). It works with macro-economic aggregates.

No economic cycles. The model assumes regular growth without recessions. In reality, there will be crises. But over 80 years, cycles balance out—the underlying trend remains valid.

No external shocks. Wars, pandemics, technological revolutions... The model does not anticipate them. It shows what happens “all else being equal.”

No financial market modeling. Capitalization returns are not simulated. The model simply assumes capitalization works—which 150 years of financial history largely confirms.

No inflation. All calculations are in constant currency. Inflation is neutralized.

Why These Simplifications Are Acceptable

A model is always a simplification of reality. The question is not “is it perfect?” but “is it useful?” As statistician George Box put it: “*All models are wrong, but some are useful*” [14]. Our cognitive capacities are limited [10]—a perfect model would be as complex as reality itself, therefore unusable.

The simulator answers a binary question: is the transition feasible? The answer is yes, and this answer is robust:

- Pessimistic scenarios also succeed
- Parameter variations change duration, not result
- Mathematical logic is unavoidable: old-system retirees pass away, their rights extinguish, so the differential can decrease

The error would be to model nothing. Without simulation, one often hears that “transition is impossible” or would “cost too much.” The simulator proves otherwise with verifiable numbers.

F.7 — Reproducibility and Transparency

The simulator’s source code is entirely available. All assumptions are explicit and modifiable. Results are reproducible.

Files provided: - `transition_pensions.py` — Simulation engine - `simulateur_gui.py` — Graphical interface - `configurations/*.ini` — Country scenarios - Complete documentation

What you can verify: - Equations used - Default parameters - Logic of each step - Results for any parameter set

Transparency is total. If you think an assumption is unrealistic, modify it and rerun the simulation. The model has nothing to hide.

F.8 — Conclusion: A Persuasion Tool, Not a Prediction Tool

The simulator does not predict the future. It demonstrates a possibility.

Faced with the mathematically collapsing pay-as-you-go system, many say there is “no alternative.” The simulator proves otherwise: a transition to capitalization is technically feasible, financially sustainable, and beneficial for all salaries from day one.

The choice remains political. But at least it can no longer be refused on grounds of supposed technical impossibility.

Return to Appendix E — Pension Transition

Appendice G

VACANT HOUSING — MINIMUM CONSERVATION OBLIGATION

Reference: Chapter VIII (The Flat Tax)

G.1 — The Principle

Housing vacancy is not penalized. The owner has no obligation to rent, sell, or put their property into circulation. Private property implies the right to do nothing.

However, **degradation of a property that creates nuisances** for the neighborhood or public space is a legitimate problem. It is not vacancy that is targeted, but its potential negative externalities.

This mechanism is **optional**. It is not constitutionalized. Local authorities can adopt it or not according to their needs.

G.2 — What Is NOT in This Mechanism

- **No surtax on vacant housing.** Vacancy itself is not taxed.
- **No exception to the flat tax.** The tax system remains uniform.
- **No obligation to rent.** The owner remains free in their choices.
- **No penalty for vacancy.** Only nuisance is penalized.

G.3 — The Minimum Conservation Obligation

Every property owner—whether occupied or not—must maintain their property in a condition that does not create nuisances for others. This principle fits within a long tradition of “housing code enforcement” documented in academic literature [84].

This obligation breaks down into four minimum requirements:

1. **Safety.** The building must not threaten ruin, present collapse risks, or constitute a danger to passersby or neighbors.
2. **Stability.** Structural elements (roof, walls, foundations) must be maintained in a condition that does not deteriorate to the point of harming adjacent properties.
3. **Sanitation.** The property must not become a source of insalubrity: pest proliferation, waste accumulation, sanitary degradation affecting the neighborhood. Epidemiological studies have demonstrated the link between degraded housing conditions and respiratory pathologies [87].
4. **Absence of nuisance.** The property must not degrade neighbors' quality of life or public space appearance beyond a reasonable threshold.

G.4 — Finding Procedure

The mechanism relies on finding nuisance, not vacancy:

1. **Report.** A neighbor, building manager, or local authority can report a nuisance.
2. **Adversarial visit.** A sworn officer verifies the property's condition, in the owner's presence or after notification.
3. **Formal notice.** If nuisance is established, the owner receives formal notice to remedy within a reasonable period (3 to 6 months depending on severity).
4. **Default work.** In case of persistent failure, the authority can have safety work carried out at the owner's expense (debt recoverable against the property).

G.5 — What Triggers the Obligation

Situation	Obligation triggered?
Vacant housing but in good condition	No
Vacant housing with collapsed roof	Yes (safety)
Vacant housing with rat infestation	Yes (sanitation)
Vacant housing with very degraded facade	Depending on neighborhood impact

Situation	Obligation triggered?
Vacant housing for 10 years, good condition	No
Vacant housing with squatters	Separate issue (public order)

Duration of vacancy has no effect. Only the property's condition matters.

G.6 — Penalties for Established Nuisance

If the owner does not remedy the nuisance after formal notice:

1. **Default work.** The authority has necessary work carried out.
2. **Recovery.** Cost is recovered from the owner, with legal mortgage on the property if necessary.
3. **Penalty payment.** A daily penalty may be imposed until work is completed.
4. **No surtax, no punitive taxation.** The mechanism remains in the realm of administrative enforcement, not taxation.

G.7 — Why This Mechanism Is Optional

This mechanism is not constitutionalized because:

- It falls under **local administrative enforcement**, not fundamental principles.
- Needs vary by territory (high-demand zones vs rural areas), as illustrated by studies on housing in Brussels [88].
- The nuisance threshold definition depends on local context.
- Intervention means differ by authority.

Authorities that wish to adopt it can do so by local deliberation. Those that don't need it are not required to.

G.8 — What Is Recommended

For authorities that adopt this mechanism:

1. **Define objective nuisance criteria.** Avoid arbitrariness—studies show for example that code violations have measurable effects on prices and rents [85].
2. **Guarantee adversarial proceedings.** The owner must be able to contest the finding.
3. **Proportion deadlines.** Light work = short deadlines. Heavy work = reasonable deadlines.
4. **Avoid fiscal drift.** This mechanism is not a disguised tax. It generates no revenue for the authority beyond work recovery—even if, as Brussels analyses show, restoration is economically preferable to prolonged vacancy [89].
5. **Provide exemptions.** Estates in settlement, pending legal proceedings, force majeure situations.
6. **Monitor unintended effects.** As some American studies show, overly aggressive enforcement can penalize vulnerable tenants if owners prefer to withdraw housing from the market rather than renovate [86].

G.9 — Distinction from Vacant Housing Tax

Some jurisdictions (Vancouver, France) tax vacancy itself. This is not the approach adopted here.

Criterion	Vacant Housing Tax	Conservation Obligation
Triggering fact	Vacancy	Nuisance
Objective	Incentivize renting	Protect neighborhood
Legal nature	Fiscal	Administrative enforcement
Revenue for authority	Yes	No (except work recovery)
Property rights impact	Indirect (taxation)	Minimal (maintenance obligation)
Libertarian consistency	Debatable	Yes (negative externalities)

The conservation obligation is more consistent with libertarian principles: we do not penalize inaction, we penalize nuisance caused to others.

This mechanism is proposed as an option for local authorities. It is neither mandatory nor constitutionalized.

Return to chapter VIII

Appendice H

PARDON JURY COMPOSITION

Reference: Chapter XXVIII (The Head of State: Symbol and Conciliator)

H.1 — The Principle

The Head of State can propose pardon for a convicted person. It is a safety valve when justice is too slow to correct itself. But they do not decide alone. A jury examines the file and rules.

H.2 — Jury Composition

Voting members drawn by lot (3/4 of total weight):

- 20 citizens drawn by lot
- 5 jurists drawn by lot

Voting participants (1/4 of total weight, divided among them):

- Judges and jurors from the original trial — they explain why they convicted
- The Head of State (or their representative) — they explain why they propose pardon

Observers (non-voting):

- 4 or 8 Constitutional Council members (representing the four bodies) ensure proper conduct of proceedings




Figure H.1 — Pardon jury composition

H.3 — Jury Size

Between 25 and 35 people depending on the original trial (variable number of judges and jurors). This size allows real debate without becoming unmanageable.

H.4 — Procedural Safeguards

- **Private deliberations:** no real-time media pressure
- **Anonymous jurors:** before, during, and after — protection against threats
- **Secret ballot:** freedom of conscience

These protections are essential in political or mafia cases where the convicted person or their associates might seek retaliation.

H.5 — Why This Weighting?

The people dominate (3/4): Ordinary citizens decide, not justice professionals.

Participants participate (1/4): They vote, so they fully participate in debates instead of testifying then disappearing. But their limited weight neutralizes conflicts of interest:

- Judges defending themselves
- The Head of State defending their proposal

H.6 — Effects of Pardon

If granted: The person is released or their sentence is annulled.

What pardon does not do: It does not erase the judgment—it suspends the sentence. Complete rehabilitation (record expungement, recognition of innocence) goes through trial revision.

H.7 — Emergency Procedure

If justice recognizes flagrant new evidence (DNA, key witness, real perpetrator's confession), it can immediately suspend the sentence pending revision, without waiting for the pardon jury.

The judicial path and pardon path coexist—the faster one applies.




Figure H.2 — Pardon procedure

Return to chapter XXVIII

Appendice I

COMPARATIVE DICTIONARY OF AUTONOMOUS COLLECTIVES

Reference: Chapter X (Autonomous Collectives)

This appendix offers a comparative survey of intentional communities, cooperatives, and collective arrangements documented in the literature. It distinguishes autonomous collectives (integral or partial), cooperative hybrids, state mechanisms (counter-models), and federations that structure them.

I.1 — Reading Key

1. **Integral autonomous collectives:** institutionalized mutual aid + collective property + internal governance.
2. **Partial autonomous collectives:** strong mutual aid, incomplete economic pooling.
3. **Cooperative hybrids:** family/individual property + pooled services/production.
4. **State mechanisms:** imposed organization, dependence on plan/State.
5. **Excluded cases:** disciplinary communities without institutionalized economic mutual aid.

I.2 — Integral Autonomous Collectives

Hutterites

Canadian prairies and northern United States — 16th c. to present [177][178]

Anabaptist communities practicing integral religious communalism. Complete collective property with total redistribution (housing, work, care). Governance structured by religious leadership, limiting internal democracy. Religious discipline and social sanctions create medium to high coercion. Standard of living often stable and materially high thanks to efficient agricultural and entrepreneurial economy. Exit formally

possible but at high social cost. *Strengths*: stability, risk pooling, efficiency at “colony” scale. *Limits*: social control, low model transferability (homogeneity required). Durable model that grows by swarming rather than indefinite expansion.

Bruderhof

Europe (origin), North America, Australia — 20th–21st c. [179]

Christian communal movement advocating pacifism and complete sharing of goods. Strong income pooling and complete member care. Governance tending toward centralization, with communal discipline creating medium coercion. Material security assured, variable by site. Exit possible but frequently entails social rupture. *Strengths*: cohesion, reproducibility across multiple sites. *Limits*: authority/individual tensions, schism risks. History marked by successive schisms and recompositions.

Twin Oaks

Virginia, USA — since 1967 [180][181]

Secular intentional community founded on pragmatic egalitarianism, inspired by B.F. Skinner's *Walden Two*. Income sharing and basic needs guaranteed according to explicit contribution rules. Structured internal democracy with defined procedures and roles. Low to medium coercion (explicit rules, social pressure). Voluntary simplicity but basic security assured. Exit legally simple, variable social cost. *Strengths*: concrete work allocation mechanisms, proven durability over 50+ years. *Limits*: organizational fatigue, constant trade-offs between ideals and daily management. Durable model through incremental adaptations.

Emmaüs Communities

France (origin), 37 countries — since 1949 [194][197]

Movement of work communities founded by Abbé Pierre, self-funded through recovery and recycling. Over 400 structures welcoming excluded persons (ex-prisoners, addicts, migrants, people in crisis). Collective ownership of work tools, communal living with shared housing and meals. Local governance by companions, federated at national and international levels. Low coercion (minimal rules, alcohol abstinence in community). *Strengths*: self-funding without recurring operating subsidies, unconditional welcome (no file, no delay), functional economic model for 75 years, springboard toward autonomy [196]. *Limits*:

mits: historical dependence on founder's charisma, growing competition from online secondhand market, practice heterogeneity across communities [195]. Resilient model but in permanent adaptation to economic changes.

Shakers (historical)

United States — 18th–20th c. [182][183]

Religious communities practicing integral communalism, gender equality, pacifism, and celibacy. Collective property with redistributed artisanal and agricultural production. Religious hierarchies structuring governance. Medium coercion linked to strong norms. Sober but productive standard of living, marked by notable innovations (furniture, tools). Exit possible. *Strengths*: technical and organizational innovations, collective stability. *Limits*: low lasting attractiveness, dependence on conversions for recruitment. Structural decline caused notably by demographics (mandatory celibacy).

Oneida Community (historical)

New York, USA — 1848–1881 [184][185]

Perfectionist Christian community practicing integral communalism. Strong income pooling with redistributed industrial production. Central leadership limiting internal democracy, with high social control. Relatively high standard of living thanks to solid economic base (silverware, traps). Exit possible but socially costly. *Strengths*: institutional coherence, economic power. *Limits*: vulnerability to external pressures, power drift risks. Dissolution in 1881 and conversion to joint-stock company (Oneida Limited, still existing).

I.3 — Partial Autonomous Collectives

Amish

United States and Canada — 18th c. to present [55][56]

Anabaptist communities characterized by voluntary cultural separation. Strong community mutual aid (support, reconstruction after disasters, assistance), but less centralized productive pooling than Hutterites or kibbutzim. Local governance ruled by the *Ordnung* (community rules), with religious norms and social sanctions creating medium coercion. Modest but stable standard of living. Exit possible via Rumspringa

(exploration period at 16), but high social cost for those who leave permanently. *Strengths*: cohesion, resilience, strong social capital. *Limits*: strong constraints, exit costs, permanent tension between individual autonomy and collective requirements. Durable model through selective technological adaptations.

I.4 — Cooperative Hybrids (Israel)

Moshav (moshav ovdim)

Rural Israel — since early 20th c. [173][172][176]

Service cooperation without integral collectivization. Production at family level, but pooled cooperatives for purchasing, sales, marketing, and credit. Low coercion. Internal democracy via local cooperatives and federative structures. Variable standard of living, often better than integral collectivism in favorable market periods. Exit legally free. *Strengths*: flexibility, preserved family incentives, service cooperation. *Limits*: vulnerability to credit crises and intermediate organization failures. 1980s crisis heavily affecting regional organizations.

Moshav shitufi

Israel — since 1930s [174]

Hybrid “between moshav and kibbutz”: collectivized production and services, more family-oriented consumption. Strong mutual aid on production and services, less on consumption. Low to medium coercion. Internal democracy via local cooperative with collective production rules. Variable standard of living. Exit legally free. *Strengths*: compromise between collective efficiency and family autonomy. *Limits*: tensions over boundaries between collective and private spheres. Resilient but remained minority form.

Classical Collective Kibbutz

Israel — since 1909, peak mid-20th c. [166][52][165]

Zionist socialism and integral egalitarianism. Complete collective property with redistribution (housing, services, education). Low to medium coercion (social norms). Internal democracy via general assembly and committees. High security but historically modest comfort. Exit legally free. *Strengths*: strong internal social security, social capital, quality collective services. *Limits*: incentive problems, risk of most productive member flight. 1980s debt crisis followed by restructuring agreements.

“Renewed” / Partially Privatized Kibbutz

Israel — since 1990s [165][54]

Pragmatic market adaptation after 1980s crisis. Reduced mutual aid (differentiated salaries, partial privatization of some services), but maintained safety nets. Low coercion. Internal democracy formally maintained, but intense debates on identity. Often higher standard of living than before. Exit legally free. *Strengths:* increased financial sustainability. *Limits:* erosion of original equality and internal conflicts over founding values.

I.5 — State Mechanisms (Counter-Models)

These mechanisms are outside the autonomous collective scope because they depend on the State and rely on coercion. They are useful as counter-examples.

Kolkhozes (USSR)

USSR — 1930–1991 [186][187]

Socialist collectivization imposed within the plan framework. Formal mutual aid at collective level, but within coercive framework. High coercion (historically forced collectivization, repressions). Weak internal democracy in practice. Highly variable standard of living, often constrained depending on period. Exit historically limited. Transformation or dissolution after 1991.

Sovkhozes (USSR)

USSR — 20th c. until 1991 [186]

State salary farms, distinct from kolkhozes by absence of even formal collective property. High coercion (direct state hierarchy). Post-Soviet transformations.

People’s Communes (China)

Rural China — 1958–1983 [188][189]

Total political-administrative collectivization. Collectivized mutual aid but with possible extraction by State apparatus. High coercion. Weak internal democracy (political hierarchy). Low exit (territorial and administrative membership). Replaced by townships and household responsibility reforms.

I.6 — Federations and Confederations

Kibbutzim — Main Federations (Israel)

HaKibbutz HaMeuhad (1927 → 1980) [167][168] — Federation associated with labor currents; political and educational infrastructure. 1951 schism along Mapai/Mapam lines, 1980 reunification.

Ihud HaKvutzot VeHaKibbutzim (1951 → 1980/81) [168] — Other major historical pole from post-1951 recompositions; trajectory ended by merger into unified movement.

Kibbutz Artzi / Hashomer Hatzair (1927 → 1999) [164][169] — Federation linked to Hashomer Hatzair/Mapam; own institutional culture, cultural autonomy preserved after unification.

United Kibbutz Movement / TaKaM (1981 → 1999) [164] — Merger of HaKibbutz HaMeuhad and Ihud; major representation and services actor during 1980s-90s.

The Kibbutz Movement (1999 → present) [164][165] — Main umbrella structure (~230 kibbutzim), excluding religious movement; governs a sector in post-crisis transformation.

Religious Kibbutz Movement / HaKibbutz HaDati (1935 → present) [170] — Framework for Orthodox kibbutzim; also includes moshavim shitufi; “cluster” policy for schools and religious infrastructure.

Crisis as federative event [165] — Federations structure credit access, risk pooling, and negotiations with State and banks. Key point: late 1989 agreement includes cancellation of mutual co-signing (cross-guarantees between kibbutzim).

Moshavim — Movements / Federations (Israel)

Moshavim Movement / Tnu'at HaMoshavim [171] — Moshavim federation; mutual aid instruments (insurance, funds, bank, pensions) and regional services (marketing, inputs). Intermediate structure vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks.

Regional organizations crisis (1985–86) [176] — Near-insolvency of regional organizations during budget tightening. Crisis passes through mutual guarantees and intermediate levels rather than individual household.

Agricultural Union / HaIhud HaHakla'i [175] — Settlement movement including moshavim and community settlements; from early 1960s merger.

Mondragon (Basque Country, Spain)

Basque Country, Spain — since 1950s [190][191][192][193]

Confederation of worker cooperatives founded on economic democracy. Confederal rules: pay caps and ratios, inter-cooperative solidarity funds, worker redeployment mechanisms. The Fagor Electrodomésticos bankruptcy (2013) constituted a stress test of group solidarities, showing how a confederation arbitrates between solidarity and systemic survival.

I.7 — Excluded Case

German Templars (Israel)

Sarona & Haifa, Israel — 1868–1948 [166]

German Pietist Protestant sect established in Ottoman Palestine. Disciplined and prosperous community, but founded on **private property** and without institutionalized economic mutual aid → outside “autonomous collective” scope in the strict sense. Retained as conceptual edge case.

Return to chapter X (Autonomous Collectives)

Resources

This manifesto is available in several formats and accompanied by complementary tools.

Read Online

Website: lib-lib.pages.dev

Download the Document

- [Download PDF](#) — Formatted version for printing or offline reading
- [Download ePub](#) — E-book version for e-readers and reading applications
- [Download Markdown](#) — Source version, editable

Complementary Tools

- [Pension Transition Simulator](#) — Python archive with graphical interface allowing simulation of different transition scenarios from pay-as-you-go to funded pensions (see Appendix E)

Glossary

Term	Definition	Refe- rences
Standard Deduction	Universal deduction applied to all income before flat tax calculation, making the system effectively progressive without creating tax brackets	VIII, App. D
Autonomous Community (AC)	Self-funded work and life community, voluntarily welcoming those who cannot or do not wish to integrate into the conventional market	X
Transition Differential	Temporary tax funding pensions of retirees from the old system (pay-as-you-go) during the transition to funded pensions	App. E
Normative Dumping	Unfair competition where an imported product benefits from non-compliance with standards imposed on domestic producers (environmental, social, sanitary)	XXX
Normative Equality	Constitutional principle requiring that any product sold on the domestic market comply with the same standards as domestic products	XXX
Risk Encapsulation	Legal compartmentalization between domains (health, retirement, unemployment, etc.) to prevent bankruptcy contagion	IX
Flat Tax	Single income tax on net income, at the same rate for all, without brackets or loopholes	VIII
Catch-Up Fund	Separate fund fed during budget deadlocks, earmarked for repairing damage (deteriorated infrastructure, deferred maintenance)	V, XIX
Structural Reserve Fund	Budget cushion fed by mandatory annual surplus, intended to absorb crises	V
Chained Index	Type of price index (Fisher, Tornqvist) where the reference basket is automatically updated each period, avoiding obsolescence	App. D
Libertarian Libertarianism	Synthesis proposed by this manifesto: State limited by constitutional architecture, social protection through market and ACs, real-time democracy	II, Concl.
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: European device requiring importers to purchase carbon certificates, applying the normative equality principle	XXX
Market Releaser	Importer or distributor legally responsible for imported products' compliance with domestic standards	XXX
Risk Pooling		VII

Term	Definition	References
	Mechanism requiring insurers to share costly profiles through a common pool, preventing selection of “good risks”	
Autarkic Option	Possibility for those refusing all collective structures to live in isolated rural autarky	XII
Parliament	Chamber elected by census suffrage, competent for budget, government, and economic matters	XXI
PPD (Pseudo-Dynamic Basket)	Incorruptible price index based on anonymized transactional data and unsupervised classification, without human intervention	App. D
Permanent Recall	Mechanism allowing voters to remove an elected official at any time if the distrust threshold is reached	XVII
Senate	Chamber elected by equal suffrage, competent for fundamental rights and societal matters	XXI
4/5 Lock	Majority required in each chamber separately (Parliament AND Senate) to modify fundamental constitutional rules	XXIV
Blank Vote	Pro-decision citizen stance; depending on the option chosen, political signal or counterweight to black vote	XVII
Census Vote	Voting method where vote weight is proportional to tax contribution, with floor (1 vote) and ceiling (100 votes)	XX, App. C
Equal Vote	Voting method where each citizen has the same weight (one person, one vote)	XXI
Gray Vote	Neutral citizen stance; creates an empty seat that systematically abstains	XVII
Black Vote	Blocking citizen stance; creates an empty seat that systematically votes AGAINST	XVII

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Bibliographie

Les numéros entre crochets renvoient aux citations dans le texte.

Sommaire :

- B1 — Theoretical foundations and general diagnostics
- Economics and political philosophy
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- B8 — Political institutions and separation of powers
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- Head of State
- Elected judges
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- B9 — Active democracy and citizen control
- Popular recall
- Citizens' assemblies
- Internal party democracy
- Lectures de contrepoint
- B10 — Voting methods and democratic weighting
- Electronic voting
- Historical property-based voting
- Plural voting theory
- Protest votes and citizen postures
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- B11 — Sovereignty, borders and higher norms
- Immigration
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- [B12 — Transition and state reform](#)
- [Transition and state reform](#)
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- [B13 — Dictionary of autonomous communities](#)
- [Kibbutzim and moshavim — encyclopedic sources](#)
- [Moshavim — academic studies](#)
- [Hutterites](#)
- [Bruderhof](#)
- [Twin Oaks](#)
- [Shakers](#)
- [Oneida Community](#)
- [State-run schemes \(counter-models\)](#)
- [Mondragón](#)
- [Emmaüs](#)

Légende des types de références :

Code	Signification
IDEO	Ouvrage idéologique ou normatif
ACAD	Recherche académique (articles, thèses)
DATA	Données institutionnelles (INSEE, OCDE, etc.)
ACTU	Actualités et événements récents
CASE	Rapport, étude de cas, précédent empirique

B1 — Theoretical foundations and general diagnostics

Economics and political philosophy

[1] [IDEO.] Hayek, F. (1976). *Denationalization of Money: The Argument Refined*. Institute of Economic Affairs. — ISBN: 978-0-255-36087-6 · <https://fee.org/ebooks/denationalization-of-money> → Chap. VI, Chap. II

[2] [IDEO.] Buchanan, J. & Tullock, G. (1962). *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. University of Michigan Press. — ISBN: 978-0-86597-218-6 · <https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/buchanan-the-calculus-of-consent-logical-foundations-of-constitutional-democracy> → Chap. V, Chap. II

[3] [IDEO.] Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and Freedom*. University of Chicago Press. — ISBN: 978-0-226-26400-4 · <https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo68666099.html> → Chap. VIII, Chap. II

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[7] [IDEO.] Constant, B. (1819). *De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes*. Discours prononcé à l'Athénée royal de Paris. — <https://www.institutcoppet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/7.-CONSTANT-Benjamin-De-la-liberte-des-Anciens-comparee-a-celle-des-Modernes.pdf> → Chap. XXII

[8] [IDEO.] Guizot, F. (1821). *Des moyens de gouvernement et d'opposition dans l'état actuel de la France*. Ladvocat. — <https://books.google.com/books?id=9mNAAAAAcAAJ> → Chap. XXII

Institutional and cognitive mechanisms

[9] [ACAD.] Merton, R.K. (1936). “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action”. *American Sociological Review*, 1(6), 894-904. — DOI: 10.2307/2084615 → Chap. I

[10] [ACAD.] Simon, H.A. (1947). *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. Macmillan. — ISBN: 978-0-684-83582-2 → Chap. I, App. F

[11] [ACAD.] Hayek, F.A. (1945). “The Use of Knowledge in Society”. *American Economic Review*, 35(4), 519-530. — <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1809376> → Chap. VI

[12] [ACAD.] Hirschman, A.O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Harvard University Press. — ISBN: 978-0-674-27660-4 → Chap. VI

[13] [ACAD.] North, D.C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press. — DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511808678 · ISBN: 978-0-521-39734-6 → Chap. XXXIII

[14] [ACAD.] Box, G.E.P. (1976). “Science and Statistics”. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 71(356), 791-799. — DOI: 10.2307/2286841 → App. F

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[15] [DATA.] Falck (2024). *Our History*. — <https://www.falck.com/about-us/our-history/> → App. A

[16] [ACAD.] Hansen, E. (1998). “Private provision for public services in Denmark: the case of Falck”. *Safety Science*, 30(1-2), 139-144. — DOI: 10.1016/S0925-7535(98)00042-0 → App. A

[17] [DATA.] Norges Bank Investment Management (2024). *The Fund*. — <https://www.nbim.no/> → App. A

[18] [ACAD.] Armas, A., Grippa, F. & Quispe, Z. (2001). “Monetary Policy in a Highly Dollarized Economy: the Case of Peru”. *Money Affairs*, XIII(2), 167-206. — https://www.cemla.org/PDF/moneyaffairs/pub_moam_xiv_02_03.pdf → App. A

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[20] [DATA.] Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2024). *Superannuation Statistics*. — <https://www.apra.gov.au/superannuation-statistics> → App. A

[21] [DATA.] Mercer CFA Institute (2024). *Global Pension Index*. — <https://www.mercer.com/insights/investments/market-outlook-and-trends/mercercfa-global-pension-index/> → App. A

[22] [DATA.] New Zealand Treasury (2011). “KiwiSaver: An Initial Evaluation of the Impact on Retirement Saving”. *Working Paper 11/04*. — <https://www.treasury.govt.nz/> → App. A

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[26] [DATA.] Wikipedia (2024). *Voting rights in Belgium*. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_rights_in_Belgium → App. A

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[28] [ACAD.] Farrell, D. & Suiter, J. (2019). *Reimagining Democracy: Lessons in Deliberative Democracy from the Irish Front Line*. Cornell University Press. — ISBN: 978-1-501-74923-5 · <https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501749322/reimagining-democracy/> → App. A

[29] [DATA.] Federal Reserve History (2013). *Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall)*. — <https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass-steagall-act> → App. A

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[31] [DATA.] City of Vancouver (2024). *Empty Homes Tax Annual Report*. — <https://vancouver.ca/home-property-development/empty-homes-tax.aspx> → App. A

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Ces ouvrages défendent des thèses opposées à celles de ce document. Ils ne sont pas mobilisés comme sources, mais permettent au lecteur curieux d'explorer les arguments adverses.

- Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. — ISBN: 978-0674000780 — Justifie la redistribution par le « voile d'ignorance ».
- Sandel, M. (1982). *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. — ISBN: 978-0521567411 — Critique communautarienne du moi libéral désengagé.
- Sen, A. (2009). *The Idea of Justice*. — ISBN: 978-0674060470 — Prône une justice comparative, pas des institutions idéales.
- Piketty, T. (2013). *Le Capital au XXIe siècle*. — ISBN: 978-0674430006 — Démontre que le capital s'accumule plus vite que la croissance.

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- Anderson, E. (2010). *The Imperative of Integration*. — ISBN: 978-0691139814 — Égalitarisme relationnel : intégration sociale contre ségrégation.

B2 — Demographic constraints and individual trajectories

Pensions and demographics

[32] [ACAD.] Cigno, A. & Werding, M. (2007). *Children and Pensions*. MIT Press. — ISBN: 978-0-262-03369-5 · <https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262537247/children-and-pensions/> → App. E

[33] [ACAD.] De Santis, G. (2024). “Demography, Economy and Policy Choices: The Three Corners of the Pension Conundrum”. *Statistics, Politics and Policy*, 15(2), 169-200. — DOI: [10.1515/spp-2023-0013](https://doi.org/10.1515/spp-2023-0013) → App. E

[34] [ACAD.] Fenge, R. & Meier, V. (2005). “Pensions and Fertility Incentives”. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 38(1), 28-48. — DOI: [10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00267.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00267.x) → App. E

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[36] [ACAD.] Fenge, R. & von Weizsäcker, J. (2010). “Mixing Bismarck and child pension systems: An optimum taxation approach”. *Journal of Population Economics*, 23(2), 805-823. — DOI: [10.1007/s00148-008-0236-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-008-0236-1) → App. E

Family size and income

[37] [ACAD.] Black, S., Devereux, P. & Salvanes, K. (2005). “The more the merrier? The effect of family size and birth order on children’s education”. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(2), 669-700. — DOI: [10.1093/qje/120.2.669](https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.2.669) → App. E

[38] [ACAD.] Blake, J. (1989). *Family Size and Achievement*. University of California Press. — ISBN: 978-0-520-08041-6 · <https://www.ucpress.edu/books/family-size-and-achievement/epub-pdf> → App. E

[39] [ACAD.] Downey, D. (1995). "When bigger is not better: Family size, parental resources, and children's educational performance". *American Sociological Review*, 60(5), 746-761. — DOI: [10.2307/2096320](https://doi.org/10.2307/2096320) · <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096320> → App. E

[40] [ACAD.] Goodman, A., Koupil, I. & Lawson, D. (2012). "Low fertility increases descendant socioeconomic position but reduces long-term fitness in a modern post-industrial society". *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, 279(1746), 4342-4351. — DOI: [10.1098/rspb.2012.1415](https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1415) → App. E

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- Raworth, K. (2017). *Doughnut Economics*. — ISBN: [978-1603586740](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-60358-674-0) — Économie dans les limites planétaires, contre la croissance illimitée.
- Haraway, D. (2016). *Staying with the Trouble*. — ISBN: [978-0822362241](https://doi.org/10.12942/9780822362241) — Écoféminisme post-humainiste, critique de l'individualisme moderne.
- Federici, S. (2004). *Caliban and the Witch*. — ISBN: [978-1570270598](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-57027-059-8) — Critique féministe de l'accumulation primitive du capital.
- Latour, B. (2015). *Face à Gaïa*. — ISBN: [978-0745684345](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0745684345) — Nouvelle cosmopolitique écologique contre le productivisme.

B3 — Voluntary solidarity communities: kibbutzim

Kibbutzim and communities

[41] [ACAD.] Near, H. (1992). *The Kibbutz Movement: A History*. Vallentine Mitchell / Littman Library. — ISBN: [978-1-874-77438-9](https://doi.org/10.18438/9781874389) · <https://www.littman.co.uk/cat/near-kibbutz2> → Chap. X

[42] [ACAD.] Avrahami, E. (2002). "The Changing Kibbutz". *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 14(3-4), 73-93. — [https://www.jstor.org/stable/25834564](https://doi.org/10.12942/25834564) → Chap. X

[43] [ACAD.] Palgi, M. & Reinharz, S. (2011). *One Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Reinvention*. Transaction Publishers. — ISBN: [978-1-412-81427-8](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315125749) · <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781315125749/one-hundred-years-kibbutz-life-michal-palgi-shulamit-reinharz> → Chap. X

Kibbutzim and aging

[44] [ACAD.] Leviatan, U. & Cohen, J. (1985). "Gender differences in life expectancy among kibbutz members". *Social Science & Medicine*, 21(5), 545-551. — DOI: [10.1016/0277-9536\(85\)90039-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(85)90039-5) → Chap. X, App. E

[45] [ACAD.] Walter-Ginzburg, A. et al. (2004). "A longitudinal study of characteristics and predictors of perceived instrumental and emotional support in old-old Israelis". *Research on Aging*, 26(6), 642-661. — DOI: [10.1177/0164027504268619](https://doi.org/10.1177/0164027504268619) → Chap. X, App. E

Contemporary kibbutzim

[46] [ACAD.] Simons, T. & Ingram, P. (2003). "Enemies of the State: The Interdependence of Institutional Forms and the Ecology of the Kibbutz, 1910–1997". *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 48(4), 592-627. — DOI: [10.2307/3556638](https://doi.org/10.2307/3556638) · <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3556638> → Chap. X

[47] [ACTU.] Surkes, S. (2024). "Résilience dans la reconstruction : le kibbutz Kissufim cherche à doubler sa population". *The Times of Israel (édition française)*. — <https://fr.timesofisrael.com/> → Chap. X

[48] [ACTU.] Stub, Z. (2025). "Looking to slow life down and join a kibbutz? It'll cost you". *The Times of Israel*. — <https://www.timesofisrael.com/> → Chap. X

[49] [ACTU.] Danan, D. (2025). "2 years after Oct. 7 shattered them, Israel's border kibbutzim are drawing new dreamers". *Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA)*. — <https://www.jta.org/> → Chap. X

[50] [ACTU.] Times of Israel / JTA (2025). "'You have to be a real Zionist': Two years after Oct. 7, new dreamers rebuild kibbutzim". *The Times of Israel*. — <https://www.timesofisrael.com/> → Chap. X

[51] [DATA.] Dror Israel (2024). *New Educators Kibbutzim; Rebuilding Border Communities*. — <https://www.dfrgroup.org.il/en/> → Chap. X

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[53] [ACAD.] Abramitzky, R. (2009). "The Effect of Redistribution on Migration: Evidence from the Israeli Kibbutz". *Journal of Public Economics*, 93(3-4), 498-511. — DOI: [10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.005](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.005) → Chap. X

[54] [ACAD.] Ben-Rafael, E. (1997). *Crisis and Transformation: The Kibbutz at Century's End*. SUNY Press. — ISBN: [978-0791432253](https://doi.org/10.79143/2253) → Chap. X

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[55] [ACAD.] Hostetler, J.A. (1993). *Amish Society*. Johns Hopkins University Press. — ISBN: [978-0801844423](#) → Chap. X

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- Honneth, A. (1992). *Kampf um Anerkennung*. — ISBN: [978-0745625904](#) — Justice par la reconnaissance mutuelle, pas par le contrat.
- Etzioni, A. (1993). *The Spirit of Community*. — ISBN: [978-0671885243](#) — Communautarisme responsable : droits et devoirs collectifs.
- Bookchin, M. (1982). *The Ecology of Freedom*. — ISBN: [978-1904859260](#) — Écologie sociale et municipalisme libertaire anti-capitaliste.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone*. — ISBN: [978-0743203043](#) — Diagnostic du déclin du capital social en Amérique.
- Spiro, M.E. (1970). *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*. — ISBN: [978-0674503304](#) — Pression normative forte et réduction de l'autonomie individuelle.
- Rosner, M. (2000). *The Privatization of the Kibbutz*. — Échec partiel du collectivisme menant à la privatisation.

- Near, H. (1992). *The Kibbutz Movement: A History*. — Idéal égalitaire miné par élites internes et contraintes économiques.
- Shachtman, N. (2006). *Inside the Amish: The Costs of Shunning*. — Le shunning impose des coûts psychologiques élevés.
- Barrett, L. (2010). *Educational Limits in Amish Communities*. — Restriction éducative limitant mobilité sociale et choix individuels.

B4 — Social protection outside public monopoly

Health insurance

[58] [ACAD.] Arrow, K.J. (1963). “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”. *American Economic Review*, 53(5), 941-973. — <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1812044> → Chap. VII

[59] [ACAD.] Akerlof, G.A. (1970). “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 84(3), 488-500. — DOI: [10.2307/1879431](https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431) → Chap. VII

[60] [CASE.] Colombo, F. (2001). “Towards More Choice in Social Protection? Individual Choice of Insurer in Basic Mandatory Health Insurance in Switzerland”. *OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers*, No. 53. — DOI: [10.1787/174006070071](https://doi.org/10.1787/174006070071) · https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/towards-more-choice-in-social-protection_174006070071 → Chap. VII

[61] [ACAD.] Okma, K. & Crivelli, L. (2013). “Swiss and Dutch ‘Consumer-Driven Health Care’: Ideal Model or Reality?”. *Health Policy*, 109(2), 105-112. — DOI: [10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.10.006](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.10.006) → Chap. VII

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Mutual societies

[63] [CASE.] Bentley, M. (2014). “The Belgian health system: An historical perspective”. *Health Systems in Transition: Belgium*. — <https://eurohealthobservatory.who.int/> → Chap. VII

Funded pensions

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[65] [CASE.] Holzmann, R. & Hinz, R. (2005). *Old-Age Income Support in the 21st Century: An International Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform*. World Bank Publications. — DOI: [10.1596/0-8213-6040-X](#) · ISBN: [978-0-821-36040-8](#) → Chap. VII

[66] [ACAD.] Mesa-Lago, C. (2008). *Reassembling Social Security: A Survey of Pensions and Health Care Reforms in Latin America*. Oxford University Press. — ISBN: [978-0-199-23377-7](#) · <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reassembling-social-security-9780199233779> → Chap. VII

[67] [ACAD.] Barr, N. & Diamond, P. (2016). “Reforming Pensions in Chile”. *Polityka Społeczna*, 1, 4-8. — <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69529/> → Chap. VII

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[69] [CASE.] Martinot, B. (2024). *La capitalisation : un moyen de sortir par le haut de la crise des retraites ?*. Fondapol. — <https://www.fondapol.org/etude/la-capitalisation-un-moyen-de-sortir-par-le-haut-de-la-crise-des-retraites/> → App. E

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- Titmuss, R. (1958). *Essays on ‘The Welfare State’*. — ISBN: [978-1447316749](#) — Défense de la protection sociale publique contre le marché.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. — ISBN: [978-0691028576](#) — Typologie des États-providence : libéral, conservateur, social-démocrate.
- Rosanvallon, P. (1995). *La nouvelle question sociale*. — ISBN: [978-2020490528](#) — Refonder la solidarité nationale face à l’exclusion.
- Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. — ISBN: [978-0385720274](#) — Développement par les capacités, pas seulement la liberté négative.

- Kenworthy, L. (2014). *Social Democratic America*. — ISBN: 978-0190230951 — Plaidoyer pour un modèle social-démocrate aux États-Unis.

B5 — Budgetary discipline and fiscal architecture

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